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Innovation is one of the key determinants of competitive capacity, as either making or 
suppressing innovation can be effective tools for competing. In addition, innovations 
have improving characteristics for the advancement of consumer welfare and the 
economy. Therefore, companies want their contributions to existing technologies to be 
considered when they are accused of abusing their dominant positions because, in 
practice, competition conditions are evolving from price-centric to innovation-centric, 
particularly in technology markets, where almost all companies allocate considerable 
budgets to research and development (R&D) activities. Hence, the competition starts 
before the product is even released onto the market in the current economic climate, 
which requires these companies to innovate constantly. It is therefore likely that non-
innovative companies will eventually leave the market, as the existence of companies 
is directly proportional related to their innovativeness. However, instead of being 
innovative, businesses can maintain their market share, and even increase it, by 
suppressing innovation. This can be done in many different ways, but this study 
examines specific types of innovation suppression practices, namely the non-use of 
patents, pay-for-delay agreements, standard-setting, spare parts design protection, 
evergreening patents and exclusionary product design (planned obsolescence), as 
these issues have not received adequate attention in terms of EU competition law 
despite their particular importance to the functioning of competitive markets. This 
thesis, accordingly, debates whether the suppression of innovation is anti-competitive 
as a form of abusing the dominant position and therefore contrary to Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), since it leads to less choice 
for consumers and more market barriers for rivals. In particular, the thesis examines 
the grey area of the relationship between law and innovation over selected issues by 
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testing Article 102 TFEU, the scope of application of which has been broadened by 
the AstraZeneca case, which tilted practice towards an entirely fresh approach. 
Pursuant to this case, whenever a practice causes anti-competitive effects on the 
market, Article 102 TFEU would be applicable, which provides an open interpretation. 
This study consequently demonstrates the negative impacts of innovation suppression 
practices on the market, as well as their anti-competitive features, in order to show the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Innovations in proprietary technologies, in particular, have become one of the most 
important economic constituents. Previous research has illustrated the close 
relationship between innovations and economic growth,1 and has suggested a 
constant promotion of the innovation process. Prominent economic scholars like 
Marshall, Arrow and Porter have explored the awareness of this close relationship in 
variety of contexts.2 It was found that, since the economy is driven by innovations, an 
economic downturn would likely become unavoidable if innovations were interrupted. 
Therefore, due to innovations’ enormous significance, several countries have 
announced relevant legislative efforts relating to the regulation of innovation.3  
 
 
1 Dirk Pilat, ‘Innovation in the New Economy’ (2002) 3(1) Canadian Journal of Policy Research 55; Rana 
Maradana and others, ‘Does Innovation promote economic growth?’ Evidence from European countries 
(2017) 6(1) Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 1-23; Andrea Pece, Olivera Simona and Florina 
Salisteanu, ‘Innovation and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis for CEE Countries’ 2015 26 
Procedia Economics and Finance 461-467. 
2 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (Palgrave Classics 2013) 183-200; Kenneth Arrow, 
‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention’ in Richard Nelson (ed), The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press 1962) 609-626; 
Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Palgrave Macmillan 1998). 
3 There are many pioneer countries in the regulation of innovation, such as Canada, the EU, France, 
the US, and the UK. For instance, Argentina has shown an increased awareness of the significance of 
innovation in economic growth with its Entrepreneurs’ Law and Knowledge Economy Law. Canada has 
special tax policies on innovative activities to boost innovation. The EU supports innovations through 
several financial instruments like Horizon 2020, the European Fund for Strategic Investment, and 
Venture EU. France declared making an investment in artificial intelligence as a national policy priority 
between 2018-2022. As to the UK, the establishment of United Kingdom Research and Innovation as 
a nongovernmental organisation would be regarded as a milestone. Also, the UK has Innovate UK 
organisation as part of a unified identity for UK Research and Innovation to contribute the progress of 
innovation to improve R&D systems for prosperity and public good. Last but not least, effective 
measures taken by the US to promote technology transfer and introduce robust intellectual property 
protections can be considered as effective steps towards promoting innovation. For further reading see, 
Global Trade and Innovation Policy Alliance, ‘National Innovation Policies: What countries do best and 
how they can improve’ (Report, June 2019) <http://www2.itif.org/2019-national-innovation-policies.pdf> 
accessed 30 September 2020. 
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Innovation as a tool of entrepreneurship4 consists of new technologies and business 
models that can provide a competitive advantage.5 Businesses accommodating an 
innovative organisational culture, such as Apple Inc., Samsung Electronics, Foxconn, 
Alphabet Inc., Microsoft, and Tesla, have markedly come to the fore in world trade, 
underscoring that innovation is a global key to success, despite market uncertainty 
and a decreasing product life curve. Yet, innovation remains a crucial factor for 
accessing new markets, increasing market share, and gaining competitive power. In 
this context, technology companies cannot be expected to act responsibly regarding 
the use of their market powers unless the legal framework for promoting innovation is 
defined. These companies can exploit their powers derived from innovations to 
increase or maintain their market shares in a wide variety of ways, including price 
gouging and a production limitation. They might, for instance, formulate a strategy that 
suppresses their innovations for the same reasons, such as exclusively offering new 
features for their latest products rather than providing compatible updates. 
Government policies have the potential to directly affect the progression of innovations 
by either suppressing or promoting them. Nevertheless, governments generally prefer 
to promote innovations in an effort to pave the way for economic growth by renouncing 
aggressive taxation systems.6 Businesses are furthermore encouraged by being 
furnished with substantial intellectual property (IP) rights to produce and implement 
their innovations.7 However, distinct motivations to suppress relevant innovations 
 
 
4 Peter Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles (Harper and Row Publishers 
1985) 19-33. 
5 Porter (n 2) 73-91. See also, Paul Trott, Innovation Management and New Product Development 
(Harlow 2008). 
6 Ufuk Akcigit and Stefanie Stantcheva, ‘Taxation and Innovation: What do we know?’ (NBER Working 
Paper 27109, May 2020) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w27109> accessed 30 September 2020. 
7 Christopher Cotropia and James Gibson, ‘The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside’ (2010) 57 
UCLA Law Review 921. 
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remain, and these can distort competition and decrease consumer welfare. Therefore, 
it is required to put forward effective legal remedies. In this matter, this thesis, 
accordingly, argues suppression of innovation as means of bestowing a privilege upon 
businesses by taking into consideration the EU’s current innovation policies in terms 
of EU competition law. 
1.1 The Rationale of the research 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate and conceptualise the suppression of 
innovation in the field of EU competition law through an examination of the abuse of 
the dominant position via limiting technical development to the prejudice of consumers. 
Throughout this research, an attempt is made to contribute to the EU competition 
policy by testing Article 102 TFEU as well as by employing the literature and best 
practices of the EU and selected Member States’ national laws, such as the pioneering 
roles played by Germany, Italy and France in this regard. This study aims to distinguish 
patterns that are likely to suppress technology for establishing a mutual relation 
between competition law and IP law by examining selected practices from an abuse 
of dominance perspective. This research also attempts to indicate whether exercises 
leading to technological development suppression are in discord with the EU’s priority 
target in competition law, which consists of protecting market competition with the aim 
of maintaining consumer welfare by paving the way for a price decrease accompanied 
by an improvement in quality and innovation. To sum up, this research aims to respond 
to the need for propounding legal issues and remedies concerning the unheeded issue 
of innovation suppression. Since this research addressed this issue in terms of EU 
competition law, the outcomes of this thesis can enhance guidance for lawmakers and 
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judicial authorities by safeguarding the protection of the market’s competitive structure 
as well as consumer welfare in the EU. 
1.2 The Scope of the Research 
This research particularly examines innovation suppression practices by evaluating 
whether they can be regarded as abuse of dominance under EU competition law. 
However, the study appropriately addresses crucial economic theories to support its 
claim, as economic facts are now considered in decision-making phase of the EC and 
the EU Courts, which have been exposed to extreme criticism because of adhering to 
the letter of the law and widely ignoring the economic analyses since the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s Intel decision; thus the EC published a 
communication to determine enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU in 
2009.8 This communication is still in date, and it leads to employing more economic 
analyses, instead of a formalistic approach, by the effects-based approach to provide 
consumer welfare.9 This also conduced towards a comprehensive economic 
investigation by considering the intention of undertakings. However, the EC has 
followed the formalistic approach by mostly ignoring the ‘as efficient competitor (AEC) 
test’ as such in Intel.10 Nevertheless, EU competition law made great strides in the 
economic interpretation of judgements as of Intel decision of the CJEU in 2017.11 As 
 
 
8 Communication from the Commission 2009/C 45/02 of 24 February 2009 Guidance on the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7 (Guidance of enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC). 
9 Moreover, the Court has recently tended to refer to 'by effects' rather than 'by object' cases in Article 
101 TFEU as seen in the GlaxoSmithKline decision. See, The Court of Justice of the European Union, 
‘The Court of Justice clarifies the criteria governing whether a settlement agreement with respect to a 
dispute between the holder of a pharmaceutical patent and a manufacturer of generic medicines is 
contrary to EU competition law’ (Press Release No 8/20, 30 January 2020) 
<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-01/cp200008en.pdf> accessed 3 
November 2020. 
10 Case COMP/37.990 Intel [2009] OJ C 227. 
11 Case C-413/14 P Intel Corp. v European Commission [2017] OJ C374/2. 
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a result of this decision, the case returned to the lower court by concluding the 
significance of the Intel’s economic arguments, which was previously rejected by the 
EC on the grounds that rebate systems, by their very nature, violates Article 102 TFEU 
and therefore, there was no need to conduct an AEC test.12 
The CJEU’s judgement was a result of a long-standing argument regarding the role of 
economic analysis in antitrust decisions. This is one of the main reasons why the 
opinion of the CJEU was somewhat delayed because Intel was fined in May 2009 due 
to the abuse of its dominance in the market for x86 central processing units for the 
period between 2002 and 2007.13 Consequently, the CJEU reframed the European 
approach and led the way to the EC for prospective cases. Accordingly, for instance, 
the EC cannot consider rebates-related issues as per se illegal unless it shows 
whether and to what extent specific rebate schemes affect competition by providing 
in-depth and case-by-case analyses. In other words, the formalistic approach lost its 
influence for latter cases where the effect-based approach was becoming a 
prerequisite for antitrust issues, particularly for merger controls and abuse of 
dominance analysis. In other words, the EC has to provide more economic evidence 
rather than solely basing upon mere presumptions to show the non-compliance of 
competition on merits by demonstrating actual and likely competitive harms. The 
CJEU, accordingly, specified a broad interpretation for the competition on the merits 
in Post Danmark I as follows “competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the 
departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient 
 
 
12 ibid, paras 975-1760. 
13 Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty and Article 54 of the Eeoj A Agreement (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel) [2009] OJ 
C227/13, para 43. 
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and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, 
price, choice, quality or innovation."14  
In sum, EU competition law has fractionally started applying contemporary economic 
principles. While form-based presumptions have been referred to make decisions 
since the late 90s,15 there is a current consensus to take a more economical approach 
in addition to existing legal presumptions when forming harm theories.16 This 
transformation in EU competition law resembles US Antitrust law, which was evolved 
under the influence of the Chicago school. However, in the context of Article 102 
TFEU, the only initiative for the transformation to these economy-based decisions was 
to prepare guidance paper where there was no alteration in the Treaty provision.17 
This caused different interpretations of Article 102 TFEU provided by the Guidance 
Paper.18  However, the development of case law has demonstrably widened the close 
interpretation of Article 102 TFEU.19 It can accordingly be argued that all conducts 
which affect the market or competitors in an anti-competitive manner would potentially 
be the subjects of competition law in terms of abuse of dominant position.20 The 
 
 
14 C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 22. 
15 Anne Witt, ‘The European Court of Justice and the More Economic Approach to EU Competition Law 
– Is the Tide Turning?’ (2019) 64(2) The Antitrust Bulletin 172-213. 
16 Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law: The European School. 
(Wolters Kluwer 2016) 378; Lucas Peeperkorn, ‘Conditional Pricing: Why the General Court is wrong in 
Intel and What the Court of Justice Can Do to Rebalance the Assessment of Rebates’, (Concurrences, 
2015) <https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2015/articles/Conditional-pricing-Why-
the-70835> accessed 4 November 2020. 
17 Guidance of enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC (n 8). 
18 Ekaterina Rousseva and Mel Marquis, ‘Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing 
Exclusionary Conduct Under Article 102 TFEU’ (2013) 4(1) Journal of European Competition Law and 
Practice 32. 
19 Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Hart Publishing 2007) 
209. 
20 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles 
of Article 102 (OUP 2011). 
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AstraZeneca case21 would be regarded as one of the most significant milestones for 
the extension of Article 102 TFEU regarding the abuse of a dominant position. 
According to this case, the existence of any anti-competitive practices, which would 
likely affect competition in the market, will be sufficient to conduct a competition law 
investigation. This makes inroads into intervening in such cases. The following 
paragraph of the Commission decision lends countenance to the open nature of Article 
102: 
“The fact that other laws and remedies prohibit misleading representations or 
provide for remedies against them is irrelevant where the objective of 
competition enforcement is not to penalise such misconduct per se, but rather 
to prevent the anti-competitive effects of such misconduct in the marketplace. 
Such anti-competitive effects must fall within the scope of competition law, and 
the fact that otherwise prohibited means may have been used to achieve them 
cannot be decisive for the application of competition law.”22  
In contradistinction to the previously common practice, the AstraZeneca case tilted 
practice towards an entirely fresh approach. Every conduct, which causes or is likely 
to cause anti-competitive effects, will require the application of EU competition law. In 
other words, competition law is liable for protecting the market by averting every single 
misconduct’s anti-competitive impacts independent of other branches of law’s 
enforcements.23 The legal precedent after this case illustrates that the application of 
 
 
21 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission [2010] 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:266; see also the appealed case before the Court of Justice, Case C-457/10 P 
AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:770. 
22 Commission Decision 2006/857/EC of 15 June 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3 – Astra Zeneca) [2006] OJ 
L332/24, para 744. 
23 Jurgita Malinauskaite and Fatih Bugra Erdem, Planned obsolescence in the context of a holistic legal 
sphere and the circular economy’ (2021) gqaa061 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; See also, Richard 
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Article 102 TFEU has broad and extendable characteristics, which would likely enable 
to consider the technological development suppression in this context. 
As this thesis examines the suppression of innovation under Article 102 TFEU, the 
applicability of this law should primarily be confirmed by showing its scope and 
limitations. In respect to this, the debate about the boundaries of Article 102 TFEU has 
gained great prominence with the Hoffmann La Roche24 regarding if and to what extent 
interpretation of this clause might be expanded. In this decision, it was concluded that 
the discounts given on the condition that the consumer purchases all or nearly all of 
the demand from the dominant undertaking, is inherently anti-competitive on the 
grounds that the exclusivity prevents the competitors’ access to the consumer. While 
case law has been settled by staying loyal to four subclauses of Article 102 TFEU,25 
the turning point of the extension has been materialised by the following definition of 
the abuse of dominant market position made: 
“The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a 
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the 
 
 
Posner, Antitrust Law (The University of Chicago Press 2001) 33-51; Massimo Motta, Competition 
Policy Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2004) 411; See also, Douglas Melamed, 
‘Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct – Are There Unifying Principles?’ 
(2006) 73 Antitrust Law Journal 375. 
24 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 
1979-00461. 
25 Article 102 TFEU: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far 
as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.” 
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degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the 
growth of that competition.”26 
The first notable discussions and analyses of determining the interpretation limits of 
abuse of dominance emerged after this definition, which presented a large spectrum 
for both case law and doctrine. Although several activities such as predatory pricing, 
tied selling and refusal to deal have been regarded as typical types of abusing 
dominant positions, there is an expanding grey area regarding atypical cases. Goyder 
interpreted the difficulty of classifying other forms of abusive conduct because of the 
‘sliding scale’ approach to dominance.27 This is why almost all prominent scholars are 
in need of mentioning other possible types of abusing dominant position under 
different titles such as ‘miscellaneous other non-pricing abuses’28 and ‘other 
exclusionary practices’.29 
Two types of abuse of dominant positions are generally identified, namely exploitative 
and exclusionary abuses.30 Exclusionary abuse is the disqualification of other 
competitors by weakening or eliminating competition by a dominant undertaking 
through several behaviours such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling.  Exploitative 
abuse, on the other hand, means forcing customers or suppliers to purchase under 
 
 
26 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 24) para 91. 
27 Joanna Goyder and Albertina Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law (OUP 2009) 311-312. 
28 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (OUP 2018) 728-732. 
29 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases & Materials (OUP 2016) 540-558. 
30 The Commission and the literature are mostly examined abuse of dominance under these headings 
although the existence of another perspectives. For example, some scholars regarded reprisals as 
another type. For instance, discriminatory abuse might also be considered as another type. See, Robert 
O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Publishing 2006). 
10 
 
unfair terms, such as imposing them excessive prices.31 So, the main difference 
between these types is their direct targets, where exclusionary abuse harms 
competitors, and exploitative abuse harms customers. However, it would not be wrong 
to say that the EC has not made a considerable number of decisions regarding atypical 
abuse of dominance types when compared to typical types of abuses until the last 
decades. Some of these divergent types could be exemplified as filing vexatious suit 
against competitors,32 using product design changes against competitors,33 
administering bribe to exclude rival commodities from the market,34 persuading 
competitors to prevent their entries into the market35 or acting deceitfully in the process 
of setting industrial standards.36 These examples show that the EC is not bounded by 
the typical types of dominance and consequently, this gives free rein to identify 
innovation suppression as anti-competitive behaviour under both abuse of dominance 
types, namely exploitative and exclusionary.  
As a final remark, it should be noted that obtaining a great level of innovation is 
important for EU competition law but innovation comes with massive destructions, 
even though it seems as a constructive process. This demolition is mostly accepted 
essential for economic progress, particularly for the survival of capitalism. Lefebvre 
built his critical theory on the exigency of destruction to explain how capitalism survives 
by describing that the city has been repeatedly demolished and rebuilt to ensure more 
effective production and consumption chain with the following words: “The relations of 
 
 
31 Guidance of enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC (n 8), paras 32, 47, 48. 
32 Commission Decision 87/500/EEC BBI/Booesey & Hawkes [1987] OJ L 286. 
33 Commission Decision 89/113/EEC Decca Navigator Systems [1989]  OJ L 43. 
34 Case C-497/99 P Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR 2001 I-
05333. 
35 Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and others v Commission 
of the European Communities [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:245. 
36 Case COMP/38.636 Rambus [2009] OJ C 30. 
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production characteristic of capitalist society require […to…] be reproduced. A society 
is a production and reproduction of social relations, not simply a production of 
things.”37 Therefore, in the pages that follow, it will be argued that the rapid pace of 
innovation significantly shortens products’ lifespans and requires manufacturers to 
implement successful innovations continuously as the necessity to compete in 
innovative-driven markets. Nevertheless, some dominant undertakings may suppress 
innovations rather than making innovations. Since suppressing innovations both harm 
consumer welfare and rival undertakings, these practices should be identified and 
prevented by legal authorities. This study limits itself to examine the suppression of 
innovation in EU competition law context by particularly addressing Article 102 TFEU. 
1.3 Research questions 
In an effort to examine whether certain circumstances may be regarded as an abuse 
of a dominant position, this thesis debates the suppression of innovation in terms of 
EU competition law. This research also analyses situations in which manufacturers 
establish unjust advantages over their competitors and consumers by resisting the 
spread of innovation. The central question of this research and its sub-questions can 
be specified as follows: 
• To what extent can innovation suppression strategies be regarded as a violation 
of EU competition law in terms of Article 102 TFEU? 
o How do the consequences of innovation suppression strategies 
influence consumers and undertakings? 
 
 
37 Henri Lefebvre, The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production (St. Martin’s 
Press 1976) 96; David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’ (2008) 53 New Left Review 23. 
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o To what extent do selected issues such as planned obsolescence, 
protection of spare part designs and evergreen patents lead to the 
suppression of innovation? 
The main research question is expected to offer a different perspective on the long-
standing discussion concerning the role of innovation in EU competition law. The 
current practice of case law still depends only on price-based justifications. However, 
in responding to the main research question, the study will demonstrate why EU 
competition law should independently consider innovation-based justifications. In 
doing so, the sub-questions will establish a frame for the anti-competitiveness of 
innovation suppression practices in two steps: in the first step, influences of the 
suppression of innovation on consumers and competitors are illustrated; and, the 
second sub-question is address to establish support for the argument that suppression 
of innovation is anti-competitive and should be treated by Article 102 TFEU. 
1.4 Literature Review 
The suppression of innovation is a relatively novel issue for scholarly enquiry in EU 
competition law. It concerns late-coming or never-appeared inventions where 
inventors deliberately decide not to use them because of anti-competitive and strategic 
concerns.38 While novel in EU law, US Antitrust law has already tackled the problem.39 
 
 
38 Kurt Saunders and Linda Levine, ‘Better, Faster, Cheaper – Later: What happens when technologies 
are suppressed?’ (2004) 11 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 25; Neil Tyler, 
‘Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression: The Use of Compulsory Licensing to Promote Progress’ 
(2014) 162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 458. 
39 George Frost, ‘Legal incidents of non-use of patented inventions reconsidered’ (1946) 14 The George 
Washington Law Review 273; Larry Karp and Jeffrey Perloff, ‘The optimal suppression of a low-cost 
technology by a Durable-Good monopoly’ (1966) 27 The Rand Journal of Economics 346; Bruce 
Kaufman and others, ‘Suppressing technology: The automobile air pollution case’ (1970) 3 Antitrust 
Law and Economics Review 111; Gerald Sobel, ‘The antitrust interface with patents and innovation: 
Acquisition of patents, improvement patents and grant-backs, non-use, fraud on the patent office, 
development of new products and joint research’ (1984) 53 Antitrust Law Journal 681-682; Richard 
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For instance, Saunders noted that the practice of patent non-use is contrary to the 
public interest because shelving innovations means restricting them to public use, and 
this means controlling competition in an unfair way.40 Cohen and Burke, on the other 
hand, stated that certain limits should be imposed on innovation suppression since 
technological innovation is currently one of the most significant elements of the 
economy. They consequently claimed the necessity to place a reasonable antitrust 
burden on inventors for encouraging innovators to be more innovative.41 Therefore, 
appropriately, both IP law and competition law came to fore concerning this niche 
problem of innovation suppression.  For instance, according to Chin, although the 
patent holder has the right to shelve the product or withdraw it from the marketplace, 
antitrust intervention would become necessary if this right turns into significant market 
power.42 To sum up, the issue of innovation suppression is now as fresh as ever, 
regardless of whether it has been previously examined in US antitrust literature 
 
 
Dunford, ‘The suppression of technology as a strategy for controlling resource dependence’ (1987) 32 
Administrative Science Quarterly 512-513; Yee Chin, ‘Unilateral Technology Suppression: Appropriate 
Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies’ (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 441-453; Joel Cohen and Arthur 
Burke, ‘An overview of the antitrust analysis of suppression of technology’ (1998) 66 Antitrust Law 
Journal 421-439; Eugene Crew, ‘Foreword’ (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 415-419; Maurits Dolmans, 
‘Restrictions on innovation: An EU Antitrust approach’ (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 455-485; John 
Flynn, ‘Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology’ (1998) 66 Antitrust 
Law 487-525; Jack Kaufmann, ‘Afterword’ (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 527-530; Saunders and 
Levine (n 38) 25-68; Daniel Spulber, ‘Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation’ (2008) 4(4) 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 915-966; Mariateresa Maggiolino, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: A comparative economic analysis of US and EU Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 85-88. 
40 Kurt Saunders, ‘Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology 
Innovation’ (2002) 15(2) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 390-452. 
41 Cohen and Burke (n 39) 439. 
42 Chin (n 39) 441-453; In this regard, it is useful to mention the prospect theory of patents proposed by 
Kitch, which mainly remarks on the social benefit of patents for the efficient coordination of technological 
development.42 Therefore, suppression of innovation by patents is contrary to the purpose of granting 
these IP rights and it can be regarded in contrast with IP law. See, Edmund Kitch, ‘The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265-290. 
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hitherto.43 In terms of EU law, there is a lack of literature, and consequently, there is 
an urgent need to initiate a discussion on innovation suppression.  
The suppression of innovation issue was properly addressed from US antitrust law 
scholars in two times. In 1998, the 66th issue of Antitrust Law Journal was dedicated 
to this specific issue. However, the later article of ‘Better, Faster, Cheaper – Later: 
What Happens When Technologies Are Suppressed’ by Saunders and Levine is 
addressed as the most relevant reference during this research since it clearly 
examines innovation suppression practices and relevant patterns with the legal and 
policy implications. Despite the fact that this article was published in 2004, it provides 
a clear understanding in the lens of US antitrust law by offering an insight into following 
literature.44 In contrast, so far, there is no specific research in this regard in the context 
of EU competition law even though there are recent studies to establish a connection 
between innovation and competition. For example, the role of innovation activities in 
EU competition law analyses is argued by Robertson,45 Glader,46 Schmidt,47 
 
 
43 Steven Anderman and John Kallaugher, Technology Transfer and the New EU Competition Rules: 
Intellectual Property Licencing after Modernisation (OUP 2006); Hanna Stakheyeva, ‘Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law: Understanding the Interplay’ in Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas Devaiah 
and Indranath Gupta (eds), Multi-dimesional Approaches Towards New Technology: Insights on 
Innovation, Patents and Competition (Springer 2018) 3-19; Whish and Bailey (n 28) 787-788; Ioannis 
Lianos, Valentine Korah and Paolo Siciliani, Competition Law: Analysis, Cases, and Materials (OUP 
2019) 97-98; Alison Jones and Renato Nazzini, ‘The effect of competition law on patent remedies’ in 
Bradford Biddle and others (eds), Patent Remedies and Complex Products: Toward a Global 
Consensus (Cambridge University Press 2019) 202-238. 
44 Neil Tyler, ‘Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression: The Use of Compulsory Licensing to 
Promote Progress’ (2014) 162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 451-75; Kurt Saunders, 
Intellectual Property Law: Legal Aspects of Innovation and Competition (West Academic 2016). 
45 Viktoria Robertson, Competition Law’s Innovation Factor: The Relevant Market in Dynamic Context 
in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2020). 
46 Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law and US Antitrust 
Law (Edward Elgar 2006). 
47 Hedvig Schmidt, Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust: An Analysis of Tying and Technological 
Integration (Edward Elgar 2009). 
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Colomo,48 Ezrachi and Stucke.49 However, the relationship between innovation 
suppression and EU competition law has not been properly addressed yet. Therefore, 
in order to link the suppression of innovation and Article 102 TFEU, this study makes 
reference to more general pieces of works from Akman,50 Padilla and O’Donoghue for 
the presentation of the general concept of an abuse.51 In addition, other competition 
law scholars writing on digital economy such as Kerber, Robertson, Botta and 
Wiedemann are also addressed by taking references from their instrumental 
approaches to understand the role innovation in antitrust analyses.52 
Indecisive approaches concerning the suppression of innovation are rooted in two 
conflicts. Firstly, the complex structure of the patent, which determines to what extent 
the technology is private property rather than publicly granted assets. Secondly, the 
incompatibility between competition law and intellectual property law in regards to the 
trade-off of boosting innovation and protecting the market competition.53 Scherer 
states that the objectives of granting patents are to promote, support and 
commercialise inventions by motivating inventors to uncover their hidden creations.54 
 
 
48 Pablo Colomo, ‘Restrictions on Innovation in EU competition law’ (2016) 41(2) European Law Review 
202. 
49 Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-
Driven Economy (Harvard University Press 2016); Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, Competition 
Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants 
(HarperCollins 2020). 
50 Pınar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
51 Padilla and O’Donoghue (n 30). 
52 To exemplify what these contemporary discussions, see, for example, Wolfang Kerber, ‘Data Sharing 
in IoT Ecosystems and Competition Law: The Example of Connected Cars’ (2019) 15(4) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 381-426; Viktoria Robertson, ‘Antitrust Law and Digital Markets: A 
Guide to the European Competition Law Experience in the Digital Economy’ (2020) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3631002> accessed 4 November 2020; Marco Botta and Klaus 
Wiedemann, ‘The Interaction of EU Competition, Consumer, and Data Protection Law in the Digital 
Economy: The Regulatory Dilemma in the Facebook Odyssey’ (2019) 64(3) The Antitrust Bulletin 428-
446. 
53 Saunders and Levine (n 38) 38. 




Hence, patents are meant to promote innovation. However, they can also provide a 
monopoly power, which allows the patent holder to use the right sometimes granted 
to ill effect, against the competitive market structure. 
Concerning the first conflict, having technological innovation provides precedence to 
its owner because technological innovations create market entry barriers through 
either patent rights or the high regular R&D costs. This requires an investigation of the 
links between the development of technology and competition rules. When the 
suppression of technical development is considered under Article 102 TFEU, 
businesses having intellectual property rights cannot refuse to grant licences to their 
competitors as long as they set out a technical development rather than just copying 
the licence.55 The EC made several decisions in this line to create a free environment 
for developing innovations,56 which may provide insight to what extent courts should 
treat patents as private properties. 
As to the second conflict, it is commonly held in the literature to approve the efficacy 
of applying both competition law and intellectual property law beforehand rather than 
bestowing a privilege on one of them.57 On the other hand, classical economists claim 
 
 
55 David Howarth and Kathryn McMahon, ‘Windows has performed an Illegal Operation: The Court of 
First Instance's Judgment in Microsoft v Commission’ (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 
117. 
56 Maurits Dolmans, Paul-John Loewenthal and Robert O’Donoghue, ‘Are Article 82 EC and Intellectual 
Property Interoperable? The State of the Law Pending the Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission’ (2007) 
3 Competition Policy International 133. 
57 The CJEU particularly stated the necessity of applying competition law and IP law together in the 
Huawei case in order to embrace the complementary nature of these disciplines. See, Andreas 
Heinemann, ‘Standard essential patents in standard setting organizations: Competition law and the 
realisation of licencing commitments’ (2015) 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 952. 
In addition to that, it is assumed that both systems generally have positive competitive effects on 
competition policy. See, Steven Anderman, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 6. See also, Chris Fonteijn, Ilan Akker and Wolf Sauter, ‘Reconciling 
Competition and IP Law: The Case of Patented Pharmaceuticals and Dominance Abuse’ in Gabriella 
Muscolo and Marina Tavassi (eds), The Interplay Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
(Wolters Kluwer 2019). 
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the ineffectiveness of granting intellectual property rights and consequently, they 
assent that effective competition in the free market without state intervention is the 
best scenario to maximise the welfare level of society.58 However, in this case, market 
failures would probably be unavoidable because of its negative externality (the cost 
reflected third parties as a result of an economic transaction), which enables the 
deceleration of technological progress. Therefore, concurrently, there is a necessity to 
judicially assure inventors for the sake of technological development by intellectual 
property rights that would assumably contradict with competition rules.59 The lack of a 
statutory guarantee would disrupt the economy in general because the current 
economic system, so-called capitalism, is based on introducing new needs with the 
help of innovations. Thus, the best option to maximise the level of welfare for society 
is unlikely to come to fruition in real life. Therefore, the most reasonable approach may 
be achieved by applying the second-best option, which is implementing competition 
policies to minimize market failures to provide a more sustainable economy and 
environment.60 Hence, one may strongly argue that state intervention (both granting 
IP rights and limiting anti-competitive conduct) has to set out principles the functioning 
of the market. This is the thorny dilemma of competition law: setting limits to the free 
market for protecting the free market itself.61  
 
 
58 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Methuen, Volume I, 
1922) 58-59. 
59 Edwin Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (1989) 18(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 31-53; 
Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP 2009) 4-
13. 
60 Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, ‘The General Theory of Second Best’ (1956-1957) 24 The 
Review of Economic Studies 11-32; Erdal Türkkan, ‘What kind of vision for Competition?’ in Turkish 
Competition Authority, A Dictionary of Competition Terms (Turkish Competition Authority 2010) 53. 
61 Kelvin Jones, Law and Economy: The Legal Regulation of Corporate Capital (Academic Press 1982) 




Lawmakers shall pay scrupulous attention to economic and social flourishing, which 
necessitates providing innovative progression and economic growth. From the 
innovation point of view, innovation has an irrefragable impact on the economy and 
also, consumer welfare. So, it needs to be promoted by law where competition law 
and IP law particularly devote close attention to ensure continuity of innovation. 
However, there are still some practices, which require to be banned, to prevent 
innovative progress. Thus, this study aims to explore the prevention of the well-hidden 
suppression of innovation practices, such as planned obsolescence and evergreening 
patent issues that would likely harm the market and consequently the consumer 
welfare under Article 102 TFEU. 
In the absence of the free market, it is likely to encounter stagnation in innovation, 
which will induce economic problems such as those that occurred in socialist 
economies where mediocre products and services seemed to be useful.62 From this 
point of view, a free market seems more than vital to boost innovation and economic 
sustainability. However, there is an on-going discussion regarding the incentives of 
businesses, namely, whether monopolistic or competitive markets foster more 
innovation. Whilst some scholars assert that the competitive market is the engine of 
innovations,63 others argue that major innovations need large investments, which only 
monopolies can afford.64 This argument goes by the names of Schumpeter65 or Arrow, 
 
 
62 William Baumol, The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism 
(Princeton University Press 2002). 
63 Thomas Holmes, David Levine and James Schmitz, ‘Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When 
Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions’ (2012) 4(3) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1-
33. 
64 Yongmin Chen and Marius Schwartz, ‘Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition’ 
(2013) 22(3) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 513-528. 
65 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge 2003) 102. 
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respectively.66 The extant ambiguity in two minds illustrates how much incentive 
monopolies have to innovate by comparison with how much able businesses in 
competitive markets are to innovate,67 is another issue worth considering. To stimulate 
the balanced and continuous improvement of innovations, this research will argue 
several innovation suppression practices by suggesting suitable (alternative) remedies 
in terms of EU competition law through showing to what extent intellectual property 
rights limit competition in the market. During the examination of frequently referred 
practices concerning innovation suppression, this study will strive to show the anti-
competitiveness of such conducts, which hinder technological developments on closer 
inspection by asking of the question that how free manufacturers are in suppressing 
their technologies.  
1.5 Contribution to the knowledge 
The key contribution of this study is to demonstrate that the suppression of technology 
practices are anti-competitive. There is no single reason for the suppression of 
innovation,68 but it generally appears to stem from several business decisions with 
anti-competitive concerns such as price-fixing and price margin squeeze by patented 
technologies, which businesses will not use or not allow others to use.69 This thesis, 
accordingly, intends to analyse prospective problems of suppressing innovation that 
has negative impacts on both consumers and rivals. Rapid advances in technology 
have altered not only the state of the art but also consumer preferences and legal 
 
 
66 Arrow (n 2) 619. 
67 Hyo Kang, ‘How does competition affect innovation? Evidence from U.S. Antitrust cases’ (2020) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516974> accessed 4 November 2020. 
68 Exclusive licencing agreements, creation of patent pools, patent thickets, takeovers of competitors, 
fencing patent would also cause to suppression of innovation. For example, even the timing of 
introducing new products as such in vapourware products may cause this suppression as competitors 
may decide deterring to produce competing products. 
69 Saunders and Levine (n 38) 37. 
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perspectives.70 There is a long-standing debate about enhancing innovative efficiency, 
as one of the main aims of EU competition law, to decrease base price with the help 
of technology.71 In this regard, suppression of innovation does not fit in an essential 
aspect of EU competition law. It is controversial to foster innovation by supporting 
either monopolised or competitive markets. This insolvable discussion causes more 
of vagueness to make an effects-base analysis regarding what extent monopolies 
contribute to the progress of technology. A similar discussion can be seen among IP 
law scholars in regard to the usefulness of granting IP rights on technological 
progress.72 These latent ambiguities put a question mark regarding what extent the 
outputs of competition law and intellectual property law would be sacrificed while 
developing pro-innovative policies. This thesis analyses to elicit the difficulties of 
adopting such a balance policy by criticising the status quo in light of current 
judgements of EU competition law. By doing this, this research is limited by only 
discussing the role of competition law in resolving and conceptualising the suppression 
of innovation since the role of IP law has already been discussed thoroughly. By this 
means, this study attempts to make a contribution to EU competition law regarding 
technological development suppression, which has not put into words in EU law yet. 
So, EU law does not yet have a specific policy on the suppression of innovation as a 
 
 
70 As another aspect of this circumstance, the validity of noncompeting and confidentiality agreements 
between employer and employee is argued because information of employee is rapidly becoming 
obsolete. See for further discussion on this argument: Ann Hodges and Porcher Taylor, ‘The business 
fallout from the rapid obsolescence and planned obsolescence of high-tech products: Downsizing of 
noncompetition agreements’ (2005) 6 The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 1-31. 
71 Francisco Costa-Cabral, ‘Innovation in EU Competition Law: The Resource-Based View and 
Disruption’ (2018) 37 Yearbook of European Law 305-343; Peter Møllgaard and Jo Lorentzen, 
‘Competition Policy and Innovation’ in Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory (eds), International 
Handbook on Industrial Policy (Edward Elgar 2006) 115-134. 
72 Eli Salzberger, ‘The Law and Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property: Paradigmatic Shift from 
Incentives to Traditional Property’ (2011) 7(2) Review of Law and Economics 101-156; Susy Frankel, 
The Object and Purpose of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019); Ove Granstrand, 
‘Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights’ in Jan Fagerberg and David Mowery, The Oxford Handbook 
of Innovation (OUP 2004). 
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means to enshrine a competitive advantage. This study consequently offers significant 
insight into the legal perspective of innovation in the context of Article 102 TFEU as 
well as it presents under-researched concepts, such as exclusionary product design 
(planned obsolescence), evergreening patent and spare parts design protection that 
have not been extensively investigated from the competition law perspective. In a 
nutshell, current regulations on innovation are inadequate when it comes to 
suppression of innovation. However, almost all these research have developed their 
remedies by mostly focusing on IP law because it was considered that effective patent 
protection would promote innovation as long as this extensive protection is not 
abused.73 This research takes this discussion a step further by arguing the 
convenience of competition law enforcement in the context of Article 102 TFEU to 
break the deadlock with reference to blocking the progression of innovation.  
1.6 Methodology 
This section mainly indicates the research foundations and methodological recourses 
used for demonstrating relevant insight into how the study’s trajectory is pursued. As 
this study aims to scrutinise the legal backgrounds of the research problem, as a 
matter of course, the doctrinal approach is appropriately selected. In this particular, 
the primary sources of the research are the provision of Article 102 TFEU, its affiliated 
regulations and directives, as well as the case law. In contrast, the addressed 
secondary sources are journal articles and other written commentaries on the case 
law, legislation and economic aspects. Furthermore, as this thesis emphasises on the 
basic precepts of law and economics disciplines under the competition law field, an 
economic analysis of law is employed as a second type of methodology.  As well, a 
 
 
73 Cotropia and Gibson (n 7) 921. 
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comparative law methodology is adopted to discover whether there are any lessons 
to be drawn from the US antitrust law and the EU Member States’ best practices. 
1.6.1 Doctrinal research methodology 
This study generally draws on the current arguments of competition law theories and 
practices as based for analysing relevant doctrines and criticising the foundation of the 
black letter research, alias legal based doctrinal research.74 The basic questions, like 
what the current law is or whether and to what extent current law offers a valid solution 
for the existing problems, are examined with their theoretic and philosophical 
aspects.75 This study accordingly adopts the doctrinal research method to offer a 
remedy through establishing potential links between competition law, intellectual 
property law and the suppression of innovation. 
The issue is mainly emphasised on the discussion of legal provisions by analysing 
relevant legal statutes and court decisions to formulate legal doctrines with the help of 
the theory of harm in the competition law context.76  From this point of view, a 
systematic overview is provided by interpreting legal materials77 and presuming future 
developments.78 On a systematic interpretation of these sources, the legal meaning of 
relevant provisions is taken into consideration under the basic philosophy of codes, 
 
 
74 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct 
of Legal Research (Pearson Longman, 2007) 51, 63. 
75 Terry Hutchinson, ‘The doctrinal method: Incorporating interdisciplinary methods in reforming the law’ 
(2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 130. 
76 Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock, Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-
Blackwell 2008) 28-37; Laura Lammasniemi, Law Dissertations: A Step-by-Step Guide (Routledge, 
2018) 72-73. 
77 Salter and Mason (n 74) 44. 
78 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83. 
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juridical decisions and legal theories79 by using deductive logic and inductive 
reasoning for better criticism and interpretation of the matter.80  
1.6.2 Economic Analysis of Law 
Competition law, by its very nature, is directly associated with economics. Hence, 
adopting an economic approach is inevitable to integrate economic thinking into legal 
reasoning while analysing competition law.81 The expansion in legal scholarship with 
the application of principles of economics has altered both regulatory and judicatory 
understandings in terms of regulation-making and decision-making phases. This 
verifies the trend of why competition law is mainly located under the roof of law and 
economics. 
The correlation between legal and economic viewpoints facilitates understanding of 
supply-side economics and consumerism under the basic principles of the neo-
classical economic theory from the legal perspective. Regulations and court decisions 
would undeniably have downstream economic influences on economic growth.82 What 
is more, most legal and economic institutions have already been intertwined, such as 
the concepts of property and capital markets. This makes the way for employing 
economic analyses.83 The status quo indicates the system, which both law and 
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economics have an impact upon each other in a comprehensive manner to redress 
and control the potential handicaps of monopoly power.84  
The necessity of an economic approach for legal studies could be extended back from 
the classical economics theory by Adam Smith.85 In the modern sense, the discipline 
of law and economics was laid a foundation by the Chicago School in which economic 
theories, provided by empirical tools, are used to obtain legal objectivity.86 Economic 
analysis of law has received widespread attention from the legal scholarship since the 
second half of the 20th century by the studies of Coase, Posner and Calabresi.87 
Particularly, the tools of economics seemed fruitful from the viewpoint of examining 
the competition law cases in which both law and economics aim at an efficient 
allocation of resources as the same goal. To sum up, economics took over normative 
responsibility by being convenient to offer an economic analysis of law.88 Hence, the 
complementary nature of law and economics89 would likely provide more solid positive 
science to be able to present more effective laws90 and social welfare.91 More to the 
point, Posner claimed that the economic approach to law is of vital importance to 
interpret the law for maximising the social wealth and reframe notions in a rational 
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way92 by bringing economic rationales and legal doctrines together.93 All these 
approaches towards the more liberalised market have been considered by pointing 
out their pros and cons. It was accordingly debated the inevitability of the suppression 
of innovation and therefore, the necessity to take legal actions for the progress of 
innovation.  
Issues regarding competition law gained a different viewpoint by the economic 
analysis of law, which has become more and more irreplaceable, particularly in the 
competition law field, whereas other legal disciplines are still frequently expanding by 
lack of empirical works.94 Although the idea of purely applying the economic approach 
to the rule of law is not widely accepted95, esteemed scholars of competition law and 
other economy-related law sub-disciplines consider economics as a part of the law. It 
has been thought that the law and economics approach will reduce policy error costs 
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and foster innovation.96 The economic theory of competition contributes to set legal 
framework bearing in mind that assignees of the EC were from the fields of both law 
and economics hitherto. Therefore, this research uses some economic models97 and 
concepts to provide a comprehensive insight by analysing the legal side of economic 
principles in judicial reasoning with regard to the suppression of innovation in 
competition law paradigm. The approach taking economic reasons and backgrounds 
of this specific issue into consideration would be consequently instrumental in 
enriching suggested legal remedies. 
1.6.3 Comparative research methodology 
Comparative law methodology is an endeavour to embed newly encountered issues 
in an ideal type through analysing different legal systems.98 Considering different 
approaches result in a more comprehensive understanding to generate solutions for 
such issues. The popular wisdom on the aim of comparative legal research is to 
provide convenience for policymakers99 through analysing similarities and differences 
of chosen jurisdictions.100 This study, accordingly, argues existing and potential legal 
remedies of EU competition law in terms of innovation suppression by exploring 
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similarities and differences of other jurisdictions. This comparison is made in two 
different levels.  
First, best practices of EU member states such as Germany, France and Italy have 
been addressed to structure an effective EU law practice since they are one of the 
most pioneering countries concerning the regulation of innovation. Particularly, the 
paper published by the German competition authority was one of the most pioneering 
initiatives to shed light on the relationship between innovation and competition law 
regarding the regulation of innovation.101 For example, accordingly, the 10th 
amendment to the German Competition Act is being discussed to address the needs 
of a digital economy. It is planned that this reform will be passed into law towards the 
end of 2020. With this draft, “the opportunity to access data required to compete” will 
be regarded as one of the criteria determining the dominant position. More importantly, 
since access to data has been added to the scope of the “refusal to supply” prohibition, 
it will become obligatory for the dominant undertakings to share data marked as 
compulsory. Consequently, competitors with economic activity based on data will have 
the right to request to access the required data.102 As to France and Italy, they were 
first two countries that fined planned obsolescence practices to lessen the influence 
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of suppression of innovation. Having said that, convergence between substantial 
national laws and European law has been increased since the Regulation 1/2003.103 
In this regard, the Commission is liable to safeguard the application of EU law in a 
consistent and uniform manner through harmonising national laws and creating a free 
and competitive environment for the EU market.104  
Second, throughout the research, approaches from US Antitrust law to the regulation 
of innovation has been referred because it provides voluminous and unique literature 
on the suppression of innovation, which is emergent in the EU law. While remedies for 
innovation suppression are discussed under Article 102 TFEU, the examination of the 
US Antitrust literature becomes more of an issue. Since there is limited research on 
this issue in the context of EU competition law, the US literature can be taken as a 
reference point to set a course for preventing any suppression across the EU. 
Moreover, such comparison will likely have a place in effectively interpreting the 
issue105 as the EU competition law and the US antitrust law are somewhat converged 
despite having distinctive flavours.   
Changes in US Antitrust law have always been influencing agents over EU competition 
law in its developmental stages. For instance, the private enforcement after the 
Regulation 1/2003 regarding the implementation of Article 101 and 102 TFEU106 has 
been developed under the influence of US antitrust law.107 Further to that, the 
Commission has changed its approach to restrictive agreements towards more 
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efficiency based case-by-case analysis as such in the US Antitrust law whereas it has 
not changed its attitude regarding vertical practices.108 Furthermore, it is generally 
argued that the focus of the European competition law is distracted and rather 
muddled, whereas the US has a steadfast economic focus.109 
Even though this study does not present a verbatim and proper comparative analysis 
of mentioned jurisdictions, it only utilises some comparative elements in terms of what 
remedies have been offered by other jurisdictions already faced with same issues. 
From all reasons above, the comparative law approach is found useful to reflect on 
the ambiguity in the EU competition law concerning innovation suppression and help 
formulate recommendations as to how the suppression of innovation could be tackled. 
1.7  Structure of the thesis 
The complete structure of this thesis takes the form of six chapters, together with this 
preliminary chapter. This chapter has presented a core background of technological 
development suppression to indicate why it has currently become a major problem. It 
also gives an outline of the necessity of competition law approach under Article 102 of 
the TFEU in regard to the suppression of innovation.  
In the second chapter, a theoretical foundation of the suppression of innovation from 
economic context will be presented to set a framework for the legal discussion in light 
of the new economy concept by considering creative destruction and innovative 
disruption, as two driving forces of the new economy. However, it should be noted that 
this chapter aims to use comparative elements from economics for the legal analysis, 
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not compare legal and economic approaches on innovation. Besides, the concept of 
innovation will be argued in different contexts to establish a ground for the main 
discussion on suppression innovation.  
An analysis concerning the suppression of innovation as an abuse of a dominant 
position will be discussed the third chapter. This analysis will initially begin with a 
definition and types of the suppression of innovation by considering specifically Article 
102 TFEU. Therefore, the anti-competitiveness of innovation suppression will be 
argued with revealing the reasons of why technologies are suppressed by mentioning 
relevant legal theories. Furthermore, this chapter will show the IP law’s (specifically 
patents’) important role for the disclosure and diffusion of innovations, which are also 
expected outcomes of EU competition law. Hence, the common and complementary 
grounds of these two legal fields will be addressed to examine the issue of innovation 
suppression by visiting relevant theories. 
The fourth chapter discussed frequently encountered practices causing suppression 
of innovation. These practices are the non-use of patent, pay-for-delay agreements, 
standardisation, spare part designs protection and the evergreening patents, 
respectively. Those practices are separately examined from EU competition law 
perspective by considering Article 102 as a remedy for those issues. In this regard, it 
will be argued to what extent these practices enhance competition, innovation and 
consumer welfare; and demonstrated why innovation suppression practices are anti-
competitive. Since the issue of innovation suppression remains in between the fields 
of IP and competition laws, this chapter will cover both. However, IP law theories, 
approaches and issues will only be discussed to support the claim that competition 
law is potentially instrumental in offering solutions to the suppression of innovation.  
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The fifth chapter subsequently will argue one of the most particular issues of 
innovation suppression, namely planned obsolescence by examining whether and to 
what extent it will hinder technological development and competition in the market. 
The reason why this study gives wide coverage to this issue is to suggest an urgent 
legal action by stressing on its destructive effects in markets. Therefore, this chapter 
will aim to response to the need for conceptualising planned obsolescence with a novel 
approach from the supply side perspective and presents a new breath to this unfamiliar 
territory 
The final (sixth) chapter will present concluding remarks to present a full understanding 
of the competition law in the suppression of innovation regarding discussions over 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework Of Innovation Suppression 
2.1 Introduction  
Innovation is the engine of competition. Either making or suppressing innovation can 
be effective tools for competing. Therefore, the concept of innovation needs to be 
addressed in competition law analyses. In this regard, this chapter aims to discuss the 
concept of innovation from both legal and economic standpoints pursuant to the 
interdisciplinary approach taken. More particularly, it discusses the role of innovation 
in the new economy by specifically focusing on creative destruction and disruptive 
innovation since the awareness of these concepts can present an upshot to shed light 
on the incentives of businesses in suppressing innovations. A theoretical framework 
of innovation suppression with the role of innovation in EU competition law is provided 
in the following sections. The next (second) section is structured to identify the concept 
of innovation and the necessity to promote innovation. By so doing, the relation 
between innovation and EU competition law is established by the essential facilities 
doctrine. The third section emphasises the concept of ‘new economy’, which covers 
the period, which has been dominated by information and communication 
technologies, from the mid-1990s to date. In this regard, the fourth section provides 
the characteristics of creative destruction and innovative disruption, as two driving 
forces of the new economy, are examined in order to demonstrate why innovations 
are short-lived and need to be replaced with other innovations. The fifth section 
examines the detrimental side of innovation since innovation does not always bring 
benefits. For instance, not all innovations, such as products made by single-use plastic 
materials, are sensitive to the environment. For another instance, a new product 
designed with a limited lifetime is disadvantageous to consumers. Therefore, this 
section explores the delicate balance between promoting innovation and the 
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externalities of innovation. Finally, the sixth and last section provides complimentary 
remarks to lay the way open for generating practical discussions taken place following 
chapters. 
2.2 Definition of innovation   
The word of innovation comes from the Latin words ‘innovationem’ and ‘innovate’ 
which mean ‘novel change’ and ‘introduce as new’ respectively.110 Hereof, it is 
necessary to reveal the differences between innovation and similar concepts such as 
creativity, invention and novelty independently of the lexical meaning of innovation to 
make a precise definition of innovation. Although creativity is a part of the innovation 
process, innovation is the application of creatively developed ideas. Therefore, 
innovation contains creativity in itself.111 Likewise, this creativity does not need to be 
transformed into the invention because innovation does not only show up with an 
invention. Innovation might also be an idea or invention, which can be commercialised. 
Hence, innovation is not just a technology-based concept but also economic.112 
Furthermore, novelties without a commercial value do not imply the existence of 
innovation. Hence, while the invention is the product of intellectual effort, the desire of 
businessperson will convert from invention to innovation.113 Similarly, the invention 
can be defined as an intellectual product for the premarket that became an output of 
the production and sale processes. In the interest of definition, innovation is an 
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entrepreneur’s ability to sell new products with added values114 or to discover new use 
or new markets for existing products in a radically new way.115 
There are two types of innovation regarding the level of innovation, namely, disruptive 
and sustaining innovation. Disruptive innovation offers entirely new products and 
services, which refer to unprecedented products or services in the market by 
supplanting the previous products and markets. The emergence of similar improved 
products (or services) after radical innovation is called as sustaining (follow-on) 
innovation. EU competition law, as it stands, appears to be habilitated performing a 
through competition law analysis of practices without innovation considerations, since 
it is not well-equipped to deal with evaluating innovation strategies116 because it 
particularly cannot evaluate pearls and pitfalls on consumer welfare. 
From another perspective, there are three types of innovation regarding the 
occurrence of innovation, namely closed, open and reverse innovation.  Closed 
innovation means keeping innovation confidential and providing knowledge for only 
companies’ internal resources. The benefit of closed innovation as company policy is 
obstructing imitation at least for a while. However, many projects would likely mire 
down, and many ideas would be wasted unless there is no support from outside. As 
to open innovation, it eases and accelerates knowledge transfers between firms by 
either selling patents or purchasing creative ideas. Designing innovation has become 
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a distinct income model with the development of the patent system,117 which enables 
firms benefitting from innovation by cooperating with other businesses. Nevertheless, 
there is also a tight link between the increase of innovations and product diversity as 
well as the reduction of product life cycles. Last, reverse innovation developed by 
Govindarajan and Trimble signifies the transition of innovations from less developed 
countries to developed countries. The question of why developed countries prefer to 
implement these innovations from less developed countries seems a puzzle, but there 
are satisfactory reasons.118 For example, developing countries are interested in 
producing products, which are budget-friendly and satisfactory performance. Such 
products offering rewarding price/performance ratios may arouse worldwide interest. 
Hence, businesses, aiming to satisfy the needs of economically deprived people by 
producing convenient products, can have a chance to globalise. This bears a 
resemblance to market-creating (disruptive) innovations of Christensen.119 
2.2.1 Innovation, Product Design and Law 
Innovation as the introduction of innovative thinking into the market is the key to 
promote welfare. Several subfields of law and economics meet on a common ground 
of fostering innovation for enabling more quality products at a lower price. A 
considerable amount of literature has been published on product durability, as one of 
the most significant indicators of quality.120 Some studies have reported that there 
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might be an incentive to shorten durability, so-called planned obsolescence, for 
manufacturers.121 
Vernon suggested the product life cycle model in 1966 to interpret international trade.  
According to this model, every commercial product has four stages in the market: 
introduction, growth, maturity and decline. In the introduction phase, the product does 
not yield a profit, but after the product overview, the profit will increase more with the 
lack of competition.122 In the maturity period, significant parameters, such as brand 
loyalty and consumption habit, become more of an issue.123 Hence, creating an 
esteemed brand is vital to compete effectively.124 In the decline phase, it has been 
mostly observed that developed countries export their innovative products to 
developing and underdeveloped countries, respectively.125 This shows that innovation 
also provides a competitive advantage in the level of states.126 It is not a coincidence 
that the US and China as two biggest economic actors having the highest number of 
patents are currently the two biggest economies. As the continuous demand for new 
products threatens even monopolies, it is necessary to devote close attention to R & 
D investments for having more IP rights.127  
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Table 1. The product life cycle model by Raymond Vernon128 
  
What is important for the manufacturer to find a way of replacing or modifying the 
product at the end of the maturity phase. Hence, as noted in the introduction, products 
are made to break at one point.129  Vernon’s model lost its charm in the beginnings of 
the 70s because this model only leant on simplistic demand-driven innovation rather 
than a realistic and comprehensive approach to innovation.130  
Everett claims that perceptions substantially direct the diffusion of innovations. For 
example, even the layout of the Dvorak keyboard is much more efficient than the 
QWERTY keyboard to write smoothly, it has been lost in the shuffle.131 In fact, the 
QWERTY keyboard layout was specially designed for slower typing because fast 
striking on typewriters buttons causes deadlock condition.132 Despite all, the QWERTY 
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keyboard layout is still dominant. To put it differently, the fact that the ideas, which are 
useful, economic or ergonomic, will not directly transform into an innovation. Because 
of the multi-pronged concept of innovation has many other sources, such as consumer 
perceptions and living standards.  
When examining the diffusion and adopting of technologies in terms of technological 
products, the main factors might be cultural changes, technological culture, social 
norms, information and communication technology and technological policies.133 In 
this regard, Rogers’ diffusion of innovativeness theory, as shown in Table 2 below, 
offers a more general frame. According to this, innovation initially catches innovators’ 
and early adopters’ attentions. These groups represent the consumer group, who are 
open to innovation. Subsequently, it reaches the consumer group, who are sceptical 
to innovation, namely, early majority, late majority and laggards, respectively.134 
Table 2. Adopter Categorization based on Innovativeness135 
  
It would not be wrong to say that the Rogers’ diffusion of innovativeness curve is 
closely linked to the innovation adaptation life cycle. When considering these two 
curves together, in the period of maturity in Vernon’s curve and the late majority in the 
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Rogers’ curve both addresses the need for innovation because these periods also 
refer to arriving at maturity of innovation’s saturation point soon. 
2.2.2 The relationship between innovation and competitiveness 
The ability to innovate plays a significant role in the current economic system as it 
provides businesses with an opportunity to gain a lead over and stand out from their 
competitors within a fierce competition environment. Superiority no longer depends on 
the production capacity of factories136 but on knowing how to innovate. Consequently, 
the competitive power of a business is closely associated with its abilities to make 
innovation, which requires a dynamic structure with cutting-edge technology and 
allocating a large part of its working resources for research and development 
activities.137 In terms of the macroeconomic perspective, the capability to innovate and 
to introduce innovations positively influences the economic progress, growth and 
employment rate.138  
The relationship between innovation and competitiveness can be examined in three 
different levels: across states, industries and firms.139 At the national and industrial 
level, states are adopting innovation-oriented policies, so-called Neo-Schumpeterian 
economics, in order to gain a competitive advantage in global trade and provide 
economic growth and development.140 However, the necessity to focus on fostering 
innovation would likely be extended to other mentioned levels since the literature 
 
 
136 See, the comparative advantage theory of Ricardo. Daniel Bernhofen and John Brown, 
‘Retrospectives: On the Genius Behind David Ricardo’s 1817 Formulation of Comparative Advantage’ 
(2018) 32(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 227-240. 
137 Elizabeth Webster, ‘Firms’ Decisions to Innovate and Innovation Routines’ (2004) 13(8) Economics 
of Innovation and New Technology 733-745. 
138 OECD, ‘Innovation and Growth: Rationale for an Innovation Strategy’ (2007) 1-29 
<https://www.oecd.org/science/inno/39374789.pdf> accessed 4 November 2020. 
139 Cantwell (n 111). 
140 ibid 546-547. 
40 
 
builds a consensus that innovation is one of the most significant tools to gain a 
competitive advantage in terms of entrepreneurs.141 In light of this, almost all 
manufacturers are likely to design their products to meet only current expectations, 
not for the next generations’ by not considering lifelong design strategies.142  Even 
though one finds a way to design with the longer life cycle, it seems more profitable to 
employ temporary design as long as the innovation occurrence rate is high. 
The theoretical perspective of the intersection of innovation, law, and economics, the 
fundamental assumption of the classical economics bases upon maximising utility of 
every homo economicus, which increases the general welfare of the society.143 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon every individual to make the most of opportunities for 
themselves. However, Schumpeter from the German-Austrian school of thought 
claims that businesses should take over more responsibility by providing innovation 
for social welfare rather than maximising just their utilities. In opposition to self-
interested agents of Classical Economics, an innovation-driven German-Austrian 
(ordoliberal) approach promotes the people serving the public with Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs and Nietzsche’s superman (Übermensch).144 Also, the ordoliberal 
approach is considerably important when it comes to evolving EU competition law 
even though the general debates continue in the controversy of Harvard and Chicago 
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Schools.145 Notably, the German competition system (Bundeskartellamt) had major 
impacts on the basic principles and approaches to EU competition law146 because the 
Ordo-liberalist theoretical foundation created by a group of lawyers and economists 
from Freiburg University in 1930 paved the way for the interventionist approach of EU 
Commission, which encumbers to governments by strict legislations.147 
Overall, both countries and businesses face serious competition pressure because of 
economic globalisation. Innovation is one of the most proper ways to overcome this 
problem. However, significant increases in innovation also lay a burden on regulatory 
institutions. One study showed the positive correlation between making regulations 
and increasing innovations in furtherance of this responsibility of regulatory 
institutions.148 In other words, the law is one of the closest followers of innovations 
along with businesses and States. Competition law, particularly, should take on the 
responsibility to promote innovation by precluding exclusionary designing products. 
2.2.2.1 Promoting innovation 
Fostering innovation, which is a common aim of both competition law and IP law, is 
provided through the attribution of exclusive rights in IP law and through preserving 
freedom of access to the market in competition law.149 The point that appears to be 
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contradictory is poles apart of the approaches and implementations of these 
disciplines. It is a matter of long debate that those IP rights incentivise quality and 
innovation while they have restrictive effects on the free market.150 Particularly, in the 
events of refusal to deal and the necessity of compulsory licencing are some vital 
issues, which are frequently encountered legal disagreement arising from the 
intersection between IP and competition law.151 
Competition law works for ensuring a competitive market in which it forces and 
promotes firms to encourage innovation in the context of product development through 
using new methods and technologies.152 One can say that IP law provides exclusive 
rights to ensure the investment costs for the innovation to prevent innovations 
remaining hidden.153 It has been largely discussed the conflicting points of these two 
different areas of law under ‘the conflict theory’.154 However, today, many scholars 
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argue that competition policy and IP rights complement each other under the ‘theory 
of complementary’.155 Therefore, there is currently a majority opinion that competition 
and IP law should be proportionally applied together with a proper understanding of 
this proportion.156 
When taking a glance at the economic approaches to innovation, it would not be wrong 
to say that these regulations are incisively congruous. Smith and Ricardo, as 
esteemed classical economists, gave an indication to innovation as one of the most 
significant sources of increase in productivity, and they both pointed out machine 
improvements and effective division of work to foster innovations.157 Neoclassical 
economist Marshall subsequently explained the reduction of production costs through 
innovation, which provides not only competitive power for companies via cost 
minimization but also more suitable goods and services for customers. Hence, 
Marshall discoursed the welfare creation effects of technological advances.158 On the 
other hand, other neoclassical economists, such as Nelson and Arrow, alleged that 
technological advances might cause market failures because of the public nature of 
innovation. This is because they claimed that providing a monopoly right to innovators 
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is essential to recover this failure even though neoclassical economists defend free 
markets without state interventions.159 
The prevention of technological development would be an undesired result under both 
competition and IP law to not make inroads on the commonweal. Monopoly rights 
provided by IP law serve the purpose of encouraging inventors and technology 
because competitive markets would not have an endeavour to produce innovation in 
the absence of these such patents.160 However, a competition law intervention would 
also be useful to balance market competition and promote innovation when these 
extensive rights cause to limit technological developments. In other words, even if 
granting patent rights will bring to a standstill the competition, this does not merely 
mean a violation of competition law unless these rights are used for anti-competitive 
reasons.161 The EU has a firm position regarding this matter by attaching priority to 
competition law rather than IP law where practices pose a danger to the technological 
development of products and suppress innovation.162 The EC clarified this matter with 
the below statement: 
“The fact that intellectual property laws grant exclusive rights of exploitation 
does not imply that intellectual property rights are immune from competition law 
intervention. Nor does it imply that there is an inherent conflict between 
intellectual property rights and the competition rules. Indeed, both bodies of law 
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share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and efficient 
allocation of resources.”163 
This statement led to the conclusion that in the case of stifling innovation via exercising 
IP rights, EU competition law intervention would be applied in a way that leaves no 
doubt. This also verifies this study is on the right track by taking the competition law 
approach for innovation suppression practices. 
2.2.2.2 Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Since IP rights are granted for promoting technology and compensating the inventors’ 
investments, patents, which are not subjected to production, will contain anti-
competitive features. This likely anti-competitiveness is well prevented by TRIPS (‘The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’) and, EU 
Member States as TRIPS members shall comply with TRIPS as well as EU laws. 
Therefore, EU Member States commit to contribute technological development 
through taking necessary actions regarding the prevention of IP abuses, which would 
“unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology”.164 TRIPS members have a right to allow third parties regarding the patent 
use, notwithstanding the absence of the right holder’s consent.165 This is supplied by 
the application of compulsory licencing, which has particular importance in fixing anti-
competitive conducts such as patent non-use and refusal to deal.166  
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According to the compulsory licencing doctrine, the IP right owner is obliged to let 
others use concerned right if the competitive structure in the market has deteriorated 
due to this IP right. So, this doctrine somewhat neutralises intellectual property right, 
which gives the owner the right not to share the protected intangible property with 
others. Hence, undertakings shall make a deal if compulsory licencing conditions are 
met. Otherwise, the refusal to supply of the concerned IP right will be regarded as an 
abuse of a dominant position in light of Article 102 TFEU, which aims to remove the 
obstacles to technological development. It is also essential to mention the essential 
facilities doctrine (EFD), also known as bottleneck doctrine, in order to have a clear 
understanding of the delicate execution balance between competition law and IP law. 
In short, this doctrine is a legal principle to force firms, which have market power by 
reason of having essential facilities, to share their sine qua non facilities with their 
rivals. Hence, firms controlling essential facilities shall make an agreement with other 
entrepreneurs under reasonable conditions in the absence of a valid ground regarding 
not to share them.  
One of the most significant sides of this doctrine is to enable more participants in the 
markets. This would probably prevent potential monopolisation cases by paving the 
way for competitive markets, which would be likely to help ipso facto preventing 
planned obsolescence practices. Therefore, this doctrine actualises the necessary 
conditions regarding the spread of technological innovations, which would likely have 
two main important consequences. First, this doctrine also prevents the abuse of 
monopoly (exclusive) rights to a large extent as such in the cases of Microsoft167 and 
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Volvo168 by leading interoperability design and prevention of spare parts designs. This 
would probably refer to a preventive measure for grasping the nettle regarding 
innovation suppression practices because the possibility of purchasing broken or 
improper working parts from different manufacturers would likely circumvent the 
manufacturers adopting strategies to suppress innovation such as planned 
obsolescence.169 Second, the EFD prompts other manufacturers to penetrate the 
market by producing alternative products as in the Commercial Solvents,170 Sealink171 
and Magill.172 That is why manufacturers would likely tend to produce higher quality 
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and cheaper products, which would possibly foreclose innovation suppression 
strategies to some extent.  
In the context of the essential facilities doctrine, the European Commission fined the 
Lithuanian Railways, Lietuvos geležinkeliai, of €27,873,000 for exclusionary abuse of 
dominance by dismantling the 19-kilometres-long rail track between Lithuania and 
Latvia.173 In March 2020, the EC made the commitments proposed by Transgaz, the 
Romanian natural gas transport operator, legally binding to ensure the provision of 
gas export from Romania to Hungary and Bulgaria, moving towards a single European 
energy market.174 As seen from this recent case, the EFD still plays an important role 
in EU competition law. However, the doctrine yields no result when it comes to the 
digital economy because businesses now use assets such as data, ranking, or 
algorithms rather than physical infrastructures. Therefore, considering these assets as 
essential facilities would likely reactivate the effectiveness of the doctrine. Graef 
accordingly claimed that this argument could offer a solution in Google competition 
cases.175  
2.2.2.3 Essential facilities doctrine as a check and balance mechanism between 
the IP and competition laws 
Innovator undertakings are rewarded with exclusive IP rights, but these grants may 
present a danger. Technology will not be a subject of the market in a given time if the 
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technology holder decides to disusing or somewhat suppressing current innovations. 
For instance, such technology holder may avoid bringing technology into use in the 
market by refusing to deal. However, the EFD may limit to use of exclusive IP rights if 
there is an abuse of dominance.176 Overall, competition law has a great potential to 
bring solutions regarding innovation suppressions in almost every junction point with 
intellectual property rights, such as standards and design rights of component parts. 
Therefore, the EFD is useful to determine the limits of manufacturers. Otherwise, using 
IP rights without competition law intervention enables designing exclusionary products 
precisely.  
Hence, it is safe to say that EU competition law can limit the use of patent rights for 
the public interest when the unilateral refusal to supply has anti-competitive effects.177 
It is worth mentioning two fundamental economic theories to enlighten if and to what 
extent refusal to supply practices will be regarded as anti-competitive: the leverage 
theory and raising rivals’ costs theory.178 These two theories were basically proposed 
for the maintenance of monopoly power in the primary market. In other words, both 
theories aim to cement the market power by the strategic use of the obtained patent. 
According to the leverage theory, a dominant undertaking may desire to extend its 
monopoly power by refusing to deal with its rivals.179 Even though this theory has been 
disproven to some extent in the US with the single monopoly profit theorem that the 
monopoly profit is constant and cannot be leveraged,180 the EU has still inspired by 
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this theory, as it was the case with Google Shopping.181 It was concluded that Google 
was in the dominant position for the market of general Internet search, and prioritised 
its comparison shopping service by applying an algorithm, which drops rivals’ 
comparison shopping services to lower tiers in the search results. The Commission 
consequently fined Google €2.42 billion due to the abuse of dominance. This decision 
obviously carries traces of the leverage theory. 
Concerning raising rivals’ cost theory proposed by Krattenmaker and Salop, the main 
incentive to the refusal to supply is to exclude rivals by setting out market entry barriers 
through increasing their economic burden.182 These economic theories lead 
innovation to progress by a sole dominant undertaking, and consequently, this creates 
a severe restriction on the progression of technology. However, the letter of the law in 
the Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities covers three cumulative 
conditions183 without referring technological development that the Commission will 
intervene if the refusal 
(1) relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to 
compete effectively on a downstream market, 
(2) is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream 
market, and 
(3) is likely to lead to consumer harm. 
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Prima facie, the Guidance seems less worried about the suppression of innovation 
straightforwardly even though the terms of effective competition and consumer harm 
in a roundabout way address the progression of technology. The Commission decision 
on the Commercial Solvents, which was confirmed by the CJEU, offered a primary 
insight into the issue of refusal to deal.184 The Commission found abuse of dominant 
position by covering all conditions mentioned above. Commercial Solvents decided to 
penetrate the downstream market, and consequently, it halted supplying aminobutanol 
(a raw material, which is only produced by Commercial Solvents) to Zoja in order to 
reap more profit in the downstream market. In this present case, Zoja had no 
alternative to procure aminobutanol from another supplier and without this raw material 
because Commercial Solvent dominated the whole downstream market.185 Whereby 
this decision, an anti-competitive practice was prevented as well as the progression of 
technology was guaranteed to an extent. 
As a result, in case that an undertaking abuses its dominant position by using an 
essential facility as a threat against its rivals, a duty to deal will surface in place of 
freedom of contract. However, the distortion of competition should be continuous; 
momentary distortions would not be enough to force undertakings to deal.186 In 
addition to that, there are other conditions to apply compulsory licencing when current 
and potential competitors are excluded from the market as they cannot effectively 
compete without the essential facility as well as they cannot find any substitution for 
this material/technology. When all these taken into account, it seems that essential 
facilities doctrine is a significant tool to deal with the suppression of innovation in a 
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sort of way because it provides competitors to contribute innovation by having required 
facilities. 
2.3 The concept of the new economy 
The new economy has come to the fore with developments in information and 
communication technology since the mid-90s, especially with the widespread use of 
the Internet. The growth of the new economy, which covers obtaining, processing and 
consequently using information,187 demands the rapid dissemination of information in 
information and communication technologies.188 It is necessary to consider the 
significance of the information economy as it is at the heart of the new economy 
because currently, the success of companies depends on their innovation and the 
continuous increase in their knowledge regarding intensive products. For instance, 
software and biotechnology products are proper examples of the new economy whose 
products contain intangible and tacit information, which determine the competitive 
capacity of firms. A sizeable investment in increasing the number of patents is 
currently becoming one of the most significant parameters of the firms’ competitive 
capacity because the abundance of intellectual property rights provides a competitive 
edge to firms and indicates the competitive capacity of firms.189 
The new economy brings a new competition understanding as the interpretation of the 
new dynamics have become impossible by the use of traditional methods based upon 
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primitive price-increase analysis. This economic order is as fresh as ever because of 
its dynamic structure even though the first steps of this phenomenon were taken nearly 
30 years ago when the transformation changed from an industrial-weighted economy 
to a more globalised and information technologies-intensive economic system. In 
traditional market types where technological development is slow, competition is 
concentrated on price (i.e. cost-based), while the new economy offers dynamic 
competition and this competition is shaped not by price but by innovation based on 
high sunk cost and less marginal cost. This situation requires acceptance of the fact 
that in terms of market power, there is no static (permanent) power in the market, 
where the market power has a kaleidoscopic Schumpeterian characteristic.190 In other 
words, the dominant firm in the market can lose its entire market share in a very short 
time if another innovator firm presents an innovation, which can supplant the former. 
The new economy is still new and keeps up to date, but it is called by different names, 
such as information economy, the weightless economy and the digital economy. For 
example, the weightless economy points to the importance of having intellectual 
knowledge to discover microchips, transistors or even intangible internet-based 
platforms rather than selling low added-value products.191 Regarding the digital 
economy, it refers to consider Internet-based markets in which intangible goods are of 
value such as e-commerce and cryptocurrencies. Although these concepts are 
basically included in the knowledge economy, it can be still enunciable that the 
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influences and basic notions of the new economy still have a command of today 
regardless of talking with different names.192 
The new economy draws its strength from two dynamics, which are the network 
economy and economies of scale. The network economy appraises the value of 
products with reference to the number of product users that has a major impact on the 
markets. For example, the values of online social platforms (Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram), credit cards (MasterCard and Visa) or software programming (Java, C and 
Python) are evaluated by their popularity. To put a finer point on it, if the majority of 
people use one specific mobile phone model, programmers will find it more attractive 
to create applications for this model. Vice versa, the network economy poses a lock-
in effect for consumers to use popular and products in high demand.193 One can 
indisputably attest that the network economy facilitates the monopolisation of 
markets.194 Regarding the economics of scale, products of the new economy require 
high fixed costs and less marginal costs, since it would not be costly to produce extra 
units after the creation of the main product. For instance, after creating a video game, 
there would be a very low cost to make this game marketable regardless of how many 
games will be demanded. In other words, the cost per unit will be less, although the 
prime cost is high. This also leads to monopolies are being formed, and that is why 
the expression of ‘the winner takes it all’ clarifies the new economy in a nutshell.  
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2.4 Characteristics of the new economy 
Regarding the approaches to the new economy, four differential features of the new 
economy can be specified as the increasing frequency of innovation, production with 
low marginal cost, cardinal importance of network effects and the first move 
advantage.195 To explain these features, first of all, innovativeness for businesses has 
become inevitable in the new economy. Therefore, the frequency of innovation is 
increasing than ever before by the help of the dissemination of information. In case of 
neglecting to follow the latest innovations, businesses would lose their competitive 
power. Secondly, the marginal cost for a wide range of products, particularly for high-
tech products, is decreasing due to the high investment cost and less periodic cost. 
For instance, developing software requires a large amount of investment charges, 
including failure costs. However, when the product is ready to present the market, it 
would be almost costless to duplicate. As to the network effect stated as the third 
characteristics of the new economy, increasing the number of users of the product 
increases the demand for the product due to the excessive use of the Internet and 
consequently, new media tools, which eases to reach the masses. Moreover, 
businesses (particularly in the information technology industries) can now obtain 
monopoly power in a short time because they are obliged to use other products and 
technologies in manufacturing process since most products are interconnected, and 
technologies are developing cumulatively.196 Lastly, the new economy changed the 
understanding of competition from price/quality-based competition to innovation 
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competition where the first-come dominates the market. The shortening of product life 
curves obliges companies to more concentrate on research and development activities 
to be the first to have this advantage.197 So, competition takes place in the fields of 
obtaining innovation, using it, and turning it into new products. This provides motivation 
for businesses to be continuously innovative. 
These characteristics underpin current discussions around strengthening 
monopolisation regarding the necessity of taking legal measures. Several scholars 
such as Pitofsky, Reitzig and Ilie argue that products of the new economy equipped 
with intellectual property rights are prone to cause market barriers because of their 
very nature.198 This debate leads to a drawing of the frontiers between intellectual 
property law and competition law by adopting interventionist practises: for example, 
broader interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine would likely be of help to the 
formation of more competitive markets. It is also stated that intervention is necessary 
to hinder the process of monopolisation because they claim that monopolies have less 
incentive to be innovative.199 However, other scholars affirm the futility of state 
intervention because the dynamic structure of the market reduces monopolisation and 
partly alleviates the effects of the network economy.200 Said otherwise, monopolies in 
the new economy are fragile because the market itself always forces businesses to 
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put new products on the market. Otherwise, they could face creative destruction or 
disruptive innovation, which both punish enterprises that do not foster innovation. 
Furthermore, even though the network effect provides a great advantage for the 
monopolisation progress, it also contains the risk of being forced from the market itself 
if it does not continuously supply innovation to the market. Hence, the existence of 
monopolies does not destroy competition in the market per se because of the driving 
forces of the new economy, which are creative destruction and disruptive innovation. 
2.4.1 Creative Destruction 
Historians in the reign of Tiberius, such as Pliny the Elder, Petronius Arbiter and 
Cassius Dio, identically quoted the same story of vitrum flexible,201 the story of 
presenting an unbreakable glass vial to Tiberius. Tiberius asked the artisan who else 
knows how to make this malleable glass.202 After the artisan took an oath that he is 
the only one, Tiberius ordered for the artisan’s head to be cut off and the glass vial to 
be destroyed.203 The underlying reason for Tiberius’ decision was the fear that this 
material might lead to a devaluation of other metals such as copper, silver, and gold,204 
in other words, “lest gold be reduced to the value of mud.” This story shows the desire 
of directing technology somehow and, at the same time, displays the anxiety of 
potential economic effects of creative destruction.205 
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In the same vein, Acemoglu and Robinson noted another event cited by the esteemed 
Roman historian Suetonius. According to this, in the reign of Vespasian, carrying 
heavy columns was a serious problem. Regarding this issue, another artisan came 
into Vespasian’s presence to display his invention, a vehicle, which can ease the 
transport and reduce the transportation cost. Vespasian rejected the use of this vehicle 
because of its potential creative destruction in politics. The reason behind denying this 
vehicle was about getting under control of plebeians via keeping occupied them. 
Vespasian believed that if plebeians are not occupied with a worrisome problem, they 
could start to disobey the rules.206 
Another example would be about the construction of Saint Basil’s Cathedral (The 
Cathedral of Vasily the Blessed). Ivan the Terrible ordered the architect’s eyes to be 
gouged out lest he designs a more glorious construction.207 It is the same old story. 
There is no shortage of examples. The common features of creations in beliefs and 
historical events mentioned above are their destructive characteristic, which causes 
and necessitates the alteration of the status quo.  
Today, it is still possible to ban these kinds of creations, but it is not possible to hinder 
these kinds of developments because the information is spreading so quickly. For 
example, although many states have initially rejected cryptocurrencies, these 
currencies could find a place in the market. In the current situation, several developed 
countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada have accepted these units of 
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example is that electronic cigarettes are likely to be the second significant milestone 
in the tobacco industry after the cigarette-rolling machine, which outmanoeuvred 
against other conventional types of smoking, such as pipes and chewing tobacco.209 
Sales of electronic cigarettes have incrementally increased since the day they had 
been introduced to the market. In the meantime, the language as a major part of the 
culture is supportively evolving from smoking to vaping, and consequently, the old 
smokers are becoming the new vapers.210 Therefore, cigarette giants, such as Philip 
Morris and British American Tobacco, took preventive measures and decided to invest 
in this industry rather than trying to confront.211 
Creative destruction, theorised by Schumpeter,212 is mostly referred to as a dynamic 
process, including the conflict between old and new. This process as a central theme 
of capitalism denotes the annihilation of old products, technologies and ideas by newer 
ones with the entrepreneurs’ effort.213 Hence, entrepreneurs, who can mainstream the 
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technical and social innovations substituted for previous innovations, are the epitome 
of the creative destructors.214  
Many powerful concepts substituted each other in a continuous state of flux, for 
example, in the political arena that neoliberalism prevailed capitalism, whereas 
capitalism has overridden to socialism before.215 Regarding current discussions 
apropos of creative destruction, for example, Uber is getting more and more market 
share of the taxi industry although there are issues with Uber too. Online shopping 
already has the edge over brick-and-mortar shopping. These all demonstrate the 
juggernaut of innovation. There is an ever-shortening time gap between the new 
becoming the old, and this gap indicates that there would be no perennial product in 
the ever-developing market conditions.  
The current phenomena will be inevitably doomed to be behind the times because of 
the rapid pace of innovation.216  In this regard, firms will be forced to leave the market 
if they lag behind technological progress and emerging trends. Hence, adopting 
innovative production strategies is one of the most reasonable ways in order to shine 
out in highly competitive markets. As currently seen in the Thomas Cook collapse,217 
there is no valid reason to protect big businesses, which are likely to be gone bankrupt 
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when they cannot keep up with innovation218 because the intervention to the creative 
destruction process will cause more damage to economic growth in the long term.219  
Businesses in either monopoly or oligopoly require making big investments in spite of 
failure risks; these investments are not made by philanthropical reasons. The high 
frequency of the introduction of innovations forces those businesses because such 
innovations create market entry barriers like costly new investments and unlooked-for 
licence fees, which would likely set imperfect competition. However, eminent scholars 
such as Schumpeter, Arrow, Teece and Stiglitz hold similar perspectives that 
companies' profit expectations are needed to be secured for fostering innovation. 220 It 
is therefore important to adopt a balanced competition policy in this fragile situation 
factoring in its all-possible economic effects. 
Even though one can argue that market power and monopoly position have an 
affiliation, it does not mean that market power can be obtained without having such a 
position. Without being one of the chief competitors, a company can still hold market 
power through innovation.221 Innovation provides a monopoly profit for quite a while. 
This period can be defined as a length of protection under intellectual property rights, 
which enable right holders to prepare an introduction of new technology before other 
entrants penetrate the same market. In the event of failing to foster innovation, the 
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profit of innovator will decrease, which will cause stagnation and depression until 
another innovation shows up. 222  
A change in the production system via paradigm-shifting innovation leads to a new 
wave, which is called different names like Kitchin, Juglar, and Kondratieff.223 Today, 
lights-out manufacturing as fully automated non-stop production factories without the 
presence of human workers is a common way of manufacturing. The fourth industrial 
revolution, (Industry 4.0) covering robotic technology and advanced automation 
systems,224 would likely be the creative destruction of the near future. Firms, will not 
adapt itself to industry 4.0, are going to be forgotten and demolished.225  
When considering the current ever-increasing global competition and the introduction 
of innovation frequency, evergreening patents, pay-for-delay agreements or planned 
obsolescence would not be considered against the grain in the playbook of 
Schumpeter due to the necessity of progressive elaboration of technology. Businesses 
have the opportunity to take due precautions to comply with the next creative 
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destruction trend through legal means for the sake of securing their existence and 
future. Adjusting the quality level by using patent rights in an exclusionary manner is 
one of the most common ways to get ready for any metamorphosis in terms of 
manufacturers.  
2.4.2 Disruptive Innovation 
Clayton Christensen, one of the most esteemed scholars from Harvard Business 
School, developed the disruptive innovation theory in 1995 to indicate the threat of 
innovations aiming to gain supremacy of the downmarket, which is often neglected by 
big businesses.226 This theory indicates an innovation that is becoming widespread of 
a product or a market, which addresses the low quality use, gradually preponderates 
against leading market players and consequently dominates the market. It also shows 
that the growth opportunities in the low-end market are higher than the high-end 
market, which is why disruptive innovation aims to generate cheap and, generally, 
non-durable products because low-end consumers find low quality products adequate. 
This paves the way for the prevalence of products in the low-end markets and the 
opportunity of providing sufficient sources for further improvement or replacement.227 
Hence, the inference is that entrant businesses (newcomers) will likely succeed if they 
focus on catering for this deprived group of consumers.228 
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Disruptive innovation emerges in either low-end markets or new markets (competition-
free niche markets), 229 which both jeopardise the status quo of current markets by 
offering low quality use for frugal consumers.230 However, it leads consumers to much 
desire the novelty in a short span of time.231 This is the likely reason that several 
leading companies encountered failures when the technology or market changed.232 
Therefore, when new technologies emerge, a good understanding of disruption theory 
will help to make better strategic decisions233 by averting potential disruptive risks.234 
Consequently, firms need to be able to adapt even slight changes and produce a 
solution in advance or before their capacity becomes obsolete. In this regard, 
collaborative work with emerging low-end market actors would be exercised if it seems 
necessary, as seen in the case that The Walt Disney Co. decided to acquire Pixar 
Animation Studios instead of competing with them in terms of computer animations.235 
2.4.2.1 Potential problems regarding disruptive innovation 
Businesses have not enough incentive to invest in the longevity of their products, 
rather than, they have to strive to be relentlessly innovative because of the rapid 
technological changes. Even the biggest firms, which have a dominant position in their 
specific markets, face the danger of losing their market share in case of failing to foster 
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innovation and ignoring ground swell236 as in cases with Nokia and Kodak. Even if 
Kodak had protected its dominant position for camera-related products for over a 
century because of its innovative strategies, it lagged behind its competitors (Fuji and 
Canon) because of delaying the introduction of digital photography by underestimating 
the transformation from conventional photography to digital photography.237 Nokia 
also delayed making inroads in software development and insisted on using the 
Symbian mobile operating system. Instead of investing in software development, it 
continued to concentrate on hardware (durability) developments and believed the 
success of hardware-oriented feature phones rather than software-oriented 
smartphones.238 
Therefore, even big companies are always in danger of facing disruptive innovation 
regardless of their scale because innovations sometimes show up with low costs. New 
competitors can always appear in any market, notwithstanding that these markets 
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require high investment costs.239 For example, young entrepreneurial ventures have 
a chance to collaborate with the Open Source Software Community for effectively 
competing in the market, although high-tech markets are hypercompetitive oligopoly 
arenas in which do not adequately encourage them.240 Innovation can arise with the 
development of an original product, the promotion of technological innovation or the 
emergence of a new business model,241 such in Amazon,242 Ryanair,243 Xerox,244 and 
Sephora.245 
On the other hand, even if disruptive innovation is always an issue for firms, it generally 
provides solutions for the public. For example, especially in underdeveloped countries, 
people cannot afford their health care expenditures because of the sumptuousness of 
medicines, and consequently, disruptive innovations are useful here to make 
affordable medicine. Therefore, at some point, supporting these types of innovations 
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by regulations or policies at the state level may help economic growth and provide 
effective health care services.246  
2.4.2.2 Is disruptive innovation absolute must for businesses to consider? 
Disruptive innovation, on the basis of what has been covered hitherto, is an 
indispensable market entry strategy for new businesses, and it necessitates taking 
precautions from dominant market players. In this regard, low-end consumers, who 
are mostly neglected for more profit under fierce competition conditions, may turn into 
a mighty weapon for newcomers with the help of innovation. Consequently, market 
leaders will lose their market shares if they do not upgrade or replace their products 
or services within a length of time. In other words, disruptive innovation is a concept, 
which shall be followed even by market leaders. A large budget spared for research 
and development departments is one of the most noticeable indicators of this situation. 
As can be seen in the Kodak and Nokia cases, if large investments do not turn into 
innovation, this makes firms becoming vulnerable with regards to catching up with the 
times. Therefore, dominant market players offering their new technologies by 
demolishing their previous goods so-called planned obsolescence. This also helps the 
protection of their dominant position but whether adopting this strategy means abusing 
their dominant position or not, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter, is 
controversial. When considering the inevitable fact of disruptive innovation and the 
corporate strategies together, it would be seen that the strategy of planned 
obsolescence bases on economically valid reasons in terms of firms. However, even 
though the economic realities affect the law to some extent as alleged by Chicago 
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School scholars, it is not possible to conclude that the economically reasonable 
decisions are legally admissible. 
2.5 The Cost of Innovation: The trade-off between price, quality and innovation 
The invisible hand has somewhat fulfilled its duties prior to the emergence of 
competition law as this market-driven approach has redressed the balance between 
cost and quality to an extent in the absence of a law regulating the market. Similarly, 
disruptive innovation acts as the invisible hand and creates a price-quality balance by 
offering low quality and cheap products.247 Thereafter, such complex multi-variable 
trade-off exists within the structure of competition law theories to maintain a free 
market, which provides allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency248 that refer the 
thought of classical utilitarianism: ‘the greatest number of goods for the greatest 
number of people’.249  However, measures to find the socially optimal trade-off point 
become uncertain under the influence of different schools such as ordoliberals, 
Chicago, post-Chicago, and Harvard.250 The EU competition law currently takes 
consumer welfare under the trilogy of price, innovation and quality as a fundamental 
principle to assess anti-competitive practices through the trade-off between this triad. 
It seems futile to expect consumers to muddle through this trade-off due to several 
reasons. First, this balance is rooted in the fact that quality has a cost for 
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manufacturers including appraisal costs (such as laboratory testing and inspection) 
and failure costs (such as warranty and product recalls costs).251 This means that high-
quality products lead to an increase in prices, which reduces the number of consumers 
who are able to benefit from the service/goods. Hence, only focusing on the quality 
would not be a goal of competition law by itself because it reduces social welfare. 
However, if competition authorities overestimate the quality point of view, they may fail 
at providing the welfare of society in some exceptional circumstances. This is because 
businesses may abstain from entering into rivalry by the rules and they fall back upon 
unfair ways of competition with external (such as introducing deceptive practices) and 
dispositional (such as benefiting from consumer biases or imperfect information) 
influences.252 Therefore, asymmetric information as a market failure would constitute 
another challenge for consumers. One may suggest setting standards, but in this case, 
the complex question of the extent to which elements should be considered by setting 
such standards will remain unanswered.253 On the other hand, given that information 
asymmetry is no longer a problem, consumers become thoroughly confused when 
they get fully-informed because of having difficulty in deciding under an abundance of 
information, which is called confusopoly.254 Beyond these reasons discussed, 
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This trade-off with three unknowns is rather a knotty issue that it seems as if this 
equation will remain incalculable. However, it is a fact that innovation becomes more 
significant in this equation as the market forces businesses to be innovative than ever 
before. Businesses will be forced into leaving the market if they cannot keep up with 
the pace of innovation because innovation creates a new market. This clearly picturise 
the status quo of demands from manufacturers: disruptive production rigged with 
innovation under fierce competition conditions (an innovative capacity). That is to say, 
the antecedent market, which fell from grace because of the recent vintage market, 
leaves the environment in ruins. Hence, the question required asking how beneficial 
to have innovations if they harm the environment while price/quality trade-off 
transforms into innovation/environment trade-off. 
2.5.1 The trade-off between innovation and the environment 
Innovations in the high technology market, particularly in the electronic market, have 
negative consequences in the environment. Goods are now discarded in a shorter 
span of time due to the higher frequency of innovations; in particular, new versions of 
technological products such as smartphones and game consoles are released every 
year. These previous bypass versions of products, which are no longer used. 
Therefore, the amount of electronic waste (e-waste) in the world has dramatically 
increased annually. While it was less than 35 million metric tonnes in 2010, it has 
increased to 50 million metric tonnes by 2018.256 E-waste includes hazardous 
components, such as arsenic and cadmium, which is deleterious to the health of 
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people living nearby this waste,257 as it could cause air-borne diseases.258 This affects 
not only developed countries but also underdeveloped countries where this waste is 
illicitly imported.259 About 80% of the total e-waste is exported from developed 
countries to developing countries.260 The worse scenario is that only about 15% of 
these waste were exported, and formally reported and the rest of them were sent to 
landfills or black markets.261 However, the impending danger is from the increasing 
amount of e-waste produced by developing countries. In approximately ten-years, 
these nations will produce twice as much e-waste as developed countries, which 
means that there will be more than 1 billion obsolete computers in total by 2030.262 
However, e-waste is not the only issue about the environment, different types of 
wastes are also generated. For instance, in the textile sector, the worldwide 
consumption is expected as 42.2 million tonnes in 2020, whereas it was 33.2 million 
tonnes in 2015.263 
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European policies place great emphasis on environmental concerns, which has given 
rise to intense interest in the collaborative economy, particularly in the past decade. 
Therefore, both governments and scholars have taken an eager interest in issues 
relating to disruptive innovations. Already, the focal points of the regulations and 
applications centre upon the vulnerability of consumers and on environmental 
problems. Even if these legislations lay a burden on manufacturers,264 it is currently 
thought that both manufacturers and consumers should make ethical and conscious 
decisions265 to secure the intergenerational justice by conserving the environment.266 
The universal structures of environmental problems would make it essential to the 
endeavour of throwing a moral dimension into sharp relief. This moral dimension 
points at protecting the environment through conscious effort. Together with voluntary 
measures such as corporate social responsibility initiatives and conscious 
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consumption,267 the circular economy approach presents all-embracing enforcement 
to minimise waste268 in the closed loops.269  
Every single product has a cost for the environment due to consuming environmental 
assets. In other words, surplus production causes too much waste by producing 
disposable, non-recyclable, irreparable and easily perishable products by means of 
exclusive design strategies, which damage the environment.270 This stems from the 
high frequency of innovations, which generates entirely new needs and directs the 
customer to replace his/her products with the new one. Equally, the manufacturers are 
also inclined to choose irreparable, disposable or non-recyclable materials in the 
production phase. This is because the lifetime of products is decreasing, and 
manufacturers see no merit in using high-quality materials that make products durable. 
Likewise, disruptive innovations have the same issues regarding the use of short-lived 
materials by ignoring the potential harm to the environment. So, considering all 
innovations per se beneficial would likely be a wrong approach. In fact, sometimes, it 
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would be seen as the right approach to suppress innovations in consideration of 
environmental factors.271 
2.5.2 The social cost of innovation 
From another perspective, most economic activities have a social cost that does not 
influence the retail price.272  Taking this statement a step further, every production that 
expedites the production chain by generating non-recyclable, irreparable and easily 
perishable products, also has a cost for the environment, due to the consumption of 
environmental assets.273  Therefore, the economic understanding based on more 
production is not sustainable.274 Coase has taken an important step concerning the 
protection of the environment for the internalization of negative externalities based 
upon property rights.275  In regards to that, one of the prominent externalities of 
overproduction, as a contemporary business practice under the planned obsolescence 
paradigm, is environmental pollution. 
2.5.3 The environmental cost of innovation 
 
The practice of every theory or thought requires a trade-off process - that is, to give 
up other theories or thoughts. On the one hand, for instance, encouraging 
manufacturers to be more innovative would likely jeopardise the environment, and 
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consequently the fulfilment of basic human well-being needs (such as a healthy 
ecological system and the efficient use of natural resources under intragenerational 
and intergenerational equity).276 It does not seem possible for judicial bodies to make 
a comparison between these two key concepts, as they (the innovation-driven 
economy and the low carbon economy) are both required for society but cannot exist 
together for the time being.277 Making effectively applicable legal provisions is 
therefore significant to maintaining the balance between the environment and 
technology. Pursuant to the global and irrevocable environment issues, the trade-off 
between innovation and the environment would require to be discussed more than the 
price-quality relationship even if it has a significant place in competition law theory. 
On the other hand, the possible interference to innovative manufacturers for the sake 
of environmental pollution would probably increase the production cost that would, in 
turn, reflect on the pocket price. This means that fewer consumers would benefit from 
the related product. Bork defines this situation as “redistribution of real income”.278  In 
such cases, consumers have an incentive to continue to use products longer, despite 
the adverse results such as safety and low-performance issues. That also impairs 
consumer welfare. These results, therefore, need to be interpreted with caution 
because employing a reasonable approach to tackle this issue would likely need either 
a sacrifice of technology or of the consumer welfare.  
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As a result of the analysis made during this chapter, at the outset, the current market 
structure was demonstrated and the importance of innovation in this structure was 
emphasised. In this regard, three facts were established regarding the current market 
conditions. (1) Due to effective enabling and facilitating the dissemination of 
information, the frequency of innovation has increased since the introduction of the 
new economy. (2) However, businesses are likely to undermine the progress of 
technological development to reap the maximum benefit from existing technologies. 
This is the overriding drive of the business mind. (3) Businesses (specifically in 
competitive markets) have to make and catch innovations because any failure to 
comply with existing technology would likely result in losing the market share. These 
three substances signify that businesses have to invest new technologies, but they 
ought to get in return for their previous investments to an extent.  
This chapter discussed the necessity of innovation as well as its potential dangers to 
browse through the prospectus. Natural motivations derived from the nature of the 
current economic system are defined to show the importance of taking actions by 
interventionist approaches. Neoliberal economic thought as a major economic 
approach since the 20th century has no viable alternative yet. Each individual in 
society as a homo economicus makes rational choices in line with their individual 
interest to protect themselves from the drawbacks of the neoliberal economy. 
However, at the same time, people should attune to the requirements of the capitalist 
market. The popular discourse of ‘laissez-faire laissez-passer’ accordingly indicates 
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that there is no ethical limit of capitalism.279 Nevertheless, the ethical dimensions of 
the decisions of commercial enterprises are now discussed under the new institutions, 
such as the concepts of corporate social responsibility and code of business 
conduct.280 However, there is an urgent necessity to legislate against innovation 
suppression practices by considering ever-increasing trade volume since these 
initiatives are all voluntary. Creative destruction and innovative disruption are some 
reasons to show why expecting voluntary steps are futile. This is because all these 
concepts canalise manufacturers to suppress technology in some way for returning 
more profit since almost all products regardless of their durability and qualities are 
somewhat replaced with following generation products. Planning or controlling the 
following generation products generally leads to suppression of innovation. For 
example, sometimes, new products or technologies are not introduced to the market 
without obtaining sufficient (aimed) profits from the previous products, and sometimes, 
the previous products can be disabled in some ways by adjusting products’ mechanic 
orders, software or any other methods to obtain maximum benefit from a newly 
introduced product.   
In terms of manufacturers, the strategy of innovation suppression would likely be the 
correct way to a limited extent because focusing on making the best model of all 
products renders manufacturers defenceless against new trends and economic status 
quo. For example, the ever-growing trend toward sharing economy models threatens 
manufacturers to make durable products, which may lead to overusing of same 
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products. Even many people can utilise one person’s belonging without purchasing it. 
Hence, durable products may pose problems in terms of manufacturers like 
decreasing in sales, extending producers’ liabilities, and reducing product replacement 
rates in a short time.281 On the other hand, there are large investments in the new 
creation of innovative products. It also makes all previous technologies obsolete. 
Consequently, manufacturers generally resort to limit technological developments in 
one form or another, but this harms consumers, environment, and markets. Overall, 
employing an interventionist approach to the freedom of manufacturers to produce 
durable goods is required for progression of technology and securing competitive 
markets, particularly for strengthening the competitive capacity of SMEs (Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises) and social enterprises.282 
All in all, this chapter illustrates business motivations towards suppressing innovation 
in the current economic structure. Fierce competition indicates the existing economic 
status, which requires enhancing the quality and decreasing product costs under free 
market conditions. Considering that there are stronger incentives in competitive 
markets to decrease the production cost rather than in monopoly and oligopoly 
markets.283 Several studies, accordingly, have revealed that directors of corporations 
in competitive markets make an endeavour to bring novelty and decrease costs,284 
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which would likely trigger manufacturers to incorporate innovation suppression 
strategies. On the other hand, non-competitive markets bring productive inefficiency 
in which producers have a low opinion of product cost and quality285 that causes 
detrimental externalities such as environmental damage. Hence, it is required to recall 
and even promote interventionist tools such as standardisation and circular economy 
to contribute to social welfare and neutralise other externalities. Following chapters 
will deeply demonstrate the applicability of Article 102 enforcement as one of those 
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Chapter 3: Suppression of Innovation in the Context of EU Competition Law 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter incorporates the features of innovation and the new economy concepts 
into the contemporary development process of EU competition law, preparatory to the 
fundamental debate of the study regarding whether and to what extent EU competition 
law protects the progression of innovation. In this premise, this chapter will make a 
constructive contribution and comprehensive look in the concept of suppression of 
innovation from EU competition law perspective. At the outset, an outlook of EU 
competition law in the historical and today’s context with practical considerations will 
be investigated along with the advancements of various technologies under the 
concept of consumer welfare to identify whether it is currently pro-innovative or anti-
innovative. The role of innovation in EU competition law will be subsequently 
discussed by considering leading cases such as the Google Shopping.286 
3.2 Analysis of innovation considerations in the framework of EU competition 
law  
3.2.1 Past, present and future of EU competition law: Aims, reforms and 
practical considerations 
This section is to examine the principles of EU Competition law from the historical and 
economic point of views with the practical considerations in innovation. It starts with 
analysing fundamental doctrines of the US antitrust law, which affected doctrines and 
practices discussed under EU competition law. It subsequently examines the sui 
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generis form of EU competition law in general as well as scrutinising innovation point 
of view.  
3.2.1.1 Background of EU competition law: Fundamental theories from the US 
Antitrust Law 
When EU competition law was established by the Rome Treaty in 1957, US Antitrust 
law had already moved forward by the implementation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 
1890. Hence, there seems little doubt that a study focusing on EU competition law will 
presumably fall short if the theories of US Antitrust law are not questioned even to a 
small extent. Besides, it is almost certain that competition law and economics are an 
integral part of a system as economic thinking has exerted an influence over the 
foundation of competition law. Therefore, this section necessarily proceeds to 
encapsulate basic socio-economic justifications of US Antitrust law before it 
demonstrates the foundation of EU competition law together with its controlling idea 
behind to estimate aims and objectives. Last, it argues the practicability of this law in 
whether it ensures the necessary safety of the progression of innovation.  
As regards the wide-ranging discussions while the foundations of US Antitrust law 
were laid, one may simply observe that every discussion leads to an economic 
controversy. While industrial policy advocates, such as Galbraith and Thurow, had the 
opinion that antitrust policies will improve social welfare only if they sustain large 
industrial organisations, the critical legal studies movement presented by Unger, Fox 
and Sullivan merely underlined that the application of antitrust is of no use in terms of 
the welfare of people, but it legitimises the capitalist (monopolistic) exploitation.287 
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However, the sharpest, long-standing, and continuing debate started between Harvard 
and Chicago schools’ intellectual movements. Bain, Turner, Mason and others from 
Harvard school made no compromises over the discussion of ‘structure-conduct-
performance’ regarding their position against the centralisation of capital.288 They 
consequently emphasised the necessity of market intervention with respect to several 
criteria such as price flexibility, development of new technologies and market entry 
conditions. The Chicago School objected to this interventionist-inclined phenomenon 
because it did not coincide with the American dominant economic thought of 
neoliberalism, which reached its apogee in Reagan’s time.  
The elementary idea of the Chicago School is to maximise productive efficiency to 
increase public weal.289 This is why per se prohibitions of the Court without 
ratiocinating the effects of practices on consumer welfare are required to be 
extinguished. For instance, they took this assertion much further with the seemingly 
contestable argument that monopolies and concentrations may provide much more 
efficiencies.290 According to Bork, unless the practice increases the cost of 
consumption (immediate cost), condicio juris291 will not appear for an intervention. 
Scholars from the Chicago School, namely Coase, Director, and Posner, also 
established the relationship between law and welfare economics by demonstrating the 
canons of pareto-optimal equilibrium.292 The major pillar of this Pareto efficiency is to 
achieve social welfare (socially optimal outcome) with the help of competitive markets 
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(limited market intervention). Bork subsequently formed a basis for the concept of 
welfare in practice on top of this burgeoning literature.293 However, it should be noted 
that this welfare concept is different from European understanding. 
It is generally acknowledged that this is not all that Antitrust has affected with other 
doctrines, such as populist and post-Chicago.294 Such aspects, as well as the 
abovementioned ones, have aroused curiosity concerning different perspectives of 
welfare. Pittman measured welfare by using the deadweight loss, which addresses the 
difference between the appraised value of consumers and requested reasonable 
value by manufacturers.295 In reference to the distribution of this amount, scholars 
have not arrived at a consensus yet. While some argue competition law aims to 
maximise total welfare (total surplus of society including both consumers and 
producers),296 others defend the principle of maximising consumer welfare (benefit of 
consumers based on their consumption).297 In conclusion, the enforcement of 
competition rules today took its final form in the US based on not only this debate but 
also untold other discussions. Even if, EU competition law shows similarities with US 
Antitrust law and its economic theories to some extent, it has a sui generis structure.  
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3.2.1.2 The Sui Generis Form of EU Competition Law 
The fundamental aim of EU competition law is to provide free and undistorted 
competition to make the internal market more competitive for the sake of consumers 
and the better functioning of the internal market.298 The CJEU verified this in the 
Continental Can case that competition law does not only consider direct damages to 
consumers, it also undertakes other anti-competitive conduct having direct or indirect 
effects on the market.299 Therefore, the impact area of EU competition law, particularly 
Article 102 TFEU’s scope of application, consistently enlarges300 in accordance with 
the everchanging political and economic objectives of the EU and the values of 
European societies.301 
The protection and operability of the European common market is the distinctive target 
of EU competition policy.302 Since this special characteristic requires a one-size-fits-
all approach, it precisely corresponds to the theory of ordo-liberalism developed by 
Freiburg School in the process of harmonising the economic interests of Member 
States.303 It is more than likely to say that an ordoliberal thought had a significant 
influence on the development of EU competition law, particularly in shaping its 
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economic foundations. Since this phenomenon had already faced German cartels in 
the 1930s concerning the abuse of their economic powers, it proactively foresees a 
controllable economic system (instead of the Anglo-Saxon economy) to improve 
democracy.304 Therefore, this conception regards some legal arrangements as 
necessary even though it adheres to taking a ‘hands-off approach’ regarding market 
interventions (no intervention unless it is really necessary). Although this thought was 
criticised by Keynesian theories several times, it was put into practice by cause 
celebres cases of Consten/Grundig305 and Continental Can306 regarding the 
integration of the common market. 
After the Maastricht and subsequent treaties, since the beginning of the 90s, the EU 
has lacked a sufficient amount of uniformed regulations with regard to the organisation 
of the internal market as they commenced to proceed step by step to the common 
market objective. In this connection, the White Paper in 1999 gave clear signals of a 
new move by demonstrating that current measures were not sufficient to meet the new 
challenges and therefore, a more efficient system was required.307 This process 
thereafter ended with the Council Regulation No 1/2003, which assured an undistorted 
common market with the effective and uniformed application Articles 101 and 102 of 
TFEU.308 Dabbah, Jones and Sufrin named this era from 1957 to 2004 as pre-
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modernisation, and they claimed since that time, competition law has been in its 
modernisation period by adopting a consumer welfare standard based on the ‘more 
economic approach’.309 The accepted opinion of the economic approach has been 
addressed in many cases like Intel and Microsoft where a review was requested of 
these cases due to insufficient economic approaches and analyses. For example, the 
CJEU returned the Intel case through a lack of showing actual and likely effects (the 
effect-based approach) supplied with a convincing theory of harm (logically consistent 
counter-factual analysis supported by empirical shreds of evidence).310 
Nevertheless, competition law has a dynamic structure that enables the review of 
actual needs and trends.311 For instance, the Treaty of Lisbon presented different 
discourses such as the social market economy and securing the social justice in 2007, 
which are likely to change the mainstays of ‘multi-purpose’ objectives by considering 
mounting concerns such as the protection of the environment and the progression of 
innovation.312 When current initiatives and jurisdictions are examined, it can be 
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observed that competition law targets different viewpoints such as consumer 
protection and dispersal of economic power (welfare distribution).313 Indeed, Vestager 
expansively outlined the aim of competition policy, which contributes “to efficient use 
of society’s scarce resources, technological development and innovation, a better 
choice of products and services, lower prices, higher quality and greater productivity 
in the economy as a whole.”314 This verifies that the EC currently follows the multi-
purpose objectives through considering the progression of innovation and the 
economy as well as other identified matters. 
3.2.1.3 Innovation and EU competition law 
Regarding the innovation perspective of competition law, the EC started to formulate 
a policy regarding science and technology at the end of the 1960s.315 The 
Commission, up to present, has been of the opinion that competition law enforcement 
is not only beneficial to price and quality but also to the innovation process.316 
Therefore, so far, the progress and promotion of innovation have been seen as natural 
consequences of the protection of EU competition law rather than the phenomenon 
required to be protected in itself. Therefore, competition law is considered as a tool for 
clearing the way for innovations.317 However, in recent years, key aspects of EU 
competition law underwent a radical change that IP-based considerations superseded 
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to price-output considerations as can be seen in cases of Motorola318 and 
Lundbeck319.  
However, the extent to which EU competition law overcomes problems about 
innovation as the Commission has not determined any benchmarks to elucidate future 
competition law analysis. This is because the place of innovation can be questioned 
in EU competition law is a vague moot point among scholars whether and to what 
extent it exists within the structure of the theory of harm.320 Colomo argues there are 
static concerns of EU competition law because this kind of approach based on static 
variables can only provide a solution for short terms, this is to say, likely affects the 
technological progress (rather than creating or cementing market power) can only be 
discovered as long as a dynamic understanding is developed.321 Kerber also considers 
forming innovation-emphasised assessment concepts instead of traditional concepts 
obligatory in compliance with the digital revolution wave, which has a potential to 
change the whole legal thinking by virtue of the fact that all new concepts of 
digitalisation such as big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and algorithms likely pose 
problems in terms of markets.322 In this regard, it is important to mention that the EC 
and European courts are currently experiencing difficulties with making relevant 
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market definitions. Akman,323 Robertson,324 Ferro325 and several other scholars326 
state that EU competition law should redress itself by generating analytical tools for 
establishing harm theories in relation to digital markets and other forthcoming 
innovative markets. 
Creating market definitions is a legal obligation in EU competition law assessments, 
as indicated by the court in its Continental Can decision, which determined that the 
EC must define the market and show that a dominance position was held to reach a 
decision.327 The initial phase of a “market power” judgment is the determination of the 
relevant market and whether the use of market power in this market has anti-
competitive outcomes. In this regard, market power was defined in the United Brands 
and Hoffmann-La Roche cases as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of its consumers.”328 
Although a broad market definition has been made, more than 40 years have passed 
since these decisions. During this period, the evaluation of new economic 
developments and changing market structures (such as multisided platforms, zero-
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price and data-centric digital markets) have been left entirely to the EC’s margin of 
appreciation through defining and assessing the relevant market. The EC accordingly 
makes detailed market analyzes as such in the Google Shopping329 and Google 
Android330 cases in accordance with the more economic approach. However, 
arguably, there is a lack of examining pre-market conditions and competition in 
innovation in R&D markets, where businesses are competing with each other to make 
more innovative products. While defining the relevant market and market power, the 
things to look at in today's technology-intensive markets should also be granted 
patents and the capacity to innovate, apart from traditional criteria such as determining 
the market share in a specific geographic market. Hence, the EC should emphasis on 
making market analyses by specifically assessing R&D markets within its margin of 
appreciation to establish more comprehensive and fitted determinations. This kind of 
approach will likely enable to react with dynamic reflections against dynamically 
expanding business models and market structures. 
Dynamic competition is a fundamental characteristic of the new economy. This causes 
a breakthrough change in the elements of competition as competition in the level of 
innovation substitutes the competition in price. In other words, while traditional markets 
consist of static competition where businesses capitalise on the comparative cost 
advantage, latter-day markets have a dynamic character as businesses are competing 
based on their innovations. Porter, accordingly, expressed that modern competition 
hinges upon productivity rather than having access to resources. This productivity is 
a form of innovation, which is one of the most effective tools to bestow competitive 
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capacity.331 This actuality promotes and even necessitates making a considerable 
R&D investment. The terms ‘promote’ and ‘necessitate’ are intentionally distinguished. 
The new economy encourages businesses to make innovation because they can gain 
favour from the network externalities, the first-move advantage and the low marginal 
cost even if there is a risk of facing enormous sunk costs.332 It also necessitates 
businesses to adapt to such innovation-making strategies to make their presence felt, 
or otherwise, they will presumably have no more market power. 
Overall, this dynamic structure of the new economy assures the prevention of 
monopolisation of businesses unless they provide innovation. In contrast, if continuous 
innovations are provided, monopolisation arguably becomes harmless.333 Despite the 
fact that the new economy seems to be able to self-regulate itself in theory, the main 
argument of the state interventionists is based on the view that monopolistic 
formations will likely eliminate the courage of other firms to innovate. As a 
consequence of that, states ought to remove the likely obstacles of innovative process 
in order to maximise consumer welfare as well as to protect other businesses. On the 
contrary case, monopoly businesses may impose on their rivals to use their operative 
systems or to make tied selling.334 These examples, of which more exist, present 
danger of the suppression of innovation. To the extent that the progression of 
innovation is disrupted, both consumer welfare and the innovation-driven economy are 
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affected negatively. Therefore, it appears that all conduct, which is prejudicial to the 
development of innovation, ought to be dogmatised as unlawful, notwithstanding any 
other dynamics in the new economy. It is quite apparent that there is a need for more 
innovation-focused policies and analyses. Studies also affirmed that developing a 
consistent policy is a must for the promotion of innovation inasmuch as uncertainties 
in policies negatively affect the quality and quantity of innovation.335 
It seems that in the orientation period of dynamic efficiency in competition law 
enforcement, it would likely be to examine to what extent businesses contribute to 
innovation before arriving at a penalty conclusion in regard to competition law 
infringements. However, one may raise the question the extent to which such 
efficiency defence is regarded as juridically acceptable (even though it is not easy to 
apply it in practice) because a similar efficiency defence was accepted in the Intel 
whereas it was rejected in the Magill. Therefore, there is no obstacle to put forth an 
‘innovation defence’ as an additional objective justification in light of Article 102 TFEU. 
In another saying, defendants can basically assert an innovation defence while 
plaintiffs are entitled to stay loyal to structuralist arguments. In the face of such a 
situation, although EU competition authorities have preferred structural dominance 
analyses (such as cost-benefit analysis) pursuant to narrow market interpretation, 
nevertheless it is required to make a point of considering cogent grounds of 
defendants.336 In spite of the difficulty to measure non-economic efficiencies such as 
innovative and environmental benefits, taking a futuristic approach seems 
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necessary.337 However, at the same time, she has been criticised in relation to the 
stifling of innovation due to massive fines levied by the Commission against 
technology companies such as Google and Qualcomm.338 It is quite evident that the 
progression of competition and innovation ought to be taken into consideration 
together rather than expecting more innovation ipso facto by only protecting 
competition. 
3.2.2 Actual and potential problems concerning the impediment of innovation in 
terms of EU competition law 
Recently, the EC’s general attitude in its competition analyses has shifted towards an 
IP-based approach, especially in the high-tech industries. This means that competition 
analyses (and enforcements) no longer confine with only price-quality considerations 
but also innovation considerations.339 However, it remains uncertain how the 
Commission handles innovation-related problems since it has not determined any 
criteria in reference to its analyses. This uncertainty arises from the static standpoint 
of the Commission while specifying the impact of innovation is required to have a more 
dynamic standpoint, because long-term outcomes of innovation considerations are too 
complex to show their likely effects on the technological process, the market and the 
consumer welfare.  Colomo attributed this challenge to ‘quintessentially static in 
nature’ structure of EU competition law.340 
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Colomo, accordingly, argues that innovation has only an indirect effect on EU 
competition law analysis according to contemporary decisions of the CJEU.341 When 
these decisions are examined by only taking account of Article 102 TFEU-related 
cases, it can be said that there are some certain practices, which are deemed per se 
anti-competitive regardless of their influences on the competitive structure such as 
exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates.342 In respect to some other practices, it is 
necessary to show anti-competitive effects by instantiating as it is the case with margin 
squeeze practices and selective price cuts.343 However, it would not be sufficient to 
show the influences of these practices on between price and output because the CJEU 
does not only prohibit practices that directly harms to consumers but also the 
competitive process. In this regard, it has to be primarily addressed the TeliaSonera 
case in which it was determined that “… an undertaking which holds a dominant 
position has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition in the internal market.”344 That means Article 102 TFEU does 
not only deal with practices causing direct harm to consumers but also other practices 
causing harm to consumers because of their impacts on competition.345 It is possible 
to interpret this development as referring that there are other parameters, which can 
harm to consumers indirectly rather than price and output. 
Thus far, EU competition law has inspirited the progress of innovation to an extent as 
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quality/price trade-off. However, considering the current discussions, it seems that 
innovation becomes a part of this classical trade-off discourse. That is to say, 
innovation is shown as such a ‘skeleton key’ to resolve the problems from economic 
growth to climate change.346 On top of that, as EU competition law professes to 
regulate innovation, it ought to focus its attention on evaluating and addressing ‘harm 
to innovation’ through considering assets granting innovation capabilities. It also 
should be obliged to throw light on a comprehensive analysis, including innovative 
capacity with respect to examine market power.347  
For instance, existing (traditional) competition law tests seem insufficient to measure 
potential harms as it has been mostly ignored the impact of innovation and economic 
benefits of foreclosed innovation.348 Therefore, one may argue that the EC ought to 
concentrate on investigating a network (rather than a simple market analysis), the rate 
of innovation by benefiting from its historical roots (rather than focusing on price/quality 
trade-off) and barriers to make innovation (rather than barriers to market entry).349 
However, Monti argued against this transformation and found it speculative because 
of two reasons: (1) the hardship to transfer these phenomena into practice, (2) these 
suggestions are inimical to EU competition law culture as it stands now.350 Indeed, 
assessing competition over innovation is a sticky situation with a static point of view. 
However, it is far from impossible to incorporate innovation considerations into 
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competition law analyses and enforcements.351 For example, the introduction of new 
products, the frequency of launching those products or the improvements (upgrades) 
of existing products may provide an insight into competition dynamics. 
Innovation-related claims have no place to assert in competition law analysis because 
of the difficulty of verifying innovation-related efficiency claims, which are ambiguous 
outcomes in the long run. Taking this issue a step further, one may argue that 
innovation by its very nature and elusiveness is not conducive to be a subject of such 
analysis. From another angle, it is also next to impossible to show the causal link 
between relevant practice and the process of innovation.352 For example, Microsoft 
raised suchlike claim that restraints on its IP rights by being compelled to offer 
interoperability for its products annihilate incentives to make innovation because its 
profit expectation in return to reserved budget for research and development 
investments is interrupted. However, not surprisingly, the General Court affirmed the 
Commission’s analyses, which found Microsoft’s claims inadequate, vague, general 
and theoretical because Microsoft fell short of specifying which technologies in what 
way are affected. This is because Microsoft simply stated that ‘disclosure would ... 
 
 
351 From merger point of view, the EC, accordingly, gave the first signals of this move in Deutsche Börse 
by making clear references to innovation considerations. According to this case, the Commission 
determined that the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse AG and NYSE Euronext Inc. has a 
potential to very likely increase exchange fees and decrease innovation because of the decrease in 
offered platforms to consumers. As stated by the Commission, the disappearance of intensive 
competition in innovation would likely be a foregone conclusion as well as a ‘non-negligible’ incentive 
decrease to innovate. This is because concentration parties trigger each other, and they would not have 
any drivers to innovate in terms of product innovation if the merger was accepted.351 At this point, the 
EC was not convinced to change its consideration coming from its preliminary conclusion, as parties 
did not put forward to any valid evidence in the presented statement of objections even though they 
made some commitments regarding the continuity of innovation to some degree.351 It is obvious that 
the EC has questioned the dimensions of workability and effectiveness of claims rather than whether 
the presented remedies are sufficient. This manner validates the thoughts of Monti in regard to the 
impracticability of applying innovation analysis under existing legal standards. See, Monti (n 333); Case 
T-175/12 Deutsche Börse AG v European Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015 :148, para 138; 
Commission Decision Case No COMP/.6166 Deutsche Börse / NYSE Euronext [2012] C(2012) 440 
final, para 635; Jones and Sufrin (n 29) 1197. 
352 Colomo (n 48) 201-219. 
97 
 
eliminate future incentives to invest in the creation of more intellectual property' without 
specifying the technologies or products to which it thus referred.353 However, it can be 
said that the Commission left the door open to make further claims through better and 
provable arguments as much as it sounds difficult. 
3.2.2.1 The Densification of Innovation-related Considerations by the EC 
The consideration of innovation appears more in most recent EU competition law 
cases in comparison with the decisions has taken during the 20th century. Hence, this 
consideration can be regarded as a new trend. It is irrefutable that the Commission 
uses its reasonable efforts to boost innovation against all the odds mentioned so far. 
For instance, it stipulates that dominant businesses have to cooperate with other 
undertakings in light of FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) conditions as 
it was the case with the IMS Health354 and the Aéroports de Paris.355 Therefore, 
exclusionary practices of dominant businesses have been regarded as unlawful to 
encourage innovation by furnishing an occasion to other firms to benefit from the 
network of dominant businesses through linking their goods and services to this 
network.356 In contrast, it can also be seen that EU case law does not presume 
practices directly abusive (unlawful) in terms of Article 102 TFEU just because they 
leave competitors in a difficult situation. Before intervening in such practices, the 
Commission wants to see whether they exceed predetermined thresholds, where 
actual and potential exclusionary effects of those practices on rivals are brought to 
light with a minute inquiry.357 For instance, the Commission determined that refusal to 
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license practices would not be evaluated as an abuse of market dominance in general 
if this license is not indispensable and therefore, it does not affect downstream market 
competition.358 Likewise, it was determined in Post Danmark I that selective price cuts 
would not constitute an abuse of dominance unless the relevant undertaking excludes 
its competitors and limits their ability (and incentives) to innovate in the long run.359 In 
reference to more recent cases, the Commission fined Google to €2.42 billion because 
of abusing dominance for the reason that Google does not level the playing field in 
terms of every competitor in its shopping search service, which provides price 
comparison of selected businesses. To put it in a different way, this service prevents 
European consumers from taking full advantage of potential innovation because other 
rivals have not enough incentive to innovate as they do not have the same opportunity. 
One of the significant preliminary conclusions of the Commission concerning Google 
is below: 
“Google's conduct has a negative impact on consumers and innovation. It 
means that users do not necessarily see the most relevant comparison 
shopping results in response to their queries, and that incentives to innovate 
from rivals are lowered as they know that however good their product, they will 
not benefit from the same prominence as Google's product.”360 
It can be stated that innovation considerations were taken into consideration in the first 
phase. However, the general approach of the Commission remains to be seen 
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because it is hard to take to any means from this statement.  On the one hand, a more 
likely scenario, this innovation consideration stems from an apprehension of excluding 
rivals. On the other hand, one may put forward that the essence of the matter restricts 
the competition in itself. On top of that, the point to consider from the statement is to 
specify an innovation consideration irrespective of the connotation under which 
meaning as the word of innovation is not frequently used. Article 102 TFEU and 
innovation have been strongly linked in Google Search (shopping) as stated in the 
following: 
“… the Conduct is likely to reduce the incentives of competing comparison 
shopping services to innovate. Competing comparison shopping services will 
have an incentive to invest in developing innovative services, improving the 
relevance of their existing services and creating new types of services, only if 
they can reasonably expect that their services will be able to attract a sufficient 
volume of user traffic to compete with Google's comparison shopping service. 
Moreover, even if competing comparison shopping services may try to 
compensate to some extent the decrease in traffic by relying more on paid 
sources of traffic, this will also reduce the revenue available to invest in 
developing innovative services, improving the relevance of their existing 
services and creating new types of services.”361 
The Commission enunciated that Google’s shopping service has a potential to 
undermine the competitive process because it leads to a stalemate their rivals and 
consumers as this practices will result in higher fees for merchandisers, higher costs 
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for consumers and fewer innovation incentives.362 The probable and proximate cause 
of using the expression of less innovation reflects the firm position of the Commission 
that exclusionary practices restrict innovation because of reducing the number of 
competitors in the market. Analyses related to innovation process (on practices 
regardless of the suppress or contribute to innovation) becomes a deep-seated taboo, 
which remains a challenge for EU competition law and it seems like it will continue to 
do so. It is more than likely that the difficulty in specifying a standard of proof is one of 
the main reasons of this challenge because it is always questionable which practices 
are detrimental to the innovation process. On the other hand, it also goes without 
saying that a practice enhances innovation will not be directly regarded as a pro-
competitive action.363  
3.2.2.2 The Current Perspective of the European Commission on Innovation 
Regarding the EC’s competition analyses, the progress of innovation is considered 
part of the assessment to establish a harm theory in merger cases,364 whereas it is not 
investigated in cases related to Article 102 TFEU. However, there are some innovative 
considerations between the lines of antitrust-related cases. The EC’s approach to 
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3.2.2.2.1 The EC’s approach to innovation in antitrust matters 
 
The current understanding of EU competition law covers several competitive 
parameters that affect consumer decisions, such as price, quality, choice and 
innovation.365 Even though the EC has developed criteria to evaluate price, quality and 
choice-related conflicts, it is unclear how the EC investigates innovation-related 
conflicts because EU competition law remains incapable of assessing dynamic 
features of innovation.366 Moreover, it is not clear how innovation (viewed from either 
a Schumpeterian or Arrowian perspective) might be improved or to what extent 
national level approaches will encourage businesses to innovate. For example, the 
French Competition Authority has decided that Nespresso (a coffee machine and 
coffee pod manufacturer) must share technical information with its competitors 18 
weeks before introducing a new product.367 This determination can be interpreted as 
a way of liberalising innovations from Arrowian perspective, whereas it can also be 
regarded as disincentivisation for Nespresso making further innovations from a 
Schumpeterian view. Yet, there is precedent in EU competition law to observe a 
European approach in this regard, but no matter which approach the EC employs, its 
primary aim needs to balance incentives for innovation and investment. 
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Among innovation-related issues, there are predatory innovations that eliminate the 
competition while providing no consumer benefit.368 These innovations can arise from 
modifications to technology uses or product technical designs, preventing technology 
compatibility and other existing operations provided by third parties.369 Put simply, 
preventing competitor access to innovation poses an obstacle to sustainable 
competition.370 Given this context, the EC found in the Microsoft case that hindering 
the competitiveness of its competitors was unlawful through providing essential 
facilities on Microsoft’s own platforms. In other words, the EC prevented innovative 
initiatives of other companies from being suppressed.371 Consequently, Microsoft has 
been found guilty of preventing users from accessing competing software (though it is 
worth noting that integrating its own sub-product does not constitute an anti-
competitive character per se).372  
This approach was repeated in the Qualcomm case as follows: “Where a holder of the 
IP right is regarded as enjoying a dominant position, the requirement that the use of 
those IP rights be non-abusive cannot be regarded as insufficient reward in the light 
of the incentives for innovation”.373 Another example in the Google Shopping case 
indicated ‘the conduct decreasing traffic from Google's general results pages to 
competing comparison shopping services, in contrary increasing traffic from Google's 
general search results pages to Google's own comparison shopping service’ and 
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found this anti-competitive, as it was likely to reduce innovation incentives when 
competing in comparison-shopping services.374 Furthermore, the EC mentioned the 
terms ‘reducing innovation’ and ‘deterring innovation’ in the Google Android case.375 
In light of these, it can be claimed that suppression of innovation claims are somewhat 
covered by EU competition law, and open to investigation under Article 102 TFEU. 
The EC also verified the application of that article in innovation-intensive markets (e.g., 
fast-growing sectors, such as software) despite these markets being characterised by 
short innovation cycles, and therefore, temporary dominant positions. 376 
Overall, the EC took a view of ensuring that consumers could switch their services 
freely in case of price escalation or innovation discontinuance,377 considering 
competition and innovation to be beneficial as long as customers have an option to 
switch providers. Simply, the EC eliminates all anti-competitive obstacles to provide 
an impetus for innovating businesses. One of the most important goals of the EU is to 
provide an open market economy with free competition;378 consequently an 
undistorted competition environment must be created to ensure free competition. 
Therefore, removing obstacles to the dynamic development of innovation is the most 
important action, ensuring all market players’ ability to innovate and guaranteeing free 
competition. Since innovation is of great importance to the consumer and market 
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perspectives, Article 102 TFEU should be interpreted in a broader sense.379 However, 
due to the uncertain nature of innovations (because of the unpredictable and dynamic 
nature of innovation), it remains unclear to what extent competition law interventions 
would be pro-consumer.380 In light of all these, Ezrachi has developed the term 
'cautious intervention' in relation to innovation in the context of EU competition law.381 
That being said, it is observed in the current situation that detailed analyses on 
innovation have not been carried out and that concerns about innovation development 
remain between the lines without influencing judgements. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to indicate henceforward that innovation can be examined as an independent 
parameter of competition law. With this understanding, enforcement against the 
suppression of innovation would be a concomitant result. 
3.2.2.2.2 Innovation considerations in merger analyses 
 
Although this study limits itself to considering Article 102 TFEU, there are lessons to 
be gleaned from the EC’s merger analyses. From a broad perspective, identifying the 
EC’s standpoint on innovation by examining the case of Dow/DuPont in relation to 
merger control would be beneficial. However, it should be noted that merger and 
antitrust analyses have completely different characteristics. The agreed upon merger 
of the Dow/DuPont382 successfully epitomised the role of innovation in merger 
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analyses. The EC assessed the innovative strengths of Dow and DuPont by analysing 
all patents granted them from 2000 to 2015.383 The investigation was launched under 
the concession that competition in the pesticide production market is based on 
innovation. Hence, the existence of innovation competition was accepted in advance 
as the competition reflected a dynamic patent race between five companies 
(previously known as big 5), namely BASF, Bayer, Syngenta, Dow and DuPont. It has 
been observed that farmers are inclined to purchase new products, including those 
that are less toxic but contend effectively with various types of pests. Therefore, the 
decrease in innovation is an undesired result since the rate of the competition will 
concordantly diminish. The main concern regarding the given merger was the 
likelihood of decreasing innovation since Dow and DuPont triggered each other to 
innovate while they were competing head-to-head. Other concerns were the decrease 
in the number of market players and the high market entry barriers to having similar 
research and development capacity if this merger would have happened.384 According 
to the conditional acceptance of this merger, it has been found appropriate to transfer 
(alienate) the large part of pesticide business and related research and development 
organisations. In this premise, it was agreed that the merger would not make any 
changes regarding the incentives to pursue parallel innovation efforts.385 In brief, the 
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Dow/DuPont merger investigation riveted innovation on to other parameters of 
competition law, namely price, choice and quality. Such a transition from traditional 
sources of competition law to more dynamic and contemporary parameters incisively 
fulfil the changing needs when considered that markets are not solely determined by 
static power anymore, but by disruptive innovations having dynamic characteristics. 
Therefore, innovation can be suitably accepted as a counterbalance to market power. 
Even if a detailed analysis of the Dow/DuPont merger was presented through showing 
likely effects on innovation competition, there was a lack of due diligence to show the 
causal link between the merger and further innovation activities. The EC had a 
reasonably abstract approach to conclude without establishing how future product 
innovations are restricted and without establishing a specific link to existing or future 
markets.387 The theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont can be based on the mostly referred 
concerns mentioned throughout the analysis, such as discontinuation, delay or 
redirection of research activities. One may argue that these concerns represent 
forward-looking apprehensions, which may enlighten the subsequent decisions, which 
will likely embody with future innovation (market) estimations. It would not be wrong to 
say that this decision is a milestone in terms of showing the importance given to 
innovation considerations. However, an endeavour to examine innovation seems quite 
insuperable as it is not conducive to be a subject of any standard of proof because of 
its vagueness (forecast uncertainty). Indeed, the very likely reason why the EC did not 
differentiate between research and development activities and innovation was to go 
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overspending budget for R&D activities does not mean to achieve more innovation 
even if it supports to innovate.  
It appears from the said investigations that several attempts have been conducted to 
find out the effects of the innovation process in competition law analysis. Even though 
the Dow/DuPont decision brought a novel dimension to the application of innovation 
in merger control analysis by considering research and development capabilities of 
merged parties, the dispute still continues with regard to innovation considerations in 
EU competition law.388 The transition towards innovation considerations has already 
begun by Deutsche Börse, but Dow/DuPont gave supporting signs to proceed with 
more innovation-focused analyses.389 In furtherance to this, an investigation has just 
been initiated against BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen on the grounds that they 
debarred European consumers from existing emission cleaning technologies from 
2006 to 2014 in light of Article 101/1(b) TFEU (whether there is a likely cartel 
agreement to limit or control production, markets or technical developments). These 
German car manufacturers are now under investigation to not to prevent 
environmental damage even though they have preventive technology as stated in the 
preliminary view of the Commission.390 Therefore, this investigation fundamentally 
attests that the Commission examines thoroughly different dimensions such as 
existing underutilising technologies (a type of suppression of innovation) and 
considering environmental perspectives alongside with price, quality and choice 
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trilogy. All these recent happenings show that EU competition law employs more 
comprehensive approach in merger analyses by paying strict attention to the 
progression of innovation through removing all the impediments, which may harm to 
innovation, in both investigation and proceeding phases.  
3.3 Theoretical analysis of innovation suppression in terms of competition and 
intellectual property laws 
The aims of competition and IP laws are prima facie considered as intertwined 
because IP law bestows monopoly rights to inventors, which can result in more 
monopolised market structure. However, these laws actually complement each other, 
and they are both instrumental to promote innovation.391 Therefore, they are required 
to be addressed regarding innovation suppression practices. For several reasons, 
some innovations are presented late or, even worse, not presented at all, which may 
imply the suppression of innovation, though not always. This scenario arises from 
patent holders’ practices, in which they use their monopoly powers originating from 
their IP rights to halt the progress of innovation. The US antitrust law literature took an 
interest in the innovation suppression concept (it is also called technology 
suppression) to some extent, whereas EU competition law has not placed any focus 
on this concept so far. In this regard, this chapter strives to carry this significant 
discussion across the ocean as members of the EU are faced with the same difficulties 
in different names. 
The suppression of innovation becomes apparent in different forms, but cases hinge 
upon patent rights since these rights lend themselves to abuse (misusing or no using) 
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of the introduction of new technologies. Patent rights, standing alone, are lawful in the 
normative sense. However, a legal assessment becomes complicated when patent 
holders conduce towards suppression of innovation, as in the case of non-use of 
patents, as there is no actual violation of competition law in the normative doctrine. 
Therefore, there is a need to designate a legal standard proof in order to prevent such 
suppression activities via competition law tools. Nevertheless, this kind of standard 
can be bending easily. For instance, an undertaking may be found to suppress 
technology if it does not sufficiently concentrate on research activities. As another 
example, a cartel practice of committing not to innovate will be regarded as anti-
competitive. Although these example scenarios have merit to an extent, it is 
challenging to lay the groundwork for making such provisions. Even though the 
practices cause technology suppression, it does not mean that they are anti-
competitive. Hence, evaluation on a case-by-case basis is required to separate anti-
competitive and unlawful conduct. Throughout this chapter and the following chapters, 
specific technology suppression cases will be argued. 
3.3.1 Suppression of innovation as an anti-competitive practice 
The concept of innovation suppression was leastwise put into word in the US Antitrust 
law, whereas it is a genuinely new concept for the EU competition law.392 The question 
that should be asked about the suppression of innovation is whether there is a real 
competition law violation by determining what purpose of the law is impinged in this 
framework. According to Peritz, competition law is a composition of regulating private 
economic activities for the sake of the development of the public interest.393 As to EU 
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competition law, it aims to provide consumer welfare, which is an ever-expanding 
concept in following the acceptance that consumer welfare covers the low price, high 
quality and wider choices. However, as this study claims, current concerns like 
promoting innovation ought to be addressed in competition violation assessments 
because businesses are now getting competitive power upon their innovativeness. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take preventive measures to secure the progress and 
promotion of innovation in the context of EU competition law, in particular against 
innovation suppression practices. 
To set a framework for this concept, it would be beneficial to address Flynn’s 
quadripartite analysis that evaluate the extent to which preventing, deterring or 
suppressing innovation are contrary to the EU competition law in light of considering 
private interests in addition to the public interest.394 The market regulator, accordingly, 
ought to ensure the dispersion of supremacy, the elevation of merit competition, the 
pleasure of consumers and the protection of the competitive process. Therefore, the 
competition policy needs to ensure three basic forms of economic efficiency, namely 
allocative, productive and innovation efficiencies.395 In other words, the policymaker 
should secure the continuity of innovations and the dispersion of these innovations to 
consumers and rival corporate entities without interruption. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to practice, it is not easy to assess these efficiencies as they mostly rest upon 
estimations. Hence, it is evident that practical difficulties will be occurred with regard 
to make a counter-factual analysis and to show an actual effect and proof of 
purpose.396 In parallel, the question of ‘what would have occurred but for suppressing 
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technology instead’ can be rested upon factual reasons, this question will likely remain 
puzzled.  
Even though there is no merit to discuss which efficiency is superior to others, Brodley 
is of the opinion that innovation efficiency is the most important one to ‘provide the 
greatest enhancement of social wealth’.397 However, the difficulty to prove innovation 
efficiency should be noted. The importance of innovation efficiency becomes more 
obvious, where innovations toward more deregulated industries currently drive 
economic systems. It would not be wrong to claim that competition analyses have not 
based on two-dimensional static form anymore, but also other indicators like 
innovation. Therefore, innovation efficiency should not be ignored under all these 
conditions by considering the changing structure of economic development and 
consumer welfare. In this context, suppression of technology (controlling or deterring 
innovations) should be regarded as a direct violation of competition law.  
3.3.2 Relevant patent theories on innovation suppression 
IP rights give the owner exclusive rights, which may lead to deterioration of the 
competitive environment. Both IP and competition laws are directed towards the 
purpose of ‘the wellbeing of EU citizens, businesses and society as a whole’398 but 
they achieve this common goal in different ways. IP law encourages people to make 
innovations and also encourages inventors to put on the market for enabling 
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technological development.399 Competition law, on the other hand, aims to provide a 
competitive environment and thus encourage the production of cheaper, higher 
quality, and innovative products.400 Therefore, the suppression of innovation will bring 
adverse outcomes for both disciplines. The reason to include relevant patent theories 
in this section is to establish a basis of competition failures arising from the use of 
patent rights. 
Amidst the Schumpeter-Arrow debate to set a legal ground for the IP rights, current 
expectations of competition law regarding the progress of technology are to encourage 
research activities through maximising incentives to innovate and maintain competitive 
markets where advanced technologies are easy to develop. However, it is quite hard 
to share this conventional opinion when technology suppression cases are 
considered. The likely way to contribute to the accepted opinion is to identify 
exceptional cases that impede the progress of innovation. Therefore, it is necessary 
to revisit some theories behind the grant of IP rights claimed by Kitch, Howells, and 
Demsetz. 
The Prospect Theory of patents proposed by Kitch mainly remarks on the social 
benefit of patents, which is the efficient coordination of technological development.401 
Therefore, the prospect function of patents is indicative of the public side of granting 
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patent rights. This theory also integrates intellectual property into property rights 
successfully by providing temporary monopoly rights. This addresses a limited 
monopoly right to increase innovations as a consumer surplus.402 From a different 
perspective, Howels argued that granting patents do not block technological 
developments, whereas practical difficulties in the administrative process cause the 
suppression of innovation.403 He exemplified the Selden patent, which is known as a 
classical instance of the submarine patent. Selden, at the same time, is the name of 
the lawyer, who adapted a distinctive strategy somehow to protract the process of 
patent issuance and patent publication. For example, Selden used a patent, which 
was used in the automobile industry, for nearly 16 years with this tactic. The US took 
necessary measures afterwards and currently, a patent application in the US will be 
automatically published after 18-months from the earliest priority date,404 where the 
EU also has the same timeframe.405 
From a different viewpoint, Demsetz stated that patent systems provide a natural 
monopoly regulation. In such a way that, the existence of more than one undertaking 
to compete for getting an exclusive franchise implies a natural barrier for monopolists. 
This consequently maximises social benefit.406 On the one hand, the prospect theory 
puts forward that the patent system effectively helps developing technology. Instead, 
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it has an adverse effect by blocking or holding-up downstream innovations because 
elementary patents have general scopes as a consequence of first-mover 
advantage.407 Therefore, specific measures ought to be taken for the passivation of 
suppressing innovations without discouraging innovators.  
3.3.3 How and why technology is suppressed? 
Suppression of technology is more often the result of the introduction of a new 
technology being deliberately timed and presented to attempt to control the 
progression of technology due to commercial concerns. Hence, it is very rare to 
encounter a case of technology being directly suppressed for the sole purpose of 
suppressing; most instances of suppression show up as a result of business decisions. 
In other words, if interpreted broadly, technology suppression is a consequence of any 
event which halts or slows innovation or decreases research efficiency. In a narrower 
sense, it is possible to define technology suppression as keeping existing technology 
out of the market. However, although there are many practices likely to result in the 
suppression of innovation, this does not mean that all of those practices are unlawful 
or anti-competitive. It is thus necessary to specify the problematic aspects of those 
practices rather than condemning all of them. 
Saunders and Levine defined the suppression of innovation as the event that a patent 
holder both files to those patents and refuses to licence them in an anti-competitive 
manner. This practice suppresses technology because it prevents market competition 
and consumers from development. For example, an exclusive licensing agreement 
requires a patent holder to grant a licence for a specific undertaking by excluding other 
 
 
407 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, ‘On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The 
Effect of Patent Scope Decisions’ (1994) 25 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 1-24. 
115 
 
third parties. Any third party which does not have such a licence is precluded from 
developing existing technology, which again results in suppressing innovation. Abuse 
of patents is another means of suppressing innovation when it comes to patent 
consolidation (controlling competing technologies to disrupt innovation), patent pools 
(exploiting monopoly rights by gathering cross-licenses), patent thickets (obtaining a 
vast number of patents and thus leaving inventors in a difficult situation) so on and so 
forth. Not all these variations of patent abuse are strictly illegal, but they can be 
regarded as abusive if they stifle innovation.408 Sometimes the market itself interferes 
with the proliferation of innovation. As explained in the previous chapter, for example, 
the network effect can increase the number of technologies being used, but newer 
technologies may nevertheless be overshadowed by current technologies, as was the 
case with the Dvorak keyboard.409  
Some products may be presented as a bundle consisting of different tools with 
different functions, some of which may be produced by rival companies; this may force 
manufacturers to use certain specific technologies while prohibiting them from using 
others.410  The process of standardisation is the effort to make products compatible 
while also providing an important market position for an undertaking having a specific 
technology, and consequently ensuring the profitability of and intellectual rights 
pertaining to a specific product. Dominant undertakings can set de facto standards to 
distort competition. However, it is also possible to use such standards to delay the 
introduction of innovations or avoid the use of a specific technology. This ultimately 
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stifles innovation because companies are not compensated for their investments (sunk 
costs) unless their products conform to current standards.411  
In addition to Article 102 TFEU and the TFEU-related patent issues explained above, 
agreements made between competitors to avoid using a specific technology and to 
each other's research area can be evaluated according to the terms of Article 101 of 
the TFEU. It is very difficult to determine how unlawful these practices are under the 
theory of harm, even though they clearly and explicitly halt the progression of 
innovation. In this regard, it is useful to refer back to US antitrust law with the decision 
on tobacco companies by the Washington Superior Court in 1996. The court fined 
related tobacco companies for violating US antitrust law by ‘suppress[ing] independent 
research on the issue of smoking and health’ regarding research on developing safer 
cigarettes. This fine was imposed because the companies in question were found to 
have suppressed new innovations to make cigarettes safer with less harmful 
ingredients.412 The primary concern of such companies was their fear of the disruptive 
effects safer cigarettes would likely have on the conventional cigarette market. Before 
this decision, in the 1950s, there was another case involving the effort to create safer 
cigarettes. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company has subsequently initiated a project 
(‘Project XA’) to create a cigarette which would be less dangerous to smoke in the 
1970s. Therefore, the link between cancer and smoking has already been 
demonstrated by the time the project began and was ostensibly the reason the project 
was created. However, following this project, Philip Morris, the biggest cigarette 
manufacturer in the market, menaced Liggett & Myers on the grounds circulating 
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negative information on the health effects of cigarettes would breach the industry 
agreement by damaging cigarette sales. Liggett & Myers was the first company to 
admit that cigarettes could cause cancer. The rest of the manufacturers cooperated in 
an effort to suppress scientific evidence showing the causal relation between smoking 
cigarettes and cancer pursuant to their limited research.413 
Overall, the above instances show how indirect and easily disguised efforts to 
suppress innovations can be. There are other practices that can be used to suppress 
technology including refusal to license, creating a patent pool or patent thickets, taking 
over rivals or bringing baseless suits for patent infringements. It is, therefore, 
necessary to set limits on practices which could be used to suppress innovation, which 
at present are normalised and even ignored. This issue is directly linked to the daily 
extension of the scope of patentable goods and processes. Patent protections are 
currently provided for everything from business methods to gene sequences; although 
it is thought expanding such protections even further will drive further innovation, its 
effects on the public interest are controversial in terms of the future impacts of 
technology suppression.414 In other words, a new business is always at risk for patent 
infringement because a product or production method may always give rise to a 
conflict with the owner of a patent. Hence, the scope of a patent ought to be sharply 
limited in such a way that it serves the purpose of protection.  
3.3.3.1 The lawfulness of innovation suppression practices 
Saunders and Levine define technology suppression as the shelving of an invention, 
which is just as instrumental as its existing equivalents that other manufacturers will 
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integrate if they are aware of this invention. Hence, the technology will be suppressed 
given the patent holder decides non-use or non-diffuse for controlling the advanced 
technology.415 The lawfulness of suppression practices as anti-competitive tactics 
ought to be revisited as it directly affects the public interest. In addition to the safer 
cigarette case, there are other claims concerning the invention of the cancer cure and 
other diseases point out that the suppression of innovation is an actual and continuing 
phenomenon. Concerning the innovation suppression, it has to be regarded as two 
distinct sides, rather than trying to find common ground as Saunders and Levine 
proposed.416 The intention behind to shelve an innovation identifies this adversary 
sides. First, it should be always bear in mind that a bona fide may be behind the 
practice of suppressing innovations whenever the patented invention is not profitable 
to be marketed or also, the invention cannot be patented because of their very natures. 
These states of affairs do not directly indicate any interruption of technological merit. 
On the contrary, indeed, businesses may suppress innovation on purpose with 
particularly reductive reasons, and only monopolies can put this strategy into practice 
as proved by economists.417  
Businesses are making profits by using their monopoly rights to compensate sunk 
costs and to fend off free riders, which watch for an opportunity of imitating the 
protected product. This is also the aim of granting patents. However, the patent system 
prompts concern in terms of increasing more suppression of innovation because 
monopolies have tendencies to maintain the status quo.418 It is more than likely that 
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dominant businesses resort to suppressing their patented technologies, which create 
market entry barriers. Therefore, the patented but suppressed technology provides the 
patent owner with an opportunity of being a monopoly in a certain amount of time. It 
should be noted that it is anti-competitive to abuse the monopoly position, not having 
the monopoly position. In this matter, the suppression of innovation practices should 
be considered as anti-competitive because the patent owner decides to suppress his 
innovation and not allow others to use the innovation. This blocks existing rivals from 
commercialising the technology in both upstream and downstream markets.419 It 
consequently indicates a violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
Albeit the strong theoretical ties between the suppression of innovation and Article 102 
TFEU demonstrated so far, there are more complex issues regarding the enforcement 
of competition law. In practice, the prejudgement that the patent is private property 
rather than a publicly granted privilege ties courts up in knots.420 In regard to 
competition law litigation on the suppression of innovation, it seems that the only way 
to handle this issue by the court is referring to the intention of businesses. Irrespective 
of motivations, the court presumably will not find any competition law violation. 
Therefore, as a remedial suggestion, the legal-economic reasoning ought to be 
presented if patent protection is not requested for a marketable invention. Therefore, 
related conduct may be deemed reasonable if the business proves ‘a technological 
necessity justification.’ Hence, it seems that competition law should include an 
emphasis on suppressing competing technologies. Although the assumption of 
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competition law addresses that maintaining a competitive process maximises 
innovation. 
3.3.3.2 What if technologies remain unpatented? 
As explained, the usual story concerning the suppression of innovation will likely begin 
after the obtainment of a patent right. However, it is not a rare occasion to remain 
inventions unpatented if they contain confidential business information, so-called trade 
secrets. Provided that businesses having trade secrets can exploit their invention as 
long as they can keep it hidden absent any time limit. However, this may end up with 
happening of the risk (disclosure of the secret) that seriously jeopardises the secret 
owner. The tricky question is whether to obtain or not to obtain a patent is more 
rewarding because trade secret owner can make more profit without time constraint in 
case that secrets are kept. The unpatented formula of Coca-Cola becomes one of the 
most intriguing cause celebre in this regard.421 One can argue that it is possible to 
intervene in this secret based on innovation efficiency claims to develop healthier (and 
cheaper) forms of Coca-Cola, as it was the case with safer cigarettes. However, it 
would be an extreme example to coercively include this entirely different scenario into 
the suppression of innovation.  
3.4 Conclusion   
This chapter provided a theoretical argument that suppression of innovation practices 
have anti-competitive features and need to be treated by Article 102 TFEU in the 
context of EU competition law. For doing this, the current standpoint of the EC on 
innovation was specified by historical, theoretical and practical perspectives. The 
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analysis was started with illustrating fundamental theories of competition law 
developed by Chicago and Harvard schools. Although these two schools have had 
influences from time to time, the sui generis nature of EU competition law in line with 
the ordoliberalist approach (on the protection and operability of the European common 
market as well as consumer welfare) was observed. Above all, it was demonstrated 
that the EC has gradually extended its interpretation in Article 102 TFEU to implement 
its political and economic policies. In this context, the EC’s more economic approach 
has brought itself in a more dynamic form, which helps to understand ever-changing 
market conditions. However, no initiative has been taken from either the EC or 
European courts to analyse competition in innovation, therefore R&D markets, even 
though they showed a tremendous effort when analysing innovative capabilities in 
merger cases. 
There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the lawfulness of business practices 
suppressing innovation alongside the degree to which businesses contribute the 
technological development. This issue was examined throughout the chapter by 
analysing the EC’s current approach to innovation. It was consequently illustrated that 
innovation considerations have not influenced judgements so far although the 
promotion of innovation was repetitively mentioned in both EU-level documents and 
case law. Instead, the progress and promotion of innovation were considered as 
offering wider choice for consumers. Then, it was critically argued the necessity to 
independently assess R&D markets, where competition in innovation occurs, as 
innovation has great importance on market power, specifically technology-driven 
markets. This importance was also underlined by showing the reasons why 
businesses attempt to suppress technologies. 
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Finally, this chapter showed the IP law’s (specifically patents’) important role for the 
disclosure and diffusion of innovations, which are also expected outcomes of EU 
competition law. Hence, the common and complementary grounds of these two legal 
fields were addressed to examine the issue of innovation suppression by visiting 
relevant theories. In particular, Flynn’s quadripartite analysis was addressed to 
conceptualise the anti-competitive characteristics of suppression innovation practices. 
Therefore, it was concluded that competition policies should be designed to increase 
allocative, productive and innovation efficiencies (despite the difficulty to prove 
innovation efficiency with counter-factual analyses). In this context, Saunders and 
Levine suggested short and long terms deterrents in regard to technology 
suppression. In the short term, contractual provisions may work, but in the long term, 
there is a need for radical changes in technology policies and existing laws (in addition 
to compulsory licencing, etc.).422 However, they stated without hesitation that 
competition law enforcement should be directly applied when it comes to technology 
suppression, which is inherently anti-competitive as it harms consumers by preventing 
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Chapter 4: Frequently Encountered Patents Related Instances of the 
Suppression of Innovation in the Context of EU Competition Law 
4.1 Introduction 
Using IP rights for businesses is one of the most addressed ways of suppressing 
innovations. Therefore, this chapter argues frequently encountered patent related 
issues of EU competition law in regard to suppression of innovation. On the one hand, 
patents secure the return of investment and allow the patent holder to exercise his 
right in the most efficient way so long as not harming the competition. Patents also 
contribute to the spread and distribute new technologies for the sake of consumer 
welfare. On the other hand, patent rights can be abused to restrict the progression of 
innovations in specific circumstances. Even though limited circumstances are chosen 
to discuss in this study, there is no shortage of examples. Five of those circumstances 
(the non-use of patents, pay-for-delay agreements, standard-setting agreements, 
protection of spare part designs and evergreening patents) are argued in the following 
sections.  
4.2 The non-use of patent rights 
It is widespread to come across the non-use of patent rights since there is no legally 
binding requirement to force patent owners to use their rights even if the society 
misses out the benefits of patented technologies. Patent owners can exploit the 
monopoly right on their own patented technology in a given period, but the non-use of 
the patent right during this period leads to the removal of the technology from the 
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market.424 This trajectory, beyond question, signalises the suppression of innovation. 
Regarding the non-use of IP rights, there are other examples under copyright law and 
trademark law such as orphan works and abandoned trademarks. The common point 
of all these examples is that protected rights do not always serve the interest of 
society.425 
4.2.1 The theoretical basis of granting IP rights 
Saunders identifies patents as a sort of social contract between patentees and the 
society where the patentee sells their labours on their inventions in the shape of 
disclosure with the promise of commercialising it and allowing others to utilise; in 
return, the society entitles the time-limited monopoly rights to the patentee.426 In this 
context, provided that the patentee does not use the patent or assign other developers 
in the manner of no benefit to society (and technology), this contract becomes voidable 
because of the violation of contract terms. Every national legal system ought to 
concentrate on setting a balanced IP protection system if they want to secure their 
technological development because an efficient protection system is required to 
provide more incentives to businesses for more innovation. Hence, the protection of 
IP rights is more than vital for the appearance of innovations. There is a delicate 
balance to standardise the level of protection because a permissive system will create 
a free environment for fruitless opportunists such as free riders and patent trolls. In 
contrast, overprotection would significantly disincentivise innovators due to its more 
complicated procedures.  
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Even though there are several theories concerning IP rights like Lockean, personality 
and social planning theories, the utilitarian approach purely underlies the foundations 
of granting patent rights.427 The utilitarian theory does not only shed light on economic 
and philosophical debates but also profoundly influences legal and political thinking. 
Bentham set crux of the argument with the formula of ‘greater happiness for a greater 
number of people.’428 This general motto has interpreted in different forms as of today. 
The current dominant thought is deducing the greater happiness as satisfying people 
with increasing their choice options.429  For this purpose, the law ought to design 
encouraging mechanisms to bring innovations to light by securing suitable conditions.  
4.2.2 The non-use of patents under the utilitarian theory 
The utilitarian theory comprises two mainstream theories: prospect theory and 
incentive theory. Prospect theory mainly emphasises on transforming the inventors’ 
efforts into commercial commodities. Therefore, this theory supports facilitating 
inventors to use their inventions. However, it would be rather difficult to associate this 
theory with any deterring mechanism, which prevents the non-use of a granted patent 
right. On the other hand, the incentive theory aims to catalyse incentives for inventors 
to introduce invent and disclose because there is no other way to recoup costs 
stemming from the invention process. The crux of this scheme is to reveal innovations 
under any circumstances whatsoever. 
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Since information is regarded as a non-excludable public good under this theory, free 
riders will always pose a problem in case of no protection for innovators and 
consequently for the development of innovations. However, the protection of IP rights 
has a social cost in addition to its economic costs (such as transaction and 
administrative costs). For example, deadweight loss is likely to occur when an 
undertaking overcharges on the strength of having an IP right. Also, it is more likely to 
encounter anti-competitive outcomes when an undertaking uses the IP right as a trump 
card to excludes its rivals. The utilitarian notion necessitates considering all of these 
probabilities for the sake of maximising the social benefit.430 
As regards the non-use of IP rights in the utilitarian account, it seems less problematic 
to determine the benefit of nonpracticing such rights to the society. Prima facie, one 
can easily see that there is no benefit to hold granted IP rights unless it becomes public 
knowledge. The utilitarian equation is quite simple that there is no merit to protect a 
buried cancer cure if it does not inure to the benefit of society. From the absolutist 
view, it is entirely abstract to legally protect a right, which will not be used. However, it 
is normatively not possible to force the patent owner to use patented technology if the 
patent is obtained in accordance with the patentability standards under the lex lata. 
Therefore, the patent owner can strategically exercise the patent right in his best 
interest by nonpracticing or holding up for a length of time.  
An IP right as befits the name is a sort of property, which entitles their owners a right 
to benefit in any case. However, it is open to debate whether and to what extent such 
rights are absolute. Having said that the issue reason for IP rights is originally due to 
a utilitarian-based legal system to increase consumer welfare, but it seems to be quite 
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obvious that the non-use of these rights is diametrically opposite with the utilitarian 
thought.   
4.2.3 Common reasons not to practice patent rights 
Some scholars advocate bringing ‘the use requirement’ into force following the 
utilitarian approach.431 However, it is worth considering whether IP owners go against 
the grain by underutilising their monopoly rights. The first and most proper explanation 
is that patents may be seen as an unprofitable investment and therefore, not 
worthwhile to put into practice. For example, the profitability of the newly acquired 
patent may be imperilled with another newly introduced technology. Under the 
utilitarianist circumstance, so-called ‘the greatest number for the greatest happiness’, 
it would not be beneficial (and practical) to expect the use of the (non-advantageous) 
patent. However, it also would not be beneficial to refuse to let third parties use this 
patent even though the third-party claims to put the patent into practice in a novel 
way.432  
Secondly, the patent may not be ready for use because of the technological level. For 
example, 5G technology firstly introduced in 2012, but there are very few countries, 
which can provide sufficient infrastructure so far, such as South Korea, Germany, and 
the UK. Hence, there is a valid ground to hold patents associated with the 5G until the 
integrity of the required technological transformation.433 This scenario looks innocent 
because the creation will likely integrate with current technology in the long view. 
 
 
431 Tun-Jen Chiang, ‘Trolls and Orphans’ (2016) 96 Boston University Law Review 700; Saunders (n 
40) 389. 
432 Bone (n 427) 15. 
433 There are already hundreds of thousands granted patents regarding the 5G technology in European 
Patent Office. It can be checked via https://worldwide.espacenet.com. 
128 
 
Thirdly, in exceptional cases, the decision not to use patent rights may be in question 
where patents are acquired without a desire to develop. So to say, patent owners use 
their rights for burying them with idiosyncratic reasons.434 It is apparent here that this 
practice has no contribution to the total welfare. 
Last but not least, the most challenging issue is the existence of patent assertion 
entities (PAEs). These entities strategically obtain patent rights without a desire to 
develop but a desire to gain favour in some financial way. PAEs are also known as 
patent trolls, which can be observed in different forms. Lemley and Melamed specified 
three types of distinctive patent trolls. First, there are ‘lottery ticket’ trolls, which fish for 
the grand prix from white shoe firms after acquiring valid and high-quality patents. 
‘Bottom-feeder’ trolls are the second type of patent trolls, which threaten other patent 
owners with frivolous litigation procedures by using their low-quality -and usually 
invalid- patents to get favorable settlements. Finally, there are ‘patent aggregators’ 
that are generally big companies such as Intellectual Ventures and IBM. They mainly 
emphasise on collecting patents from the market as much as they can (quantity rather 
than quality), and subsequently, they demand royalties pursuant to those patents.435 
It seems that each type of troll acts against the progression of innovation because of 
the impediment of newer technologies (the suppression of innovation). 
4.2.4 Patent Trolls: Is it just an American phenomenon? 
There is a common belief that the current EU patent system does not provide effective 
remedies as it should be, and one of the examples is PAEs where they do not engage 
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in research and developments but aggregate patents, which they do not exploit, but 
use them as a mean to collect royalties. Such activities may lead to suppression of 
technologies that harm consumer welfare as the consumer do not benefit from new 
products that are protected by these sleeping patents. Even though such entities are 
mostly known in the US patent system, there is a remarkable amount of patent trolls 
in the EU where the progression of innovation is hanged on by a thread. 
The US has been suffering from patent trolls for a long time. However, PAEs-related 
litigations have steadily decreased with the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act436 in the 
US as of 2011 since it has provided a more solid post-grant review process and a 
forum shopping opportunity for defendants.437 So far, the apparent truth is that patent 
trolls have been much more effective in the US where it was borne the brunt of PAEs’ 
attacks.438 These attacks inevitably undermine the progression of technology and 
generate an uncertain environment that innovators are obliged to make a payment to 
negotiate with patent trolls. According to the prevailing opinion, patent trolls are not 
the problem, but the symptom is stemming from the weakness of the US patent 
system. As it was determined very low barriers in granting patents, the number of low-
quality (and likely to conflict other) patents is abundant.439 
The EU patent system seems far superior to the US in terms of the struggle with low-
quality patents. However, other superiorities such as the forum shopping opportunity 
and the loser-pays-attorney-fees regime should not be underestimated. Regardless of 
the structural predominance of EU patent system, Those litigations, conversely, 
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increased across Europe with the 19 per cent average yearly increase rate from 2007 
to 2017 and reached to a dangerous extent.440 Some other empirical studies also verify 
the existence of PAEs across Europe.441 This fact on itself is enough to raise doubt 
about denying the allegations that Europe does not suffer from PAEs.442 However, it 
is worrisome that it has not taken any European level action in regard to the elephant 
in the room yet as a result of being affected not too much.443  
Since this issue has always been beside the point in terms of EU law, there is 
uncertainty with regard to likely approach of EU courts and the Commission.444 In 
terms of intimidating patent litigations, the application of Article 102 TFEU may always 
come to the fore to the extent that such litigations have likely anti-competitive effects 
even though those litigations (vexatious suits) seem juristically rightful. Therefore, 
undertakings’ practices may be regarded as abusing their dominant position as long 
as the existence of dominance and the intention of eliminating competition are 
established.445 The Commission demonstrated two cumulative conditions to determine 
whether there is an anti-competitive litigation strategy in the ITT Promedia.446 First, the 
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lawsuit has to be brought with the intention of leaving competitors in a tight spot. 
Second, this lawsuit has the characteristic of eliminating actual or likely competition 
environment.447 In the absence of these, the application of Article 102 TFEU will 
become impossible. Therefore, an intent to file suit can be regarded as a determinant 
to determine which conduct are anti-competitive. However, it should be noted that this 
situation is highly exceptional. Otherwise, the competition will be damaged if all suits 
are being considered in this regard.   
4.2.5 Does EU suffer from patent trolls as much as the US? 
There is a further need for an explanation about the spell protecting the EU patent 
system and the reason why it seems that patent trolls were more likely effective in the 
US. To unveil this mystery, first and foremost, it is required to consider traditional and 
structural differences between the US and EU if one wants to take a lesson from this 
comparative analysis. The US Patent system underwent a radical change with the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which triggered a transformation from the ‘first-to-
patent rule’ to the ‘first-to-file rule’. According to this alteration, the first person to file a 
patent application will be privileged over the person to invent an item or process. This 
transformation can be seen as a partial remedy to the dispute of finding the first 
inventor since patent trolls mercilessly exploit the rule of first-to-patent.448 In terms of 
the US perspective, this can also be seen as getting in tune with the rest of the world 
where the first-to-patent rule is applied. Therefore, the first spell of the EU may be 
regarded as having this principle for a long time. 
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There are some other proposals to deal with American patent trolls toward employing 
EU practices in terms of the attorney fees regime.449 In the US, the parties pay their 
own attorneys' fees regardless of the outcome of the case, while in Europe, the losing 
party pays for its attorney fee as well as the winning attorney (loser-pays-attorney-fees 
regime). Even though there is a lack of empirical work, it appears that the US system 
disincentives patent owners because they always should consider likely litigation 
costs. This is known as sham litigation, which addresses the process of discouraging 
rivals by bringing several suits with baseless claims on patents. This is because patent 
owners may face deprivation of rights if they are not able to cover the cost of 
proceedings. Consequently, several patent holders will have to withdraw from using 
patents because they cannot finance the litigation process.450 Since the lawsuits filed 
by dominant undertakings to strategically exclude competitors or prevent competition, 
so-called sham/vexatious litigation, can be examined under the purpose of harming 
the opponent in the competition law literature,451 it would be useful to visit principles 
of competition law to prevent any attempt that can harm the introduction and 
progression of innovations. 
4.2.6 The procedure and remedies offered by the EU patent system 
The consensus about the EU patent system is that it shows no major weakness 
against PAEs so far since it did not give passage to patent trolls. However, the 
imminent danger regarding PAEs mentioned above necessitates the handle this 
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problem directly in the context of the EU. The following lines address how the EU 
patent system works and how it can be equipped against patent trolls. 
Briefly stated, a European patent shelter is granted by the European Patent Office 
(EPO) if the application meets the patentability requirements set in the European 
Patent Convention (EPC). Once this right is granted, it will be effective in jurisdictions 
designated by the patent holder, which has two options. One option is to apply for 
European patent via the EPO, which in the end will provide a bundle of patents with 
protection in specific jurisdictions. Another option is to apply to the national IP office to 
obtain a national patent that will protect that specific jurisdiction. Since a patent is a 
territorial right, the inventor may choose, in which jurisdiction he/she wants protection. 
Therefore, an innovator does not always need to have patent protection in every 
Member States as patents are differentially valuable in specific geographies states 
about their technological development levels. The question should be asked in terms 
of patent holders whether the opt-in cost for protection compensates patent protection 
benefits. 
While the TRIPS agreement establishes the minimum level of protection for all 
inventions, it allows its member states to define the patentability criteria for such 
protection. In other words, it enables its members to differentiate their patentability 
criteria as per including but not limited to commercial customs, public order or 
morality.452 This exemption becomes significant when it considers the least developed 
and developing countries where it is likely to suffer from strict patent protections.453  
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Information-oriented economy places a burden on patent offices, which have to 
perform duly in the patent waste pool. This is because it is very common to encounter 
overlapping patents, as administrative examiners investigate the novelty of the patent 
claim in a given time. Patent trolls obtain their vaguely worded patents with a broader 
scope, and subsequently, they start waiting in ambush to claim patent infringement. 
This trolling activity, on the one hand, sabotages (undermines) the progression of 
innovation. On the other hand, it generates more litigation costs and disincentives for 
potential innovators.454 The EPC designed an ex post bilateral inspection phase to 
overcome these potential problems. The post-issuance patent review furnishes an 
occasion to reconsider the validity of patents in the adversarial and administrative 
procedures. This inspection step proceeds nine months after issuing the patent, 
namely the opposition and limitation procedure. In this procedure, three different 
objections can be made: patentability (whether the patented matter is novel, furnished 
with an inventive step), incomplete disclosure or improper support for amendments.455  
Even if the abovementioned procedures seem to offer comprehensive investigation 
against patent trolls, the system will remain unprotected after the opposition and 
limitation procedure (nine months period) because henceforth, only patent owners are 
able to demand limiting or revoking.456 The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 
(UPC)457 seems to take a positive step here against those patent trolls as it offers a 
prepotent ex post control mechanism for issued patents with low litigation and 
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administrative costs.458 The UPC does not exist yet, but when it is operational, PAEs 
will have still the right to engage in forum shopping to find the most convenient legal 
system. Moreover, despite the harmonisation steps in EU patent law, it is a crystal-
clear fact that the distinctness of substantive laws likely causes problems in the 
litigation. For instance, one has to show how related patent affects its economic 
interests in order to request a patent validity review in France. However, any third 
party, regardless of their relationship with a patent, can request the same review. The 
ruling of national courts can also be different since judicial tests have different 
evaluations, such as the novelty criteria.459  
It is necessary to improve the remedies in the level of EU law for struggling with patent 
trolls. Liivak and Peñalver, accordingly, propose resorting to patent remedies based 
on the patent owners’ efforts in consideration of disseminating their innovations. This 
proposal is to offer remedies for PAEs practices and the likely patent wars between 
high-tech companies by somehow obliging the use of the patent.460 Otherwise, 
opportunistic infringement behaviours, such as rent-seeking behaviour, last longer. 
This creates another cost for other companies to forestall any infringement claims 
because there are only two options to handle this kind of situation: litigation or 
settlement. Both ways are costly, but the settlement way is cheaper to some extent. 
This is why only big companies opt for the litigation way. Thus, there is an obvious 
threat for newcomer businesses and SMEs, which cannot reserve a budget for huge 
litigation costs. In addition to set a high bar for the patent quality, it seems that a better 
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clarification of FRAND licensing commitments can also be beneficial to get to the root 
of the issue, as it has the potential to contribute to the settling of disputes.461 
4.2.7 Evaluation of the non-use of patents as an abuse of dominance 
Even though the owner of the IP right cements its monopolistic position, he is not 
allowed to use this right for the purpose of unreasonably limiting trade or international 
technology transfer.462 In this manner, the owner needs to bring forward reasonable 
grounds if he wants not to exploit the patent because those patents are granted for 
the public interest as well as inventors’ interest, where unused patents do not provide 
benefits to the public. This section accordingly argues why the non-use of patents 
should be subjected to competition law (Article 102 TFEU) as such in the use of 
patents in an abusive way. 
It is common to encounter unused patents due to several reasons: over one-third of 
European patents are not used, and more particularly, three-quarter of electronic 
based patents are not used.463 However, the patent owner generally has valid excuses 
for the non-use of patents such as patent’s cost-effectiveness and incompatibility with 
the existing technologies. Under these circumstances, there is no merit to force the 
owner’s hand in practising the patent. Nevertheless, the use of patents is known to be 
subject to EU competition law enforcement under certain conditions as such in the 
AstraZeneca case due to the acquisition of patents by misleading patent offices and 
in Microsoft due to refusal to supply. This section takes a step further to examine 
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whether the acquisition of patents independently creates an abuse of dominance 
without a misleading representation or refusal to supply.  
Although it has not received sufficient attention in both the academic community and 
the case law, the non-use of patents is of great importance as a niche issue for the 
development of innovation. In general, the non-use of patents is occurred to prevent 
competitors from making similar innovations by filing a wide range of alternative patent 
applications on the same subject, which is also known as ‘smoke screen patenting’.464 
This is the point where necessitates the application of Article 102 in recovering the 
failure of IP law. In regard to the practical foundation of this application, the EC took a 
firm action in the AstraZeneca case by determining that the groundless exclusionary 
rights gained through patent applications undermine the legitimate competition 
(competition on merits).465 However, the question left unanswered is whether an 
accurate patent application poses a problem in the context of competition law. 
Likewise, the procedure initiated with the claim that Boehringer ‘filed for unmeritorious 
patents’ remained inconclusive as a result of the agreement between the parties.466 At 
least a relevant determination has been made in Servier by the EC as “[…] Servier 
applied for and obtained a number of process and crystal-line form patents, which 
Servier internally referred to as ‘blocking patent’ or ‘paper patent’ […with] zero 
incentive activity”.467 However, despite this determination, the EC did not consider the 
event of filing blocking patent strategy as a violation of competition law. Instead, the 
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Commission concentrated on the reactions of the originator to the generic’s activities. 
Therefore, the same question remained unanswered once again.468 
Despite the lack of case law, Heinemann has proposed a ‘four-prong test’ to identify 
under which circumstances patents abusively block the process of innovation.469 
According to this, the abuse of dominant position by abusing the patent right would 
occur if the patent (1) is not exploited, (2) excludes competition by substitution, (3) is 
used to block competitor’s innovations, and (4) is unnecessary for further alleys of 
research.470 This test provides a very accurate analysis since all steps of the test put 
the development of innovation in the foreground. To offer a more simple test, it can be 
proposed that every practice by using patent rights suppresses the progression of 
innovation should be regarded as an abuse of dominant position and thus be subjected 
to Article 102 TFEU. In this regard, the EC and competition authorities should be 
entrusted with a task to determine which patent applications are abusive or legitimate. 
4.2.8 Conclusion 
Patent trolls in overall have no contribution to the progression of technology even if 
there is another eye, which accepts PAEs favourable as they invest in even 
undercapitalised projects. However, contrary to this objection, it had better remind that 
since most of the patents have low quality, PAEs acquire patents for speculative 
purposes rather than developing a product or a technology. Instead, counterproductive 
patent trolls with their aggressive litigation strategies create an expense item for 
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innovators. Every disadvantage reflected in innovators means the suppression of 
innovation. The non-use of patents is a complicated problem, and even though the 
first solution that comes to mind is the obligation to use them as such in trademarks,471 
this will put the inventor into pressure by bringing huge costs. Moreover, the inventor 
would likely lose its motivation to make innovation. However, testing the obtained 
patents with Article 102 TFEU to weaken the hand of IP right abusers can produce an 
ex-ante remedy to this problem. 
4.3 Pay-for-delay agreements 
As indicated, the suppression of innovation can be seen in different forms, and this 
section examines whether and to what extent pay-for-delay agreements are the 
reflection of suppressing innovation. Also, since most of the pay-for-delay agreements 
are concluded between drug manufacturers, this section investigates the anti-
competitive outcomes of these agreements in pharmaceutical markets. 
After the end of IP law protection for originator drug manufacturers, generic drug 
manufacturers penetrated the market by producing generic medicines, which have 
nearly the same active ingredients. This competition between such producers 
decreases the medicine price in the market because generic medicine producers will 
have fewer investment costs to develop this technology, which has already been 
formulated. However, originator drug manufacturers may agree with potential generic 
drug manufacturers to delay their market entrance for a reasonable fee or a non-
monetary payment to strengthen and maintain their dominant positions. These 
settlements are known as ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements or ‘reverse-payment settlement’, 
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which are another likely way of abusing their dominant position regarding patent rights, 
as seen in the Servier.472 The pay-for-delay agreement can be regarded as a win-win 
deal for parties of the contract473 because the main economic incentive is to maximise 
total market income in the competition-free market.474 The generic manufacturer will 
make more gains without even penetrating the market when the originator 
manufacturer keeps taking advantage of its exclusivity.475 
The Commission specified precisely that a patent-related settlement agreement 
between originator and generic drug manufacturers would not be against the law as 
long as it does not have anti-competitive characteristics.476 However, pay-for-delay 
agreements are anti-competitive because they damage not only other rivals but also 
the society through providing less-efficient resource allocation477 such that restricted 
competition due to these agreements causes less choice for consumers.  
Also, prospective litigation costs would negatively affect the society, as pharmaceutical 
patent cases are costly.478 Besides, the Technology Transfer Guidelines also 
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mentioned that "…licensing as such is pro-competitive as it leads to the dissemination 
of technology and promotes innovation. In addition, even licence agreements that do 
restrict competition may often give rise to pro-competitive efficiencies, which must be 
considered under Article 101(3) and balanced against the negative effects on 
competition. The great majority of licence agreements are therefore compatible with 
Article 101."479 Therefore, the law should always keep these pay-for-delay agreements 
under control as such in cases of Lundbeck,480 Johnson & Johnson,481 and Teva.482 
The General Court ruled, for the first time, a pay-for-delay agreement for Lundbeck as 
a “by-object violation”, which enabled Lundbeck to find such agreements against 
competition law without any necessity to show its anti-competitive effects — because 
these agreements impair the market entry incentives of generic drug manufacturers.483 
Lundbeck derived benefits from keeping the price of citalopram, an antidepressant 
medicine, high in return to make reverse payments to its potential competitors. The 
estimation of the reverse payment amount is based on a hypothetical profit or turnover 
expectation of generic drug manufacturers if they decide to enter the market.484 
Otherwise, the innovator company will likely lose a market share because of the 
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increased number of manufacturers and the availability of cheaper generic drugs in 
the absence of a pay-for-delay agreement.485 
Even if the coordination between originator and generic drug manufacturers by making 
capital out of both healthcare systems (taxpayers) and patients through dooming 
consumers to purchase sui generis drugs is subjected to review Article 101 TFEU, the 
Servier case revealed that these conducts might also have the potential to infringe 
Article 102 TFEU. Rather than by object analysis, the EC stated that patent-related 
agreements like pay-for-delay agreements have anti-competitive features because 
they reasonably restrict potential competition as was the case between Servier and 
other generic manufacturers. Consumers, accordingly, are devoid of having 
alternative and cheaper products. Finally, the Commission determined that Servier 
abused its dominant position by purchasing a unique technology to prevent emerging 
generics and convincing its rivals not to participate in the market through settlement 
agreements, which restrict the production of generic products. However, the General 
Court annulled the fine imposed on Servier concerning its infringement of Article 102 
TFEU since the Commission made a very narrow market definition. However, the 
Commission’s approach to settlement agreements in terms of Article 102 TFEU gives 
clues to further alterations. 
The protection provided by IP rights ministers to the continuation of innovation and 
economic efficiency. In this context, patent agreements preserve innovators’ rights to 
contribute to a competitive environment where innovations race. At the same time, 
they serve to main aims of competition law through providing the dissemination of 
technology by the use of patented rights from third parties. However, they may also 
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lead to restrictions and infringements of competition law, as can be seen in pay-for-
delay agreements. The Lundbeck decision sheds light on the competition law and 
intellectual property law relationship by following words: “The conclusion of an 
agreement settling a patent dispute does not provide immunity from competition law 
simply because the agreement relates to patent law. A patent holder only has the right 
under patent law to enforce its patent rights unilaterally, if necessary through 
infringement action before the court [...]. Such agreements are fully subject to the 
discipline of competition law”.486 
The conservation of competitive markets is one of the best effective ways to hamper 
the suppression of innovations. Since patent agreements are open to argument 
whether and to what extent they promote innovation, competition law enforcement 
would likely be an instrumental tool to prevent technological developments. As 
mentioned in the Astra Zeneca case that “...misuse of the patent system potentially 
reduces the incentive to engage in innovation, since it enables the company in a 
dominant position to maintain its exclusivity beyond the period envisaged by the 
legislator.”487 Therefore, patent protection would be undue if it is not in the interest of 
promoting innovation, as seen in the pay-for-delay agreements struggles. Therewithal, 
Article 102 TFEU as another enforcement option for patent agreements may be 
revisited in the near future, although it has just been annulled in Servier.488 
4.4 Standardisation 
Independent of its benefits to economic growth by boosting competitiveness, 
standardisation minimises the risk when purchasing a technological product, which is 
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likely to become obsolete. Hence, it is a direct and effective weapon to prevent the 
suppression of innovation in terms of inter-technology competition with the 
disappearance of switching cost.  From the global perspective, standardisation also 
allows consumers to use standardised goods in other countries where same standards 
apply.489 
Standardisation is a scaling system to specify the minimum requirements by 
establishing regulations with the contribution and cooperation of all related parties. In 
the absence of common features such as standardisation, the products would likely 
be of incompatible and impractical. Consequently, standardisation in manufacturing is 
key to achieve interoperability, which increases competition and prohibits lock-in 
situations.490 Assuring the product quality by standardisation enables almost all 
products to meet certain criteria before being released on the market. It directs the 
competition conditions of the market in favour of the environment, businesses and 
consumers.  
When products are not compatible, standards will become more significant, 
particularly in innovative markets. Consequently, producing goods and services in 
compliance with the agreed standards has an important role in meeting the 
consumers’ demand, efficient use of resources and increase of the general quality of 
products. The EC deemed the concept of standardisation necessary to meet rapidly 
changing market conditions. The standards ought to be updated regularly according 
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to innovation and current economic conditions, as it is not possible to reapply them to 
new developments.491  
Standardisation is generally classified into two types: standardisation by international 
organisations, also known as de facto standards and standardisation by private 
companies, so-called de jure standards.492 In either case, standardisation is 
instrumental in providing trust by assuring a reliable foundation and a well-disciplined 
procedure of manufacturing and selling because it enhances innovation and quality.  
Even if several standards are optional, there are some mandatory standards 
determined by standardisation bodies. These bodies mainly aim to transform the 
needs of society by standards that help to reflect the will of society to the markets.493 
Standardisation is directly associated with the market structure and competition law 
because setting standards too high or too low would likely eliminate all the benefits of 
standardisation by distorting the market,494 which may cause market entry barriers or 
unhealthy products. The contribution of standardisation to the circular economy is 
particularly emphasised in terms of innovation, quality and safety in EU competition 
law cases as such in cases of Rambus,495 Google496 and Intel.497 Regarding the 
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fulfilment of the circular economy’s requirements, the Commission asked 
standardisation organisations to set standards for promoting more durable, reusable 
and recyclable products.498 
In addition to standardisation organisations supported by governments, there are 
some other standards mutually employed by enterprises from an ethical 
perspective.499 Particularly, due to the lack of an official standardisation body, the 
cooperative standard-setting comes to the fore to set the standards via the joint 
decision of the corporation of specific industries. However, when competitors come 
together to make standards, there is likely to be a risk of making confidential 
agreements leading to cartelisation. Therefore, objectivity, impartiality and openness 
ought to be adopted as principles in the progress of establishing standards. 
Regarding de jure standards, standardisation agreements are essentially the 
determination of technical and quality requirements for existing or future products, 
such as regarding their compatibility or interoperability.500 It is a voluntary and 
consensus-driven activity, which is determined by independent and recognised 
standards organisations.501 The concept of standardisation affects the competitive 
structure of the market by regulating minimum technical standards and sale conditions. 
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Standardisation would likely contribute to the economy by reducing output and sales 
costs.502  
Either de jure or de facto standardisation leads to more efficient applications of circular 
economy policies. They also enable maintaining competitive markets by furnishing 
occasions for business strategies such as lean manufacturing503 and total quality 
management.504 In the absence of standardisation, competition, innovation and 
environmental consciousness will decrease while deceptive practices regarding the 
quality and price will increase. Hence, standardisation can be regarded as one of the 
applicable interventionist approaches that should be taken for the sake of promoting 
consumer welfare. 
4.4.1 Standardisation and its pro-innovation features 
The common view on standardisation is evolving from hampering innovation to 
supporting innovation-led growth.505 Furthermore, today, standardisation is 
considered as a way to contribute technological development and promote consumer 
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welfare and competitive markets.506 When examining the effects of standardisation on 
innovation, it is revealed that it has an impact on preventing adverse selection, lock-in 
previous technologies and high transaction costs whereas increasing monopoly 
power, rivals’ costs and market concentration.507 Standards are not only contributing 
to lock-ins of old technologies becoming inferior over time. They can also be shaped 
to avoid this lock-in, for example, by designing appropriate interfaces between old and 
new technologies allowing their simultaneous use or ensuring their compatibility. 
Therefore, the integration of IP rights into standards provide more incentives for R & 
D investments because of more licensing revenues. It also benefits to scale 
economies by preventing externalities and simplifying the shift from old to current 
technologies protected via IP rights.508 
Standard-driven innovation enables the capitalisation of IP rights.509 Regarding the 
abuse of IP rights, the Commission brought an accusation against Rambus510 referring 
to an attempt of the patent ambush by preserving relevant patent throughout standards 
have been determined and afterwards claiming the infringement of its patent, namely 
‘Dynamic Random Access Memory chips’. The Commission gave notice to Rambus 
with respect to break the competition rules by abusing its dominant market position as 
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long as it continues charging unreasonable royalty rate.511 Rambus thereupon 
accepted to decrease its royalties reasonably. As mentioned by the Commission, this 
case is important in terms of examining the issue of patent ambush in the context of 
competition law.512 It also underlined the importance of standardisation in the context 
of the circular economy to promote robust and high quality products by calling several 
European Standardisation Organisations like CEN (European Committee for 
Standardization), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute).513 
More than one IP rights would be likely necessary to manufacture because of the need 
for collective management of IP rights. Shapiro accordingly put forward a patent thicket 
problem, so-called complements problem, which indicates the difficulty of the 
progression of IP rights interdependently.514 Therefore, technology pools (patenting 
pools) are formed to remove the necessity to make an agreement with all affiliated 
patent holders for effective allocation and distribution of the rights.515 Nevertheless, 
these pools come with much jeopardy in terms of competition law, such as enabling 
price-fixing and creating market entry barriers.516 
Standardisation has emerged to guarantee quality and security matters. However, as 
these standardisations require the use of certain technologies, it is probable to be 
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beset with problems regarding IP rights such as refusal to deal and product bundling. 
Herein, there might be necessary to conclude more than one agreement with different 
right holders regarding the use of IP rights.  This stirs up trouble for manufacturers to 
produce and develop technological goods with reasonable expenditures. Furthermore, 
it would be likely to pose a problem for right holders to commercialise their intellectual 
properties.  
From another perspective, producers may gain from the misapplication of standards 
while consumers are harmed. For instance, even if the regulatory threshold of tyre 
depth is 1.6 mm,517 EU drivers are misadvised to change their tyres when this depth 
is around 3 mm for preventing future accidents. This is despite the studies on 
accidentology, which show that accidents bear no relation to the threat depthless from 
1.6 to 3 mm.518 This early replacement causes harm to both the environment and 
consumers by bringing about 35% more waste along with excessive raw material 
usage and surcharging to motorists of €6.9 billion every year, including increased fuel 
consumption and purchasing new tyres.519 In light of this, both producers and 
consumers should exactingly follow determined standards. This collaborative care 
would likely offer a remedy for the suppression of innovation by maximising the benefit 
of current technology rather than underutilising it.  
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4.4.2 Does standardisations provide an adequate remedy for the suppression of 
innovation under Article 102 TFEU? 
Standardisation, in today’s context from the firm level, had its origins from the early 
industrial revolution in terms of Europe.520 However, developments regarding 
standardisation go back to 1992 when the EC drafted the ‘Communication on 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standardisation.’ As per this Communication, the 
existence of a recognized standard provides a certain level of quality alongside the 
proposal of interoperability.521 After a long hiatus, the EC reawakened to the standard-
setting issue by 2001 Horizontal Guideline to draw a general framework for the 
standardisation agreements, which increase the competitiveness of the market522 by 
guaranteeing interoperability, improving quality and providing information.523 The 
current understanding of standardisation is to provide extended guidance to standard-
setting organisations, which is expected to result in lower price, more choice and better 
products for consumers.524 If there is a lack of effective regulation regarding 
standardisation agreements, it would likely cause a problem by weakening 
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competition525 through restricting price competition and limiting production, markets 
and innovation.526  
It is crucial to state that participants holding the IP right, which is essential to use for 
complying with determining standards, are not regarded as abusing their dominant 
positions.527  However, restrictive standardisation agreements to exclude potential or 
actual rivals will be regarded as anti-competitive measures.528 This is because FRAND 
commitments were mentioned in the Guideline to ensure all market players obtain 
compulsory licences in return for fair, reasonable and anti-competitive licence fees.529  
The first Commission decision regarding the Standard Essential Patent (SEP) allied 
with FRAND commitments was about the proposed acquisition of Motorola Mobility by 
Google.530 This decision is followed by Samsung,531 Motorola,532 and Huawei533 cases, 
which shaped the approach of the EC. Taken together, these cases employed a 
reasonable approach to tackle the licencing agreement issue by paying regard the 
balance between competition law and IP rights.534 It is now clear that the protection of 
competitive market plays an important role in case restricting market by SEP holder. 
In other words, all standards can influence the efficiency and effectiveness of both 
sides of the market, in a broader concept the economy. Therefore, to the extent that 
distortion of competition can result in higher royalty fees, which reflects badly on the 
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economy because of the higher pocket price and less incentive to innovation. There 
would consequently seem to be an effective competitive environment need for 
benefiting from the standardisation. 
Standard setting organisations, emerged by collaborative initiatives of manufacturers, 
aims to develop most advanced and financially effective standards by making current 
technology available on FRAND conditions.535 It mainly goals to provide access to 
required technologies on FRAND terms for downstream competitors through 
minimising entry barriers and preventing opportunistic abuse of standard essential 
patent holders’ conducts. They also serve the smooth and rapid transition from 
ordinary to superior technologies.536 However, every shift has a potential negative 
impact on weak competitors for the sake of promoting technology as all 
standardisation attempts mean new investments and destructions of previous 
technologies.537 
The EC found Motorola to abuse its dominant position in the technology market, which 
contributes to ETSI 3G standards. This is because Motorola sued Apple to ban the 
use of its product, just after allowing Apple to use its GPRS technology.  According to 
the theory of harm developed by the Commission, imposing competitors, who are 
willing to obtain a license, to backbreaking terms such as filing a lawsuit as a 
precautionary measure would be regarded as a violation of competition law. However, 
this test was widely criticised because of the lack of the definition of ‘willing licensee 
competitors.’ As this test paved the way for court-determined FRAND terms, it also 
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blocks all benefits of collaborative standardisation such as allocative efficiencies and 
technological development. 
However, immediately after the Motorola case, EU competition law has a 
metamorphosis in the Huawei case538 pursued by the Landgericht Dusseldorf (District 
Court of Dusseldorf) in which the court asked to the opinion of the CJEU regarding 
what extent the use of SEP will violate to Article 102. It is accordingly determined that 
there would be no violation of Article 102 TFEU by SEP holders if they seek an 
injunctive relief to prevent any patent infringements. However, such conduct may be 
a subject of delaying tactic of SEP holders in case of following conditions: (1) SEP 
holders shall grant a license according to their commitments to the standardisation 
body under agreed FRAND conditions; (2) SEP holders shall alert the alleged infringer 
before taking precautions regarding potential or ongoing patent infringements; (3) SEP 
holders shall offer license agreements under FRAND conditions by determining fair 
royalties to the alleged infringer, which shall express its intention to be keen on willingly 
making licencing agreements. Such injunctive relief would be lawful if SEP holders 
follow the expressed way and the alleged infringer does not reply the offer diligently 
within a reasonable time in harmony with customs of trade.539 
In line with this CJEU decision, SEP holders can take action for the compensation of 
its damage regarding the previous use of patents before the license agreement without 
being concerned about violating Article 102 TFEU. This case has specific importance 
on determining the obligations of both SEP owners and patent infringers.540 On top of 
that, the Huawei case altered the Commission’s approach of court-determined FRAND 
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conditions to the CJEU’s approach of establishing FRAND conditions by bilateral 
negotiations. This clarified that licensing negotiations of licensing parties are prioritised 
for determining FRAND conditions, whereas the court-determined FRAND terms are 
applied in the last resort. 
The EC has reasonable grounds to prevent anti-competitive collusions through 
standard-setting and FRAND conditions. Hence, Article 101 TFEU is an instrumental 
tool for public policy to avoid such conducts, which lead to price-fixing, shady price 
increasing, decreasing the output, market entry barriers and the suppression of 
innovation.541 However, in terms of enhancing competition and technological 
development, it is also important to examine issues regarding standardisation by 
considering Article 102 TFEU. However, keeping Article 101 TFEU in the forefront is 
of significance to prevent establishing cartels and other forms of collusive behaviours 
while encouraging bilateral negotiations for standard-setting. 
4.5 Spare part designs protection: Suppression of innovation by locking-in 
consumers and knocking-out competitors 
Product design that increases ergonomic performance and usability affects 
consumers’ purchase considerations; consequently, this design requires legal 
protection. The protection of spare part designs is complicated. Competition and 
innovation will be suppressed if this protection blocks generic manufacturers from 
producing alternative spare parts. If aftermarket manufacturers do not provide spare 
parts for complex products due to barriers set by the design protection owner, 
competition will be distorted: however, the existence of more replacement products 
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warrants the more competitive market. In this manner, this section discusses this 
prevalent issue to maintaining the technological innovations and the competitive 
structure of aftermarkets, and suggests a two-phase test to determine whether the 
spare part design protection has an anti-competitive impact in these markets. 
4.5.1 Historical development of spare part designs protection 
An IP right is an efficient tool for protection of non-complex (i.e. single-unit) products, 
since they cover the entire product. However, due to changes in production patterns, 
where complex products with several individual parts became more widespread, 
manufacturers were also granted separate protection for the designs of their specific 
parts.542 Nevertheless, this protection prevents other spare part manufacturers’ 
abilities to compete in aftermarkets.543 As a response to this matter, EU law, in the 
beginning, has addressed this issue by separating spare parts as “must fit” and “must 
match” for two decades. “Must fit” spare parts are parts of complex products having 
interconnected mechanical or physical components, and are necessary parts for 
repairs to be in compliance with operational imperatives. On the other hand, “must 
match” spare parts are parts of complex products that provide visual enhancement or 
aesthetic improvements. Under this dichotomy, must fit spare parts have constituted 
an exception, whereas must match parts have taken advantage of the spare parts 
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design protection.544 However, since the exclusivity for must match spare parts has 
provided a strong position for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the 
aftermarket, the “repair clause” was formed within Article 110 of the Community 
Design Regulation (CDR) to exclude must match parts from design protection, with 
the intention of liberalising European aftermarkets for competitors in favour of 
downstream users, with the increase in options for sub-industry products.545 Even 
though the CDR reflects the spirit of EU policies towards the “one-note European 
approach” regarding the protection of spare part design of complex products, there 
are differences between member countries’ laws.546 Therefore, legislative 
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harmonisation has not yet been achieved because of these fundamental differences 
in legal policies and national interests.547  
4.5.2 Market analysis for spare parts 
EU competition law tracks the Chicagoan principles in terms of the spare parts design 
protection by following the idea that any price increase in the secondary market will 
lower the sales amount and the price of the original product because consumers keep 
in mind the availability and affordability of products in the secondary markets. 
Therefore, the market will eventually balance itself. Considering the analysis made in 
EU competition law, it is seen that the analyses are not only made on the secondary 
markets but also the primary market.548 In this context, for example, the automotive 
market is considered as competitive since consumers have several alternatives in the 
automotive market, where OEMs are not seen in the dominant position. This 
interpretation is based on two decisions made in 1988.549 Although competition law 
has evolved since then, there has been no recent development of the definition of the 
spare parts market; neither in court decisions nor legal regulations.550 
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4.5.3 The Uncertainties Regarding the Application of the Repair Clause 
The introduction of the “repair clause” offers a remedy, to an extent, regarding the 
vulnerability of independent spare-part manufacturers in producing spare parts for 
complex products. The variable approaches of EU member states, however, make it 
difficult to reach a uniform European-wide agreement. Currently, some countries 
(Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, and 
the United Kingdom) provide the repair clause, while others (Austria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Sweden) still resist its implementation. Germany was one of these resistant 
countries, due to concern over the likely impact of the repair rule on its national 
economy, which includes global manufacturers like Mercedes, BMW, Audi, and 
Volkswagen. However, even though Germany had an opposing view to applying the 
repair clause for many years, as of January 1, 2020, with Section 40a of the Act on 
the Legal Protection of Designs (Designgesetz, DesignG) the repair clause was 
legitimised in Germany.551 France subsequently announced to make necessary 
changes to incorporate this specific rule to maintain more liberalised aftermarkets.552 
These current developments are expected to trigger the approaches of other EU 
countries.553  
Although it seems that the EU is close to having a uniform approach, what matters 
here is how the national courts will reflect and apply to this rule. Concerning the 
application of the repair clause under Article 110 (1) CDR, the most current case, 
 
 
551 Design Act as published on 24 February 2014 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 122), as last amended by 
Article 15 of the Act of 17 July 2017 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2541). 
552 Loi d’orientation des mobilites [2019] TRET 1821032L 
553 Beldiman, Blanke-Roeser and Tischner (n 550) 676. 
160 
 
which can be taken as a reference, is the CJEU’s decision in the Acacia.554 
Accordingly, the CJEU pointed out the importance of maintaining the competitive 
structure of aftermarkets and keeping consumers fully informed (concerning the 
lifetime, availability and prices of replacement parts) to decrease the dependency of 
consumers to original providers.555 While a precise clarification of the application of 
the repair clause was expected from the CJEU, the Acacia decision fell short of 
concluding the discussion. On the one hand, it aimed to enhance to the liberalisation 
of aftermarkets by eliminating the form-dependency concept (for instance, the wheel 
shroud could be regarded as an exemption of the rule before this rule) as a criterion 
for implementation of the repair clause.556 On the other hand, it hinders carrying out 
the duty of diligence to independent spare-part manufacturers (for instance, informing 
downstream users that the spare part was only produced for the purposes of repairing 
the complex product).557 Therefore, the CJEU treated both sides equally by being 
noncommittal to redressing the balance in the aftermarket competition. However, from 
a critical perspective, national judicial authorities could interpret this decision in 
accordance with their interests. For example, the aftermarket would be more 
monopolistic if those authorities controlled the duty of diligence to independent spare-
part manufacturers firmly, and vice versa. 
4.5.4 Proposed Solution in the context of Article 102 TFEU 
It appears that the solution based on the repair clause is not adequate to address 
current innovative developments like introducing connected and autonomous cars in 
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the automotive industry. Such developments use personalised data, and there is a 
grey area regarding whether independent spare-part manufacturers can access the 
data for the purpose of integrating their parts into the complex products. In all 
likelihood, independent spare-part manufacturers will be confronted with a challenge 
with regard to competing in the aftermarkets under equal conditions.558 The application 
of the repair clause is a completely delayed solution. In fact, the adoption of this clause 
by countries like Germany (which have had a contrarian viewpoint for more than two 
decades) could arguably be the ineptness of this clause in today’s context.  Likewise, 
it is also possible to bypass the spare parts design protection by obtaining other IP law 
tools provided via trademark law and copyright law.559 Therefore, it is necessary to 
take adequate precautions to prevent the abuse of dominant positions, which are likely 
to be practised by OEMs. Concerning such abuses, this study offers a two-phase test 
to leave the field for competition law enforcement by applying Article 102 TFEU.  
According to this test, the first thing that needs to be demonstrated is that the spare 
parts design protections hinder the innovative and competitive capacity of independent 
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spare-part manufacturers. This can occur in several ways. For example, OEMs may 
refuse to share necessary features (material, measurements, and other technical 
details) with spare-part equipment manufacturers (SEMs). Else, OEMs can also pose 
challenges for independent spare-part manufacturers with regards to the 
digital/personal data without any valid ground. Secondly, the use of spare parts design 
protection should not damage the liberalisation of the aftermarket as it was made 
cleared by the Acacia case.560 In this regard, competition law enforcement should be 
undertaken when the IP right (it can be patent, trademark and copyright) owners abuse 
their exclusionary rights to expel competitors from the market. After finding evidence 
regarding these two steps, it can be inferred that Article 102 TFEU should be applied, 
and judicial authorities may set a frame in light of the stated objective criteria.561 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
The issue of protecting spare parts designs is much more complex than meets the 
eye. Although this discussion is mainly focused on in the automotive sector, it 
concerns many other sectors closely: vacuum cleaner handles and train seats can be 
given as different examples. When examining the automotive market, which includes 
several innovative businesses, important continuous developments such as 
autonomous driving, holistic connectivity, and more environmentally friendly engines 
are observed, as well as the increased attention to performance, fuel-saving, and 
security. Under this circumstance, OEMs expect broader protection in exchange for 
their innovative efforts, while independent spare-part manufacturers expect to 
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eliminate all market entry barriers to compete on a level playing field. However, 
broader protection for OEMs in regard to spare parts designs has potentially anti-
competitive outcomes because this kind of protection would likely cause higher prices 
for consumers in the secondary market.562 Due to the fierce competition in primary 
markets, manufacturers would be in a tendency to make more profit from secondary 
markets. Manufacturers may accept losing money in their primary markets, by 
reducing their prices, in order to more profit in aftermarkets. For instance, after selling 
coffee machines or printers, manufacturers would receive regular profits from selling 
coffee capsules or ink cartridges, in addition to repair services. It is necessary to review 
the extent to which these protections serve the purpose of fostering innovation. Spare 
part designs protection is nothing less than a contractual relationship between 
providers and consumers, who accept that all the repairs are going to be handled by 
providers in advance.563 However, excluding other manufacturers will decrease both 
the number of choices by eliminating innovative initiatives of competitors. Therefore, 
the suggested two-phase test in order to keep the market competitive and innovative 
would be implementable as an instrumental way. 
4.6 Evergreening patents as blockers of innovation 
This section approaches the evergreening patent issue as a type of innovation 
suppression through seeking to extend exclusivity on patent rights since IP law can 
provide immunity from competition law enforcements up to some extent. Hence, 
evergreening of patents may lead to abuse and misuse of the patent system to fend 
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off from competition law.564 This being the case, such conduct will likely pave the way 
for exploiting monopoly rights.565 Starting from this point of view, the conformability of 
the application of Article 102 TFEU into evergreening patents will be argued 
throughout this section.  
4.6.1 Introduction 
Once the patent protection expires, others can copy and sell the product by competing 
with the original version of the product. As from the end of the original product's patent 
protection, it is expected that the substitute goods in the market will be enlarged with 
generic versions of the product. This will inarguably decrease the price and increase 
the competition between generic manufacturers. Therefore, regulations should 
support boosting the generic competition by facilitating access to the market. In line 
with this, there is no ambiguity regarding the lawfulness of evergreening when it comes 
to the application of Article 102 TFEU to evergreening of patents.  
More particularly, this section argues the issue of introducing second-generation 
products with regard to evergreening patents. This mainly ensues from companies’ 
practices, which aim to extend patent protection to maintain their advantageous 
positions in markets by just adding minor patches to original patented products. Such 
incremental innovations are also precompetitive, and therefore, they should need to 
be protected as much as they contribute to the existing technology level.566 On the 
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other hand, it may eliminate all incentives to make breakthrough innovations as they 
require more investment costs. Consequently, this issue can also be regarded as a 
different type of innovation suppression. 
4.6.1.1 The legal context of the evergreening issue 
Evergreening refers to patentees’ conduct to extend their exclusive rights granted by 
patent protection. This is also known as strategic patent planning where originator 
manufacturers take precautions against generic manufacturers in advance to get a 
competitive edge. The evergreening patent indicates the exploitation of patent 
protection in which patent holders draw advantages from sore points of patent 
regulations and related regulatory processes just before the end of this protection. This 
strategy is generally held by innovators having a large volume of research investment 
costs through making minor (slight) modifications in order to extend the period of 
exclusive rights.567 The Commission did not explicitly use the term of evergreening. 
Instead, this situation has been mentioned as a tool for preventing or delaying generic 
products’ entries.568 Some of the evergreening practices specified in the Commission’s 
Pharma Report are including patent filling strategies,569 patent-related litigation,570 
patent settlements,571 life cycle strategy572 but not limited to.  
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As patent evergreening is a broad concept, this section limits itself with the introduction 
of second-generation products by obtaining new patent protections through showing 
only incremental innovations. The introduction of second-generation products is one 
of the most frequently referred strategies to keep away rivals from generic competition. 
Despite the expiration of patent protection, generic product manufacturers will always 
have market entry barriers as consumers are directed towards ‘improved’ second-
generation products.573 Patent holders generally introduce second-generation 
products; in other words, follow-on products, into the market to return more profits by 
using their original products’ fundamental structure via incremental innovations. 
Although this innovation contributes to the existing technology leastwise, second-
generation products will also benefit from patent protection as long as they meet 
patentability conditions.  
There are strident criticisms in the literature against evergreening patenting strategies 
in not only pharmaceuticals but also other technology-intensive industries as they 
suppress the benefits of introducing generic substitution.574 Since generics are copies 
of the product that is already in the market, it prima facie seems ‘no suppression’ but 
there are two issues, which can cause suppression here. First, the product or service 
may be bound or tied such that the product owners will likely have a tendency to 
purchase a latter-generation product. For instance, in the context of the software 
market, consumers will not be keen on changing their software, which they have 
already become accustomed to using. Moreover, the plug-ins in the software may not 
 
 
573 Such products are nearly the same with primary products but having innovative contents.  
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be compatible with generic substitutions. Further to that, consumers may be under 
obligation to pay during the contract term, and they may get a better deal before the 
expiration of the contract in return for a renewal of the contract with the new product. 
These are just a few examples of how generic manufacturers can be excluded from 
the competition, and therefore, doctrinal discussions with regard to tying and bundling 
concepts are open to change in terms of Article 102 TFEU.575 Second, the innovator 
may misinform to the patent office and apply for a patent, which shows just an 
improvement (not novelty) of the patented product or has already been obtained by 
itself or third parties. However, Becker highlighted that evergreening patents problem 
does not exist since it is not possible to re-file the same invention for an extension.576 
Every patent office elaborates on both breakthrough and incremental innovation 
applications whether there are usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness to issue 
patent protection. Therefore, the problem ensues from the patent system, and the 
likely solution is to raise the bar of patenting through asking better quality of patents. 
Patentees will obtain a monopoly position with the help of its exclusive right since they 
are sole sellers or manufacturers of certain products. Hence, patents actually block 
competition. More specifically, they block price competition because others cannot 
copy the product protected by the patent. This will likely constitute a contradiction with 
the purposes of EU competition law. However, it is considered that they stimulate 
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The issue concerning evergreening patents will show up when patent holders restrict 
(delay) generic competition by abusing of IP systems’ regulatory laxness through 
obtaining follow-on patents.578 This practice is called evergreening, which establishes 
a ground for less competitive markets. So, it is anti-competitive and consequently, 
open to the application of Article 102 TFEU. There will accordingly be two main 
discussion points in case of evaluating Article 102 TFEU: (1) Whether and to what 
extent does an extension of exclusivity consider as anti-competitive conduct? (2) 
Whether and to what extent do businesses making incremental innovations deserve 
monopoly rights? 
In the grand scheme of things, the innovativeness of countries indicates the level of 
their social welfare.579 As such, the effectiveness of patent protection systems matters 
to encourage businesses to be more innovative. An effective patent system can 
promote technological innovation by presenting judicious compromises. At the same 
time, it also gains favour to the frequency of innovations through providing an 
appropriate environment for new inventions.580 However, on the other hand, any 
deficiency in the patent system will lead to evergreening applications, which likely 
eradicate all the benefits of IP protection. 
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4.6.1.2 Theoretical Examination of Evergreening Patents 
The term of evergreening, as explained above, refers to several behaviours towards 
further exploiting granted patent protection via legal and illegal strategies. These 
strategies are generally lawful, but it does not mean that they are exempted from the 
application of Article 102 TFEU. Therefore, Article 102 TFEU is a matter to prevent 
any abuse attempts of exclusive rights. Whish and Bailey, accordingly, lay stress on 
the importance of applying this law in case of exercising patent rights in an abusive 
way.581 In regard to the theoretical background of evergreening practices, patent law 
has an aim to contribute to industrial progress by inspiring scientific works and newer 
technologies.582 From this aspect, it can be claimed that patents as temporary 
monopoly rights are necessary for the prevention of likely market failures because 
innovators will be discouraged since competitors in the absence of patents where 
competitors can freely penetrate the market without any research costs.  
The theoretical base of evergreening can be explained under Lockean and 
Schumpeterian perspectives. From the labour theory of Locke, as a moral principle, 
the state ought to grant a right to innovator, who puts a mental effort on an invention.583 
As this (tangible or intangible) invention contributes to the public, it deserves 
protection. However, arguably, this theory does not support evergreening patents 
when it is considered that there is a lack of creative efforts on evergreening patents,584 
which are not availed to the public. According to Posner, as long as IP rights 
 
 
581 Whish and Bailey (n 28) 814-827. 
582 Peter Groves, Source Book on Intellectual Property Law (Cavendish 1997) 48. 
583 John Locke and Robert Filmer, Two Treaties on Civil Government (Routledge 2018); Eric Maughan, 
‘Protecting the rights of inventors: how natural rights theory should influence the injunction analysis in 
patent infringement cases’ (2012) 10 Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 233-234. 
584 Janice Mueller and Donald Chisum, ‘Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine’ (2008) 
45 Houston Law Review 1101. 
170 
 
encourage businesses to innovate, the pitfalls of granting such exclusivity can be 
tolerated.585 Article 7 of TRIPS similarly stated that granting IP rights contributes to the 
development of technology through increasing technological knowledge, the effective 
spread of innovation, and socioeconomic welfare by holding the balance between 
holders’ rights and obligations. If granting a patent is accepted as a social contract 
between innovators and the society, innovators will have monopoly rights where the 
society tolerates for a length of time to gain favour from innovators’ creations. This 
theory is vital for the emergence of innovations, which lay the foundation of patent 
systems.586 Nevertheless, breach of covenant will likely come in sight when it comes 
to patent evergreening in which innovators abuse this contract by extending their 
monopoly rights by showing minor alterations. In other words, in the case of 
evergreening patent issues, the supposed contract becomes unjust and theoretically 
deficient. 
From the Schumpeterian perspective, innovators should always be promoted via 
exclusive rights as those innovations will eventually be beneficial to society. 
Otherwise, investments in research and development will decrease because of free-
riding strategies, and consequently, technological progression will decelerate.587 
However, on the other hand, evergreening patents require relatively fewer investment 
costs and efforts. Therefore, one can claim that evergreening practices are not 
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deserving of patent protection588 even though they are commonly examined under 
monopoly-profit incentive theory, which supports rewarding monopolies in exchange 
for their minor or major innovations.589 It would be highly controversial to grant patent 
protection (as a property or a privilege) for evergreening practices where the risks are 
very low due to the inessentiality of time and cost for introducing a new product. One 
may accordingly claim to shorten/weaken patent protections for evergreening patents. 
However, it would not be appropriate because technology is developed cumulatively 
by depending on previous technologies. Hence, any restrictions on IP laws would likely 
result in suppressing technologies. 
In conclusion, providing a reasonable economic incentive for an innovator seems 
instrumental to leverage consumer welfare and, more generally, public benefit from 
different theoretical perspectives. By courtesy of exclusive rights stemming from 
patent protection, the innovator will be able to estimate its potential profit before 
introducing the innovation.590 However, the vagueness of determining novelty and 
non-obviousness of inventions is the essence and the abstract of the matter where 
patent holders push the limits of the patent system, and arguably abuse it, via slight 
modifications, which are the Achilles’ heels of the system. 
4.6.2 An application of TFEU provisions in evergreening issues 
Manufacturers, who have patent protection, can benefit from monopoly rights and 
derive a profit without a competitive pressure in a given period. They generally resort 
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to evergreening patent rights for extending this privilege through patenting follow-up 
inventions as long as these inventions only make a minor addition to first-generation 
products.591 This intellectual monopoly privilege is at the centre of both international 
trade and intellectual property laws, particularly for the pharmaceutical industry. 
However, it also has a clear link with Article 102(b) TFEU in terms of limiting technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers because the expiration of patent prevents 
patent holders from retaining more royalties, which are provided by the monopoly 
market. Such patent strategies lead to market entry barriers, which restrict fair 
competition.592 Therefore, the evergreening problem needs further examination from 
a competition law paradigm.  
Concerning the legality of evergreening patents, such strategies are considered lawful 
under patent law as well as currently under EU competition law.593 What is certain that 
this issue prima facie seems to relate with patent law rather than competition law and 
as per Article 345 TFEU, the Union law is not entitled to examine patent rights whether 
they are obtained lawful or not because they are granted as national rights. However, 
it is evident that these recognized rights do not provide effective immunity if they are 
against EU competition law.594 So, the existence of IP rights is outside of the 
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competition law intervention. Competition law only controls the exercise of this right. 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement fundamentally assures to prevent all potential 
monopolistic abuses arising out of misusing IP rights.595 Hence, conducting a detailed 
investigation is a must to evaluate whether evergreening patenting practices are 
competitive on merits or breach of Article 102 TFEU since patenting of second-
generation products by originator manufacturer likely restrict the market access of 
generic manufacturers.  
Even though it is hard to establish a link between evergreening practices and special 
conditions of Article 102 TFEU, those practices can still be prevented under this 
provision, whose sphere of enforcement is beyond listed conditions because of the 
exhaustiveness of this provision. When determining fresh types of abuses in the 
context of Article 102 TFEU, an intention to eliminate competition is considered by the 
Commission. Hence, the link can be established by assessing the competitiveness of 
evergreening practices and their impact on competitive markets. However, the claim 
of eliminating competition intention shall be supported with objective and economic 
data as EU competition law mostly bases on objective justifications. In these premises, 
Article 102 TFEU would be enforceable when considering anti-competitive results and 
detrimental effects on consumer welfare.  
EU patent law has arguably a weak legal infrastructure to cope with evergreening 
practices, and therefore, it reveals weakness to evaluate whether patent applications 
are lawful or not. Hence, as concerns evergreening practices, Article 102 TFEU will 
always come up even though it constitutes a contradiction with member countries’ 
 
 




national patent laws. In terms of EU law, the AstraZeneca decision provided useful 
principles that may be relevant to evergreening.596 Hence, the trace of evergreening 
can be found in the AstraZeneca case in the context of Article 102 TFEU even though 
this case is beyond a ‘lawful’ evergreening practice.597 However, there was no such a 
similar decision in regard to the strategic use of patent before this case where 
AstraZeneca delayed and even prevented the introduction of its generic products by 
abusing its dominant position through bending the rules of the patent system. This 
redressed the frame of Article 102 TFEU enforcement, and the current frame indicates 
that every conduct, which seems completely lawful and has a likely anti-competitive 
effect, may be subjected to an abuse of dominance investigation. Therefore, bending 
patent protection issue (evergreening) requires further explanation to make out the 
degree to which it contrasts with the aims of competition law.  
4.6.2.1 Case law regarding evergreening issues 
Evergreening patenting issues have so far been mostly encountered in pharmaceutical 
companies’ cases598 such as the Astra Zeneca and Lundbeck cases, where patent 
holders had strived to extend the duration of their granted exclusive rights.599 However, 
exploiting IP rights to the core is significant for all other high technology-intensive 
markets, such as electronics and software markets. Such strategies cement 
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patentees’ negotiating and competing positions, which established an anti-competitive 
environment for generic product markets.600 
The court of the United Kingdom particularly emphasised in the Lundbeck that follow-
on patent claiming (on escitalopram) did not prevent rival producers from introducing 
generic versions of original products after the patent protection expires.601 However, 
rather than doing in-detail examination of Lundbeck, this section will emphasise on the 
AstraZeneca case as the first judgement of the CJEU in terms of strategic use of 
patents, more specifically evergreening patent issue, was the AstraZeneca case. What 
has happened that AstraZeneca renounced its patent protection for Losec -in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden- to have an advantage over its competitors when it 
introduced its second-generation product, namely Losec MUPS. This complicated to 
produce generic versions of Losec as there was no announced formula, and 
consequently, competitors encountered market entry barriers because producing an 
equivalent product would likely be costly and time-consuming.602 Even though 
AstraZeneca’s conduct of withdrawing its marketing authorisation of Losec seemed 
prima facie lawful, AstraZeneca claimed that such conduct fairly and proportionately 
inconveniences rival businesses, not eliminate effective competition.603 
The court carried out an investigation against AstraZeneca because of two main 
conduct. First, the claim that AstraZeneca extended its original patent protection for 
its medicine named Losec by applying patent offices and courts with deceptive 
statements. AstraZeneca, in its defence, stated that the General Court misinterpreted 
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the notion of competition on merits and it made a mistake by applying Article 102 TFEU 
without showing an intentional fraud or deceit. Second, it has also been claimed that 
AstraZeneca has rightly but differently interpreted ‘the Supplementary Product 
Certificate Regulation’ in good faith by adding that patent applications would likely be 
decreased and this consequently distort competition in the absence of this alternative 
interpretation.604 However, it would also be irrelevant to argue good faith for the 
application of Article 102 TFEU, which generally bases on objective justifications.  
Courts are able to consider this alternative interpretation as a misinterpretation of law 
even if likely anti-competitive effects are seen.605 By looking at a contrario, courts are 
also able to find the conduct lawful even if it has a restrictive effect on generic 
competition as long as objective justifications are seen. However, Article 102 TFEU 
will become an issue in any circumstance if businesses wander from the competition 
on merit expanding to damage consumers.606 The CJEU revealed that relevant 
conduct prevents generic competition, and therefore, it should not be evaluated in the 
context of competition on merit.607 As a result, the CJEU convicted AstraZeneca of 
abusing its dominance by the deregulation of Losec (in other words, withdrawing 
marketing authorisation). Therefore, the anti-competitive effects of this deregistration 
process were found enough to apply Article 102 TFEU even though AstraZeneca 




604 ibid, para 69. 
605 ibid, paras 94, 99, 112; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige (n 14), para 64. 
606 AstraZeneca (n 21) para 129. 
607 ibid, para 131. 
177 
 
4.6.2.2 Evergreening in the context of Article 102 TFEU  
To establish a relationship between EU competition law and evergreening patents, it 
is necessary to refer to the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement 
Priorities, which specifies the aim and limits of EU competition law occupies an 
important position to ensure market integration.608 All concerning provisions are 
significant to stabilise functioning of the market by levelling the playing field all 
undertakings.609 Hence, the CJEU lays a burden on dominant undertakings to not 
anyhow distort competition in the internal market by mentioning their special 
responsibilities.610 The standard of undistorted competition indicates that business 
decisions shall not fit the purpose of eliminating competitors without any economic 
justification. The lawfulness of business conduct under their special responsibilities is 
taken into consideration with the concept of ‘competition on merits’611 which also has 
an amphibology. The use of intellectual property rights may cause trouble at this 
juncture even though having an exclusive right will not per se present an infringement 
as long as it is not being abused.612 Therefore, it is required to specify an objective 
justification in terms of the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU and this justification is 
formed by case law to offer a remedy. According to this, courts should bring in a verdict 
by evaluating economic justifications after they determine actual or likely conduct, 
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causing the elimination of competitors.613 Hence, the Commission has to put forward 
an objective justification, which reversed the burden of proof to the detriment of the 
Commission. However, the CJEU frequently refused economic efficiency defences as 
they only rest upon commercial interest, which does not overlap with consumer 
interests.614 
One can claim that the Commission now considers a more economic efficiency-based 
approach in Article 102 TFEU examinations, but this approach cannot be applied for 
all concerning issues. For instance, the Commission makes an infringement decision 
when it comes to royalty discounts without examining any actual or likely anti-
competitive effect as it was the case in the Michelin II.615 However, it seems that 
undertakings are frequently able to put forward their efficiency defences in case of 
being on trial even if it is debatable how much the Commission leaves the door open 
for such defences.616 Nevertheless, this much is certain that the concept of special 
responsibility has been expanded considerably by way of case law.617 In Michelin I, 
the CJEU determined that dominant undertakings have special responsibilities not to 
distort competition in the internal market via exclusionary abuses. Besides, what has 
been taken to mean in the AstraZeneca case is to notice the enlargement of the special 
responsibility concept, which has already enlarged with the Michelin I.618 As stated by 
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Friedman, businesses have special responsibilities to raise their profits.619 However, 
they shall also behave accordingly not to harm competition. Businesses, as a matter 
of course, keep their profitableness on the forefront, they are disposed to suppress 
innovations by retarding, non-introducing or in other similar ways. Therefore, they 
generally have tendencies to explore all avenues for exploiting the patent system as 
fully as possible. However, since no patent system allows double patenting (as long 
as patent applicant shows novelty and non-obviousness),620 this exploitation most of 
the time appears completely lawful. However, it does not mean that concerned 
undertakings fulfil their special responsibilities under competition law, and therefore, it 
is ought to be required to imply competition law provisions. To sum, concerning the 
affiliation between patent protection and the progression of innovation, there is a need 
for an absolute statement of ‘special responsibility’ concept because businesses may 
likely suppress innovations and make their strategic decisions counterproductive. 
Therefore, broad in scope concepts like undistorted competition and competition on 
merits should be supported by more accurate statements in case law.621  
4.6.3 Conclusion 
In consequence of evergreening patent practices, patentees extend and, 
consequently, cement their privileged positions pursuant to their patent rights (in an 
anti-competitive way). Evergreening strategies have negative impacts in terms of 
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continuity of innovation and access to innovation. Especially in cases related to human 
health, such innovation suppression practices become more complex. For this reason, 
evergreening patent, eliminating generic competition and its price-reducing effect, has 
often been a more frequently discussed subject in the pharmaceutical sector. Some 
of the specific evergreening practices may be listed as patenting existing medicines 
with new formulations or compositions, patenting new combinations of drugs, 
patenting an in-use drug for a new use, or patenting a known drug with a new 
dosage.622 These products, generally called next or second generation, have 
insignificant and minor changes and do not put the product in an entirely new form. 
However, this does not mean that evergreening issue only occurs in the 
pharmaceutical sector; patent holders from different sectors also have effective 
strategies with regard to patents’ lifecycle management. 
The advancement of technology depends on providing patent protection for both 
incremental and breakthrough innovations. Therefore, it is necessary to provide 
substantial incentives to actualise and ensure follow-on innovations.623 Patent granting 
authorities control all applications firmly, but some applications are succeeded even if 
they do not deserve any protection. This issue is due to the weakness of the patent 
authority or patent system itself. More particularly, evergreening issues are stemming 
from -including but not limited to- strategic patenting, lax rules, and the malfunction of 
 
 
622 Abbas (n 588) 54; Galit Gonen, ‘Innovation in known drugs – the European Angle’ (2017) 12(3) 
Washington Journal of Law, Technology and Arts 278. 
623 Christopher Holman, Timo Minssen and Eric Solovy, ‘Patentability Standards for Follow-on 
pharmaceutical innovation’ (2018) 37(3) Biotechnology Law Report 136; Robert Merges, ‘Uncertainty 
and the Standard of Patentability’ (1992) 7(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 33. 
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patent examination mechanisms through filing several patent applications to prevent 
third parties’ research initiatives.624 
The most likely solution of evergreening is to apply patentability requirements as strict 
as possible by delving into the existence of an inventive step and non-obviousness. 
This would be the best possible way to nail down the continuity of the introduction of 
technological advancements by calculating the innovator’s actual contribution to 
innovative progress. Therefore, it seems that realising inconveniences in the patent 
system will likely answer the evergreening problem625 such that the determination of 
the extent to which new patent applications contribute to innovation is under the patent 
office’s responsibility. However, what is quite certain that a patent owner undertaking 
becomes in a monopoly position in the market for patented technology when the right 
is granted. Therefore, any inconveniences in the patent system would likely distort 
competition since other manufacturers with the intention to penetrate the same market 
are restricted from the competition. Consequently, as a temporal solution, sore points 
of patent systems should be treated by Article 102 TFEU for the sake of ensuring 
competitive markets, consumer welfare, and the development of innovations. 
4.7 Overall Conclusion of the Chapter 
This chapter aimed to show that the suppression of innovation can take many different 
forms and argued that five frequently encountered patents related examples of these 
forms (namely, non-use of patent rights, pay-for-delay agreements, standardisation, 
spare part designs protection and evergreening patents) in the context of EU 
competition law. These various practices, amongst others, are signs of continuing 
 
 
624 Scott Parker and Kevin Mooney, ‘Is ‘evergreening’ a cause for concern? A legal perspective’ (2007) 
13(4) Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 235-241. 
625 Holman, Minssen and Solovy (n 623) 160. 
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incentives to suppress innovation. The common point of all the cases examined is to 
secure a competitive edge, rather than promote innovation or provide alternative 
products to consumers. Therefore, it was argued to what extent these practices 
enhance competition and consumer welfare; and demonstrated why innovation 
suppression practices are anti-competitive. Since the issue of innovation suppression 
remains in between the fields of IP and competition laws, this chapter covered both. 
However, IP law theories, approaches and issues are only discussed to support the 
claim that competition law is potentially instrumental in offering solutions to the 
suppression of innovation. 
In regard to the non-use of patents, it was argued that patents are expected to secure 
the interest of society from a theoretical standpoint (from both utilitarian and Lockean 
perspectives). Granting a patent right to the innovator is considered to be beneficial to 
society although it provides absolute market power and a monopoly position for a 
certain time. However, the inventor can abuse this exclusive right for anti-competitive 
reasons by hindering the development of innovations through not using the patent. 
Following this premise, PAEs’ anti-competitive practices were examined under Article 
102 TFEU. Subsequently, pay-for-delay agreements were analysed as another type 
of abuse of patent rights. Anti-competitive aspects of these agreements, which deter 
innovation, were explained by taking into account both doctrines and case law. As to 
standardisation, pro-innovation features of standardisation were illustrated with the 
benefits of providing interoperability and, consequently, preventing customer lock-in 
issues. Therefore, it was seen that standardisation is an instrument for promoting 
innovation but it can be turned into an obstacle if it is abused. On the issue of spare 
part designs protection, which has been debated for many years, it was discussed to 
what extent competition the law could be involved in the issue for the continuation of 
183 
 
innovation. Subsequently, it was showed the need for generic manufacturers to 
produce freely alternative products and presented the two-phase test as a remedy to 
the current deadlock in light of Article 102 TFEU. Finally, evergreening patents, which 
extend (prolong the duration of) the exclusive rights granted by patent protection, were 
discussed, along with the consequences of delaying innovation. It was then 
considered whether these practices constitute a violation of Article 102. To sum up, 
the above examples show that abuse of patent rights can be regarded as abuses of 
dominant positions, as patent rights provide temporary monopoly positions. Also, 
these patent-related abuses impair competition in the market, consumer welfare, and 
the progress of innovation. Therefore, this chapter mainly emphasized that all the 
cases examined should be considered within the scope of Article 102 TFEU.
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Chapter 5: Suppression Of Innovation Via Predatory Innovation And 
Exclusionary Product Design: The Case Of Planned Obsolescence 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the case of planned obsolescence as a likely type of 
innovation suppression by deeply considering exclusionary product design practices. 
A considerable amount of literature has reported that there might be an incentive for 
manufacturers to shorten product durability, so-called planned obsolescence. 
However, product durability as one of the most significant indicators of quality was 
examined without linking with the suppression of innovation. The following sections 
will establish a connection between suppression of innovation and exclusionary 
product design in light of EU competition law by specifically emphasising on Article 
102 TFEU through using the case of planned obsolescence. 
Planned obsolescence was an often-ignored concept until recent investigations 
against Apple and Samsung in France and Italy where planned obsolescence has 
been investigated from a demand-side perspective. However, this issue has not been 
properly addressed in the supply-side context, although for example, locked-in 
consumers create market entry barriers for rivals. Besides, the issue causing anxiety 
is the ever-shortening time gap between the new becoming the old, which indicates 
that there would be no perennial product in the ever-developing high-tech markets. It 
poses dangers for every business if they fail to put new products on the market 
continuously. Therefore, this chapter addresses a highly controversial issue and 
responds to the need for conceptualising planned obsolescence with a novel approach 
by considering the supply-side perspective. As businesses employed planned 
obsolescence strategies jeopardise competitive market structures, particularly in the 
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high-tech markets,626 by gaining an unjust advantage over vulnerable consumers and 
against their rivals, the extent to which planned obsolescence would be as a new type 
of abusing dominant position is questioned by considering economic analysis 
alongside a legal perspective. 
The factsheet on planned obsolescence published by the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) stressed the multidimensionality of the problem with the 
following sentence that “designing products that become obsolete or break down 
prematurely is a major social, economic and environmental problem.”627 As this issue 
has more than one dimension, either a total ban628 or an interdisciplinary legal 
approach should be considered as well as taking into consideration the basic 
dynamics of economics.629 Linking common denominators among different disciplines 
will enrich the perspective of this study.  
This chapter has seven sections, which are attempted to argue the legal dimension of 
planned obsolescence, which cause innovation suppression. After this introductory 
section, the next (second) section will release information about the definition and the 
literature of planned obsolescence to pave the way for discussing the likely remedies 
 
 
626 Data gathered from over 400 consumer complaints concerning short life cycles of products between 
May 2013 and October 2013 by Swiss Consumer Organisation (Stiftung für Konsumentenschutz) 
indicated that a great majority of complaints is about electronic devices, such as computers, printers, 
television, electrical kitchen appliances, and telecommunications devices. Nearly one-fourth of the 
complaints registered over non-electronic products, such as cosmetics, textiles, and furniture. See, The 
European Consumer Organisation, Planned obsolescence – the point of view of consumer 
organisations (EESC Roundtable on Planned Obsolescence, 17 October 2014) 1, 8 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/sylvia_maurer.pdf> accessed 5 November 2020. 
627 European Economic and Social Committee, EESC Study on Planned Obsolescence (Factsheet, 29 
March 2016) <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/factsheet-en.pdf> 
accessed 5 November 2020. 
628 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Calling for a total ban on planned obsolescence’ (Press 
release, 17 October 2013) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/CES_13_61> 
accessed 5 November 2020. 
629 Rick Szostak, Claudio Gnoli and María López-Huertas, Interdisciplinary Knowledge Organization 
(Springer 2016) 1-64; Wendy Schrama, ‘How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some 
experiences with an interdisciplinary research method’ (2011) 7 Utrecht Law Review 147. 
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by particularly offering competition law tools. The third section shows the necessity to 
examine planned obsolescence issue, which has been mostly ignored so far. The 
fourth and fifth sections will discuss planned obsolescence as an exclusionary product 
design practice by considering to what extent manufacturers have a free hand in 
regard to design their products. The subsequent (sixth) section will go a step further 
to conceptualise planned obsolescence under the EU competition law by discussing 
how planned obsolescence suppresses innovation. Finally, in the seventh section, a 
conclusion will be presented to the piece suggested remedies together.  
5.2  The concept of planned obsolescence 
Albeit there is no overarching definition of planned obsolescence in the legal literature 
of the EU law,630 it would simply be defined as a design practice of product to quickly 
become broken or outmoded products for encouraging consumers to replace their 
belongings.631 Herein, it is necessary to specify which products are counted as 
obsolete and what is legally meant by planned obsolescence. As not all obsolescence 
is planned, the underlying reason for obsolescence has to be identified whether it 
stems from a deliberate business practice or not.632 For example, an item might be 
defined as obsolete when it does not meet the users’ expectations anymore just 
because of being old-fashioned even still functioning.633 Moreover, products may also 
 
 
630 European Parliament accordingly took a decision to call the Commission to make an EU-level 
definition of planned obsolescence in 2018. See, European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2017 on a 
longer lifetime for products: benefits for consumers and companies [2018] 2018/C 334/06. 
631 Whereas the Dictionary of Business and Management defines the word “planned obsolescence” as 
“deliberate policy adopted by a manufacturer to limit the durability of a product in order to encourage 
the consumer to buy a replacement more quickly than he or she otherwise might have to”. See, 
Jonathan Law, A Dictionary of Business and Management (OUP 2016). 
632 Rafael de Oliveira, ‘Planned Obsolescence’ (2013) 13 Leadership and Management in Engineering 
262. 
633 Andrew Lemer, ‘Obsolescence’ in Andrew Carswell (ed), The Encyclopedia of Housing (SAGE 
Publications 2012) 529-530. 
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become obsolete due to other reasons, such as their components may be corroded or 
demoded, or else it may have a shortened life cycle. While a variety of definitions have 
been suggested for the term of planned obsolescence, this study will mainly follow the 
definition by Yosef Sherif and Ellen Rice who saw it as “a design plan that is intended 
to hasten existing products to become undesirable either functionally or 
psychologically and consequently to be replaced by new products.”634 
5.2.1 The terminological classification for the planned obsolescence 
Planned obsolescence is getting a common term by degrees due to the increasing 
influence of consumerism trend and shortened product life cycle.635 To better 
understand the mechanism of planned obsolescence and its practices, planned 
obsolescence will be investigated into two distinct dimensions, which are built-in 
obsolescence and post-planned obsolescence by taking as a reference to the 
production moment.  
5.2.1.1 Built-in obsolescence 
Built-in obsolescence will exist if a manufacturer designs its products having an 
artificially limited life. In other words, it merely addresses a method of limiting the 
service life of products when they were designed.636 The most-known instance 
regarding built-in planned obsolescence is the design of light bulbs, which could 
endure 1500 hours in 1895.637 Later, the endurance of the light bulbs was increased 
 
 
634 Yosef Sherif and Ellen Rice, 'The Search for Quality: The Case of Planned 
Obsolescence' (1986) 26(1) Microelectronics Reliability 75. 
635 Whereas the Dictionary of Business and Management defines the word “planned obsolescence” as 
“deliberate policy adopted by a manufacturer to limit the durability of a product in order to encourage 
the consumer to buy a replacement more quickly than he or she otherwise might have to”. See, Law (n 
631). 
636 For instance, computer mice having a limited number of clicking life expectancy will be the subject 
of this matter. 
637 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1504. 
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up to 2500 hours. However, the Phoebus cartel638 decided to decrease the lifetime of 
the light bulbs to 1000 hours by modifying filaments639 as from 1925. Nevertheless, 
traces of planned obsolescence in the United States dates back to the early part of the 
1870s640 by disposable shirt collars. Modern consumption culture (consumerism) for 
the fashion industry was intensified by supplying nylon stockings as an additional 
aspect of this fragile-producing strategy.641 Nylon stockings produced by DuPont642 
has reached a high amount of sales throughout the 1950s and afterwards. The secret 
of success behind this figure was to produce fast wearing nylon stockings, which were 
easily torn or stretched.643 Therefore, from the disposable shirt collars to present, 
consumers have been obligated to overcome the depreciation arising from 
obsolescence that boosts prospects for novelty.644 To give a recent example, the 
Italian antitrust authority fined Apple and Samsung because of similar reasons.645 Four 
big printer companies, namely Epson, HP, Canon and Brother, have been interrogated 
in France because of misguiding their users regarding the components’ lifetime by 
 
 
638 Phoebus s.a. compagnie ındustrielle pour le développement de l’éclairage was an organization 
whose members were strong companies like Philips and General Electric. See, Arthur Bright, The 
Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change and Economic Development from 1800 to 1947 
(Macmillan 1949); Stef van Gompel, ‘12 Light Bulb’ in Claudy Op den Kamp and Dan Hunter (eds), A 
History of Intellectual Property in 50 Objects (Cambridge University Press 2019) 104-111. 
639 Rivera and Lallmahomed (n 270) 119. 
640 Slade (n 129) 3. 
641 Jesus Pineda and Maria Salmoral, ‘A Juridical 'Theory' of Planned Obsolescence’ (2017) 
20 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966052> accessed 5 November 2020. 
642 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. 
643 Rivera and Lallmahomed (n 270) 119. 
644 Harvey (n 215) 230; István Mészáros, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition (Monthly 
Review Press 1995) 765-767. 
645 The Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante Della Concorrenza E Del Mercato), 'PS11s009-
PS11039 - Apple and Samsung fined for software updates that have caused serious troubles and/or 
have reduced functionality of some mobile phones (Press Release, 2018) 
<https://en.agcm.it/en/media/detail?id=385e274c-8dc3-4911-9b8c-




using smart chips in their ink cartridges.646 Briefly, there are currently some national 
initiatives to overcome this issue in the absence of EU-level regulations. 
5.2.1.2 Post-planned obsolescence 
As to post-planned obsolescence, it exists in case of wearing off the product in a sort 
of way after releasing it on the market.647 It arises in two different ways. The first and 
prevalent type of post-planned obsolescence is stemming from the introduction of 
products’ new models, which leads to making even durable goods inconsumable. 
Newly introduced and technologically advanced products cause the former products 
to be in the position of relatively old and impractical. For instance, 1912 Cadillac 
Touring Edition equipped with the electric starter made all previous cars obsolete. 
Planned obsolescence latterly became a prevalent event in the automobile industry by 
the evermore-intensive technological developments, and new model cars are put onto 
the market every year with a new technologic extension. 
Nevertheless, at times, technological developments may not be satisfactory for 
consumers to replace their products. In other words, consumers may decide to 
disobey the law of obsolescence and use their outmoded properties even if it happens 
very seldom.648 That is why there is a need for the second way of post-planned 
obsolescence for triggering consumption by changing the design to create a consumer 
perception and ascribe meaning to exact products. For instance, making continuous 
 
 
646 David Schrieberg, ‘Landmark French Lawsuit Attacks Epson, HP, Canon and Brother for ‘Planned 
Obsolescence’’ (Forbes, 26 September 2017) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidschrieberg1/2017/09/26/landmark-french-lawsuit-attacks-epson-
hp-canon-and-brother-for-planned-obsolescence/#3a0fba351b36> accessed 26 September 2019. 
647 Obsolescence is mostly categorised under three basic reference points, which are artificial, 
psychological, and technological. 
648 Bernard London, ‘Ending the Depression Through Planned Obsolescence’ (1932) 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/125574436/London-1932-Ending-the-Depression-Through-
Planned-Obsolescence> accessed 17 Dec 2018. 
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design alterations, releasing incompatible upgrades or halting the production of spare 
parts would likely promote the consumption of new products. In fact, the main purpose 
of these strategies is to direct consumers to be bored and dissatisfied with their 
existing properties.649 In this way, the new can easily take the place of the old.650 
Hence, the purpose is somehow to make older products undesirable.651  
Manufacturers can manage the consumption of their products via “immoderate and 
reckless behaviours” towards consumers under the favour of planned obsolescence. 
What is worse, consumers are not sufficiently aware of inciting to have newer products 
due to these business practices.652 Since using fashionable products has become an 
important indicator of human relationships,653 the concept of fashion is directly 
associated with planned obsolescence as a matter of course. For example, Burberry 
as a British luxury clothing and cosmetics brand physically destroyed its finished goods 
amounted to £55.5m in the years of 2017 and 2018 as per its Annual Report 
2017/2018.654 The reason behind this operation is presenting exclusivity to its 
consumers and maintaining its brand value. However, this practice also indicates that 
 
 
649 Henry Maloney, ‘Planned Obsolescence and TV’ (1958) 33 The Clearing House 58; For further 
reading see, Vance Packard, The Waste Makers (David McKay 1960); Jonathan Chapman, Emotionally 
Durable Design: Objects, Experiences and Empathy (Taylor and Francis 2005). 
650 As extreme examples, Henry Maloney linked the ascending divorce rate and the increasing 
disappearance rate of TV programs with the created perception behind planned obsolescence. For 
further reading on this issue, see Maloney (n 649) 58. 
651 Sherif and Rice (n 634) 75. For another example, Orbach mentioned the Color Marketing Group 
whose members, colour designers, aiming to boost production efficiency in terms of saleability and 
quality. This platform also serves companies to expedite depreciation of durable products with using 
colours. See, Barak Orbach, ‘The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly power in durable-goods markets’ (2004) 
21 Yale Journal on Regulation 67, 101-102. 
652 Pineda and Salmoral (n 641) 3-6. 
653 Jonathan Chapman, ‘Design for (Emotional) Durability’ (2009) 25(4) Design Issues 29-32. 
654 Burberry, ‘Annual Report 2017/18 of Burberry’ (2018) 165 
<https://www.burberryplc.com/content/dam/burberry/corporate/Investors/Results_Reports/2018/Burbe
rry_AnnualReport_FY17-18.pdf> Accessed 19 December 2018. For further discussion, see Marie-
Cécile Cervellon and Lara Shammas, ‘The Value of Sustainable Luxury in Mature Markets: A Customer-
Based Approach’ (2013) 52 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 90. Also see, Fang Kaixin ‘Recycling of 
the high-end brands’ leftovers’ (Master dissertation, Politecnico di Milano Facolt del Design 2017). 
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Burberry makes its products obsolete and provides a basis for planned 
obsolescence.655  
5.2.2 Consumer perceptions on planned obsolescence 
Recent studies suggest contradictory findings of consumer perceptions on planned 
obsolescence. Some studies indicate that the consumer expectations apropos of 
durable goods show a falling tendency.656 As reported in surveys among consumers, 
products durability has little importance for technologically evolving devices, like 
smartphones. Especially for technology products, the consumer prefers eye-pleasing 
and hi-tech product with pushing the durable product into the background. 657 
However, some other studies demonstrate that consumer perceptions might be 
changed by informing about the predicted lifetime of the product658 or providing a long-
time warranty.659 For example, a survey conducted in Germany by the Obsolescence 
Research Group indicated that the majority of the German population assessed 
durability is more important than new product versions and functional updates.660 
From the historical point of view, it would be instrumental in examining the competition 
between Ford and General Motors from the beginning of the 20th century. Henry Ford 
 
 
655 The question distant from our current discourse but not altogether irrelevant, namely whether it is 
possible to create timeless design, is directly related to marketing discipline. For further research on 
this area, see Wei Sun and Ping Sun, ‘Post Planned Obsolescence’ (2008) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251867933_Post_Planned_Obsolescence> accessed 28 
Dec 2018. 
656 Alex Gnanapragasam and others, ‘Consumer expectations of product lifetimes around the world: a 
review of global research findings and methods’ in Conny Bakker and Ruth Mugge, Product Lifetimes 
and the Environment 2017 – Conference Proceedings (IOS Press BV 2017) 464-470. 
657 Denise Dantas and Lia Assumpção, ‘Planned Obsolescence, Consumer Practices and Design: A 
Survey on Consumer Goods’ (2017) 3 Mix Sustentável 191. 
658 Volker Kuppelwieser and others, ‘Consumer responses to planned obsolescence’ (2019) 47 Journal 
of Retailing and Consumer Services 157. 
659 Darryl Seland, ‘Future Proofing and the Death of Planned Obsolescence’ (2015) 54(6) Quality 6. 
660 Melanie Jaeger-Erben and Tamina Hipp, All the rage or take it easy - Expectations and experiences 
in the context of longevity in electronic devices: Descriptive analysis of a representative online survey 
in Germany’ (2018) <https://challengeobsolescence.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Research-
Group-OHA_Description-Online-Survey_2018.pdf> accessed 5 November 2020. 
192 
 
adopted mass production to decrease the production cost of automobiles for drawing 
intention from every walk of life. Through the very innovative production chain, 
unskilled workers in different assembly lines with the help of machines contribute to 
the final standardised products. Ford was able to decrease its production time from 
514 minutes to 138 seconds.661 In this period, Ford only provided “Model T” as a simple 
and universal car by coming up with a reason that having a car is more than a need. 
Cars afterwards turned into an indicative of the people’s wealth, which shows their 
purchasing power.  Consequently, consumers did not want to use the same car, Model 
T, with others. Alfred Sloan, chairman and CEO of General Motors, subsequently 
offered diversity for their cars by putting more than five different models on sale to fulfil 
consumers’ needs. This was the move, which shakes the foundations of Ford.662 
General Motors got an edge over Ford through attaching the importance to human 
behaviours. This is also the proof of people are not just homo economicus, they are 
more complex, i.e. irrational, than economic realities. The current competition 
dynamics stretches away to Sloan’s methods. It bases on understanding consumer 
needs, either basic needs or artificial needs. To sum up, Sloan’s marketing technique 
can also be evaluated as a planned obsolescence strategy in terms of bringing a new 
dimension to trade apart from quality and the price of products. 
Even though consumers take an important role of planned obsolescence strategies, it 
is hard to expect from consumers to generate a solution for this matter. Hence, looking 
at the producers’ perspective would be more solution-oriented. Producers having 
serial production line are prone to make excessive production. For selling those 
 
 
661 Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World 
Order (Simon & Schuster 1995) 260. 
662 Richard Tedbow, ‘The Struggle for Dominance in the Automobile Market: The Early Years of Ford 
and General Motors’ (1988) 17(2) Business and Economic History 49-62. 
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multiplexed products, they generally manipulate consumers because the actual 
demands are less than the existing supply. Kevin Carson, a left-wing market anarchist 
in his own words, argued that the mass-production industry controls consumers via 
planned obsolescence.663 In other words, planned obsolescence is used in order to 
create a demand for manufactured products by the mass-production industry. Hence, 
there is an exigency of protecting consumers against the practice of planned 
obsolescence. On the other hand, producers are sovereign to produce low-quality 
products at their discretion under the current EU regulatory framework.664 Even if this 
sovereignty, producers should not be inclined to produce low-quality products to 
increase their financial incomes. On top of that, they would probably be inclined to put 
the product on the market with shortened life, which will harm to economic interests of 
consumers.665 All in all, consumers and producers (with their engineers, designers and 
marketers) ought to be accepted as equally responsible.666 However, it is currently 
thought that both manufacturers and consumers should make ethical and conscious 




663 Tate Fegley, 'Kevin Carson and the Freed Market: Is his Left-Libertarian Vision 
Plausible?' (2016) 8(2) Libertarian Papers 273-292. 
664 There is no legal restriction regarding the adjustment of product life. 
665 Therefore, guarantee, refund, labelling or ecolabels would be effective legal remedies in the context 
of protecting consumers. However, other aspects of law would also be taken into consideration for 
overcoming the problem even if the necessary information is provided to them. That is because planned 
obsolescence affects not only the contracting parties but also the whole market, consumer welfare and 
environment beyond an individual unjust treatment.  
666 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1504. 
667 Maitre-Ekern and Dalhammar (n 265) 378-394. 
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5.2.3 The emergence of planned obsolescence in the literature 
The legal literature is woefully inadequate when it comes to planned obsolescence.668 
There is a tendency to understand planned obsolescence as a consequence of 
entrepreneurial choices.669 Hence, more general, mostly economics-weighted, 
literature will be provided throughout this part. The paper of ‘Ending the Depression 
through Planned Obsolescence’ by Bernard London in 1932 is accepted as a starting 
point of planned obsolescence in the academic literature.670 This research indicates 
that the main reason for the Great Depression in the US from 1929 to 1939 took its 
source from the ineffective supply lines. London found that there was a low demand 
for new products because people were prone to use their old and worn-out products 
for quite a long time.671 He consequently offered to manufacturers adopting planned 
obsolescence strategies with the following sentences: 
“…The essence of my plan for accomplishing these much-to-be-desired-ends 
is to chart the obsolescence of capital and consumption goods at the time of 
their production… An equally advantage of a system of planned obsolescence 
would be its function in providing a new reservoir from which to draw income 
for the operation of the Government…”672  
 
 
668 Stefan Wrbka, ‘The Potential and Limits of Teleological Reduction Shown with the Example of the 
Austrian Warranty Regime’ in Mark Fenwick and Stefan Wrbka (eds), Flexibility in Modern Business 
Law: A Comparative Assessment (Springer 2016) 28. 
669 Mariateresa Maggiolino, ‘Planned Obsolescence: A Strategy in Search of Legal Rules’ (2019) 50 IIC 
– International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 405-407. 
670 London (n 648). 
671 According to Keynes, economic shrinkage arises from the demand shrinking, which stems from 
widespread unemployment. For further reading, see John Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and, Money (Macmillan 1936). Hobsbawm has also mentioned economic concentration after 
the great depression, which triggered the emergence of a few big businesses rather than several small 
companies. For further reading, see Eric Hobsbawm, Fractured Times: Culture and Society in the 
Twentieth Century (Little Brown 2013). 
672 London (n 648). 
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Therefore, London sought a solution in consideration of creating a fund for the 
government and pioneered for the adoption of the planned obsolescence. Harvey also 
verified the planned obsolescence as a solution of stagnation and signalled the 
prudential problems with following words: 
 “…Devaluation through violent swings in the business cycle was brought under 
control and reduced to the kind of steady devaluation through planned 
obsolescence that posed relatively minor problems…”673 
Jacoby also verified that planned obsolescence is a requirement for the current 
economic system by mentioning the above sentences:  
“... The intensification of the drive for surplus value and profit accelerates the 
rate at which past goods are liquidated to make way for new goods; planned 
obsolescence is everywhere, from consumer goods to thinking to 
sexuality…”674 
Capitalism, the most fundamental feature of today’s economic system, requires the 
increase of commercial transactions, which necessitate repetitive demands for 
ensuring overconsumption.675 It also prevents consumers from taking logical decisions 
by accelerating the existing consuming cycle.676 “The mobilization of fashion and 
 
 
673 Harvey (n 215) 184. 
674 Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology (Transaction Publishers 
1997) 4-5. 
675 Consequently, planned obsolescence is the current and modern method of dispossession. 
Manufacturers are obliged to reduce product prices or increase the products’ quality under fierce 
competition conditions in order to survive in the competitive market. However, lowering the price means 
sacrificing quality and/or life of the product. On the other hand, increasing the quality will increase the 
price. The increase in quality and decrease in price are the main objectives of competition law. However, 
high quality products will reduce the frequency of product purchase. Therefore, the manufacturer has 
an incentive and reasonable cause to adopt planned obsolescence. 
676 Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Objects of Consumption, Causes of Desire: Consumerism and Advertising in 
Societies of Commanded Enjoyment’ (2006) 14 Journal of Theory and Criticism 83; Danielle Todd, ‘You 
are what you buy: Postmodern consumerism and the construction of self’ (2012) 10 Hohonu 48; Mathias 
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advertising the accelerate change”677 are some of the other tools of enhancing 
consumption in addition to physical obsolescence strategies. These basically 
circumvent to the classical economic theory in which it is always assumed that homo 
economicus (economic man) make the most rational choices for their self-interests.678 
Planned obsolescence as a capitalist institution679 undertakes a task for demolishing 
and reproducing to preserve the status quo. Expediting of obsolescence may amount 
to brace for the competitive position in terms of provider.680 Hence, it might be 
suggested that fierce competition creates pressure in the sense of practising 
obsolescence for providers.681 
5.2.4 Which fields are currently covering planned obsolescence? 
Although there are several considerable studies to make a legal ground for planned 
obsolescence,682 legal literature is still scant scope, rather recent developments.683 
The legal literature related to planned obsolescence on the purpose of pinpointing 
which disciplines are mainly attracting considerable interest.684 This is a controversial 
 
 
Varul, ‘Towards a consumerist critique of capitalism: A socialist defence of consumer culture’ (2013) 13 
Ephemera Theory and Politics in Organization 293. 
677 Harvey (n 215) 229. 
678 These preferences are determined according to the concept of marginal benefit. 
679 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, The Anxiety of Obsolescence: the American Novel in the Age of Television 
(Vanderbilt University Press 2006) 3; Arthur Fishman, Neil Gandal and Oz Sihy, ‘Planned Obsolescence 
as an Engine of Technological Progress’ (1991) <https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275512> 
accessed 5 November 2020. 
680 George Nelson, ‘Obsolescence’ (1967) 11 Perspecta 170, 173. 
681 ibid 170, 174. 
682 Larry DiMatteo and Stefan Wrbka, ‘Planned obsolescence and consumer protection: The 
unregulated extended warranty and service contract industry’ (2019) 28 Cornell Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 483-544; Jesus Pineda, Planned Obsolescence and the Rule of Law (Universidad 
Externado de Colombia 2019); Maggiolino (n 669) 405-407; Maitre-Ekern and Dalhammar (n 265) 394-
420; Alberto de Franceschi, ‘Planned Obsolescence challenging the Effectiveness of Consumer Law 
and the Achievement of a Sustainable Economy: The Apple and Samsung Cases’ (2018) 7 Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law 217-221. 
683 Wrbka (n 668) 28. 
684 It can be exemplified, including but not limited to, as an issue of civil law, criminal law, competition 
law, unfair competition law, contract law and consumer law. 
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and hotly debated term among scholars, but to date, there is no consensus about how 
to define this issue and whether it should be perceived as a misleading commercial 
practice, as an abusing the dominant position, as a contractual relationship or as a 
crime factor. Nevertheless, the majority of the literature has almost exclusively focused 
on reviewing planned obsolescence from non-legal perspectives such as 
economics685 and engineering.686 In the economic literature, two different 
manufacturer strategies are defined to shorten product life cycle, namely contrived 
durability and planned obsolescence. Contrived durability is seen as a business 
strategy to shorten product life in advance of putting products on the market, while 
planned obsolescence is used for shortening product life after releasing products onto 
the market to convince consumers purchasing newer products.687 Engineering 
literature made a distinction through the usability and functionality of products, namely 
subjective obsolescence as being a byword for product dissatisfaction and objective 
obsolescence as amounting to product breakdown.688 
 
 
685 Ronald Coase, ‘Durability and Monopoly’ (1972) 15 Journal of Law and Economics 143; Jeremy 
Bulow, ‘Durable-good Monopolists’ (1982) 90 Journal of Political Economy 314; Jeremy Bulow and 
Lawrence Summers, ‘A theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy, discrimination, 
and Keynesian unemployment’ (1986) 4 Journal of Labor Economics 376; Michael Waldman, ‘A New 
Perspective on Planned Obsolescence’ (1993) 108 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 273; Jay Choi, 
‘Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence’ (1994) 42 The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 167; Michael Waldman, ‘Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters’ (1996) 69 
Journal of Business 489; Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri, ‘Adverse Selection in Durable Goods 
Markets’ (1999) 89 American Economic Review 1097; Orbach (n 651) 67; Hodaka Morita and Michael 
Waldman, ‘Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency’ (2004) 13 Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 273; Jae Nahm, ‘Durable-Goods Monopoly with Endogenous 
Innovation’ (2004) 13 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 303; Paul Grout and In-Uck Park, 
‘Competitive Planned Obsolescence’ (2005) 36 RAND Journal of Economics 596. 
686 Christian Remy and Elaine Huang, ‘Addressing the Obsolescence of End-User Devices: Approaches 
from the field of sustainable HCI’ in Lorenz Hilty and Bernard Aebischer (eds), ICT Innovations for 
Sustainability (Springer 2014) 257-267. 
687 Orbach (n 651) 67, 91-92. 
688 Material obsolescence should be also noted here concerning product obsolescence because of 
ageing product’s materials in the nature of things. See, Proske and others (n 221). 
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A variety of disciplines have so far assessed the term of planned obsolescence by 
because of its practicableness to different areas.689 It would not be wrong to say that 
the trends of the time have continuously altered perspectives regarding planned 
obsolescence, and consequently, this problem has been dealt with in various aspects. 
For example, at the Great Depression time and after, several scholars addressed an 
issue of planned obsolescence along with the economic perspective.690 Therefore, the 
literature has almost exclusively focused on reviewing the economic dimensions of 
planned obsolescence. Later on, it was seen as an ethical issue in the marketing field 
during the ’70s and ’80s with the consumer perspective.691 Thereafter, rapid 
technological advancements lead to research on planned obsolescence by 
engineering sciences. The literature today continues to develop through 
environmental studies because of the increasing environmental concerns since every 
single product has a cost for the environment due to consuming environmental 
assets.692 Today, surplus production causes too much waste because of producing 
disposable, non-recyclable, irreparable and easily perishable products as a result of 
planned obsolesce strategies damages to the environment.693 This paves the way for 
 
 
689 For the sake of example, planned obsolescence can be observed in city planning in which the 
housing obsolescence may be an instrumental way in order to develop urban areas. In this respect, 
gentrification is one of the most current leading topics through social studies. For further reading see, 
Lemer (n 633) 529-530. To augment the examples, planned obsolescence might also be considered as 
a useful tool for media studies, philosophy, literary and art history. 
690 London (n 648). The discussion started in 1932 with the paper of ‘Ending the Depression through 
Planned Obsolescence’ by Bernard London, who allege to employ planned obsolescence practices for 
creating a fund for the government through promoting consumption of goods. 
691 Joseph Guiltinan, ‘Creative Destruction and Destructive Creations: Environmental Ethics and 
Planned Obsolescence’ (2008) 89 Journal of Business Ethics 19. 
692 Relevant regulations are preparing within this framework, such as Council Directive 2002/96/EC 27 
January 2003 on Waste Electrical and Electronical Equipment [2003] OJ L 37; Council Directive 
2009/125/EC of 21 October 2009 on Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Related Products [2009] OJ 
L 285/10. 
693 From a different standpoint, repeatedly packaging of all these products also poses a great danger 
for the environment. See, Rivera and Lallmahomed (n 270) 122. 
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applying circular economy principles of the EU694 and sustainable consumption and 
production goals of the United Nations (UN) because environmental damage influence 
negatively to the society at the end of the day.695Even if perspectives have frequently 
changed in time, a common view amongst all these previous works addressed to need 
for further legislation and in-depth analysis in the legal field. 
5.2.5 Different Aspects of Planned Obsolescence 
5.2.5.1 Psychological and Sociological Aspects of Planned Obsolescence 
It is generally accepted in the literature that the consumer cannot make rational 
choices because of many reasons, such as misdirection and information 
asymmetry.696 For instance, advertising through mass media like perception 
management, mass manipulation, and viral marketing would likely create the desire 
for the affiliated product.697 Hence, people take inconsistent decisions with economic 
theory in well-defined circumstances698 via nudges controlled by market actors 
because people concentrate on the narrow effects of their decisions on themselves in 
the absence of self-control.699 Kahneman and Thaler were deemed worthy of a Nobel 
Memorial Prizes in economics for their contributions to behavioural economics with 
 
 
694 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1506. 
695 Wieser (n 271) 156-160. 
696 Edward Bernays successfully defined the basic terms of consumers, need and so on in accordance 
with the today’s concepts. Through this sophisticated understanding, successful strategies are 
implemented on the consumer mind. This indicates the psychological perspective of planned 
obsolescence, which this thesis does not engage with. For further reading, see Edward Bernays, ‘The 
Engineering of Consent’ (1947) 250 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 113; Also, Lyotard shows that on the contrary of the concept of homo economicus, consumers 
somehow decide against all these orientation anarchically in rare cases. See, Jean-François Lyotard, 
Libidinal Economy (Indiana University Press 1993). See also for counter arguments against rational 
choice theory, Kahneman (n 255). 
697 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (Ig Publishing 2004) 37-83; Larry Tye, The Father of spin: Edward L. 
Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations (First Owl Books 2002). 
698 Thaler (n 255) 39. 
699 Thaler and Sunstein (n 255). 
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regards to establish a connection between psychology and economics 2002 and 2017 
respectively. This bridge would likely trigger law to redress consumer and social 
welfare concepts in the context of competition law. 
Furthermore, Adorno and Horkheimer from Frankfurt School alleged that the ‘Culture 
Industry’ could manipulate every person by producing counterfeit and artificial needs 
for the purchase of surplus goods. Culture takes the form of the commodity and 
consumers to accept purchasing goods offered by the culture industry as part of the 
culture.700 Entirely new and unanticipated needs are imposed on consumers by using 
mass media and other tools.701 This increases both production and consumption.702 
To put it in a different way, homo consumericus (consumerist person) is somehow 
programmed to use up the unnecessary things to trifle with. The person consuming 
everything that is offered to him will eventually turn into a thing instead of the human 
being.703  
Consumers ascribe different meanings to have a product. The product meets 
consumer needs and also brings prestige, social rank and sense of belonging. 
Therefore, the current socioeconomic system is a pillar of strength to planned 
obsolescence by promoting the consumption culture.704 Consumption has an 
important place as a requirement of capitalism in terms of the continuity of the ever-
increasing production-consumption chain because the need for consumption is far 
 
 
700 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford University Press 2002) 
94-137. 
701  There are some certain cases, where demand of product increases as the price increases. Those 
products are also known as Veblen goods (such as luxury cars and champagnes). For further reading, 
see John Diggins, Thorstein Veblen: theorist of the leisure class (Princeton University Press 1999). 
702 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (Sage Publication 1998) 69-87. 
703 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Routledge 2001) 26-65. 
704 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1504. 
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beyond the actual need. Today’s economy is predicated on excessive consumption, 
which is the reason for emerging consumer society.705  
There is more than one way to trigger consumption. For example, having some exact 
products has become important indicator of human relationships. 706 It is a fact that 
people use material goods to represent themselves and make contact with other 
people.707 The inability to consume material goods causes them to feel insecure, but 
consumption can assuage this anxiety of insecurity. For example, conspicuous 
(status) consumption theory developed by Veblen argues that consumers think to have 
higher social status with high-priced and luxurious goods they purchase.708 In modern 
understanding, consumption actually provides insight to the living standard of person 
and the human well-being on the level of society.709 Therefore, consumerism is also a 
concept that directly concerns human relations.710 
5.2.5.2 Environmental Aspect of Planned Obsolescence 
While planned obsolescence creates market distortions, it also leads to environmental 
problems because it increases trash piles by shortening the product life. Moreover, it 
also offers disposable products rather than recyclable ones. From another 
perspective, almost all high-tech products are composed of rare earth elements. 
Mineral deposits regarding precious metals are sharply decreasing in number because 
 
 
705 Neva Goodwin and others, ‘Consumption and the Consumer Society’ (2008) in Neva Goodwin and 
others (eds), Microeconomics in Context (Houghton Mifflin Publishing 2005). 
706 Chapman (n 653) 29, 32. 
707 Weber described that traditional peasants would be despised if they earn or consume more than 
their needs. See, Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford University Press 1976) 3-23. 
708 Baudrillard (n 702) 69-87. 
709 Marx also argues that the capitalist system determines the material and social needs. 
710 Allison Pugh, ‘The planned obsolescence of other people: Consumer culture and connections in a 
precarious age’ (2013) 19 Culture and Organization 297. 
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of many perpetual productions.711 Regarding the e-waste problem, contamination of 
obsolete electronic devices into nature is required to be prevented or at least delayed 
as far as possible. For instance, junked mobile phones include more than 40 harmful 
chemicals like beryllium and arsenic, which may likely cause skin diseases and lung 
cancer by mingling with the soil and the air.712 
The cumulative progression of technology leaves the environment all in ruins. Above-
mentioned practices and similar practices regarding planned obsolescence damage 
the environment as much as the competitive markets. The EU aims to reduce waste 
of electrical and electronic equipment and to encourage the recovery of such wastes 
by listing ten categories including household appliances, lighting equipment and 
toys.713 Accordingly, extensive producer responsibility is allocated to inform customers 
regarding its probable environmental damages bluntly. Printer and printer units are 
severally in the list under the category of IT and Telecommunications Equipments and, 
in this way, at least EU has banned refilling the cartridges.  France, as a pioneering 
country concerning planned obsolescence, has also individually taken an important 
step in this regard. Halt Planned Obsolescence Association (HOP) claimed that four 
big printer manufacturers, namely HP, Canon, Epson and Brother, in France have 
 
 
711 Amit Kumar, Maria Holuszko and Denise Espinosa, ‘E-waste: An Overview on generation, collection, 
legislation and recycling practices’ (2017) 122 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 32-42; Berrin 
Tansel, ‘From electronic consumer products to e-wastes: Global outlook, waste, quantities, recycling 
challenges’ (2017) 98 Environment International 35-45. 
712 Bianca Sardo, Moacir Marques and Thais Vieira, ‘The Environmental Consequences in a Process 
of Planned Obsolescence of Mobile Phones’ (2018) 7(5) American Journal of Engineering Research 
389. 
713 Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste 
electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) [2012] OJ L 197, Annex 1; Directive 2011/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment [2011] OJ L 174, Annex 1. 
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been taking advantage of using specific techniques to decrease the lifetime of the 
cartridge although it has more than 20% inks.714  
Moreover, the EC implemented new eco-design measures to achieve energy 
efficiency for the production of specific products, including light sources and washing 
machines by forcing manufacturers to produce long-lasting, repairable and recyclable 
products. Monique Goyens, director-general of the European Consumer Organisation, 
accordingly commented on these measures by following words: “The new repair 
requirements will help improve the lifetime of everyday appliances that currently fail 
too quickly. It is crucial we bin the current ‘throwaway’ trend, which depletes natural 
resources and empties consumers’ pockets. It is excellent news that consumers’ 
health will be better protected, thanks to fewer flickering light bulbs and the removal of 
harmful flame retardants in TV screens.”715 In the context of reparability, spare parts 
of specified products will be available through a long course of time after the purchase, 
for instance, this period is ten years for washing machines. Besides, manufacturers 
shall ensure delivery of these spare parts within 15 working days and replacing of 
these parts will not any harm to the appliance.716 Hence, this Regulation is going to 
boost the repair market alongside offering a statutory remedy for planned 
obsolescence by prolonging products’ lives.  
 
 
714 Isabelle de Foucaud, ‘Obsolescence programmée: une plainte déposée contre des fabricants 
d'imprimantes’ (Le Figaro, 21 September 2017) <http://www.lefigaro.fr/conso/2017/09/19/20010-
20170919ARTFIG00093-obsolescence-programmee-une-plainte-deposee-contre-des-fabricants-d-
imprimantes.php> accessed 5 November 2020. 
715 European Commission, ‘New rules make household appliances more sustainable’ (Press release, 
IP/19/5895, 1 October 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5895> 
accessed 5 November 2020. 
716 European Commission, ‘The new ecodesign measures explained’ (Questions and Answers, 
QANDA/19/5889, 1 October 2019) 




Planned obsolescence has also been fallen into disrepute because it seemed to be 
associated with over-consumption since the twentieth century.717 In this regard, for 
example, one study by Joan Martin Nicholson in 1978 indicated the need for raising 
consciousness against planned obsolescence for women as caretaking consumers.718 
However, it is currently thought that both manufacturers and consumers should make 
ethical and conscious decisions719 to secure an intergenerational justice by conserving 
the environment.720 Overall, it is not simple to overcome the conflict of interest between 
economic and environmental sustainability by using legal tools.721 However, to 
maintain a competitive market and consumer welfare, which are both in danger under 
free planned obsolescence practices, it is necessary to address this issue from 




717 Ella Mingazova, Carole Guesse and Bruno Dupont, ‘Planned Obsolescence: Text, Theory, 
Technology’ (Conference Report, Universite de Liege, 8-9 December 2016) 
<http://textshopexperiments.org/textshop03/planned-obsolescence-conference-report> accessed 6 
November 2020. 
718 Joan Nicholson, 'The Caretaking Consumer' (1978) 4(10) EPA Journal 10-12. 
719 Maitre-Ekern and Dalhammar (n 265); Vidalenc and Meunier (n 265) 18. 
720 De-Shalit (n 266) 6-10. 
721 Countries, companies and societies should aware of imminent peril regarding electronic waste, 
which contains harmful components for human life like arsenic, cadmium and radioactive substances. 
Furthermore, as an impending danger, developing countries will produce e-waste twice as much 
developed countries shortly before 10 years. This means that there will be more than 1 billion obsolete 
computers in total by 2030. What is worse that numbers showing the total e-waste are highly 
speculative. Only about 15% of the total e-waste was formally reported when examining national 
records in 2014. The rest of them were sent to landfills or black markets. In this regard, the UN set 
some goals to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns by 2030, such as more efficient 
use of natural resources; reducing waste generation through recycling; encourage companies for 
sustainable production; and raising the awareness of people regarding sustainable development. See, 
United Nations, ‘Responsible Consumption and Production: Why it matters’ (2015) 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/12.pdf> accessed 5 
November 2020; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1, ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development’ [2015] UN Doc A/RES/70/1, goal 12.2 and 12.5; Jae Park and 
others (n 257) 1-6; Garlapati (n 262) 874-881; Wang, Zhang and Guan (n 261) 23-25. 
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5.2.5.3 Consumerism and Planned Obsolescence 
One of the most important tools of consumerism is planned obsolescence as it triggers 
more consumption. The bilateral rationales behind planned obsolescence are the 
producer’s profit-driven motivation and consumers’ insatiable artificial demands.722 
Harvey claims that as lifestyles and values affect consumption patterns and vice versa. 
In this sense, he addresses the influence of using disposable goods in our modus 
vivendi that it is prefigured to alteration of values, relationships and lifestyles.723 As 
has been previously reported in the literature, manufacturers are inclined to present 
new products to the market with rendering obsolescence of old products724 to create 
repetitive demands.725 They accordingly want to bring into the existence of need or 
desire having new products.726 Therefore, actually, consumers are not sufficiently 
aware of being incite to have newer products due to these business practices.727 
The crux of the problem lies down beneath the understanding of the needs of people, 
which has multidimensional aspects. Consumers do not expect only the duration and 
quality, but also the functionality and contemporary design from products. The 
question, namely whether it is possible to timeless design, is directly related to the 
marketing discipline. Of course, it is necessary to distinguish regular fashion changes 
and innovative changes, but this kind of determination is exceeded the competency of 
court.  It is although distant from our current discourse not altogether irrelevant to 
adduce here the fact that design for fashion should be admitted as a marketing 
 
 
722 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1504. 
723 Harvey (n 215) 201-240. 
724 More comprehensive discussions can be found in Jeremy Bulow, ‘An Economic Theory of Planned 
Obsolescence’ (1986) 101 Quarterly Journal of Economics 729; Waldman (n 639) 273; Chun-Hui Miao, 
‘Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence’ (2010) 58 The Journal of Industrial Economics 579. 
725 Slade (n 129) 11. 
726 ibid 5. 
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strategy for planned obsolescence and a part of consumerism.728 For the sake of 
example, advertisements generate demand for newer products by creating 
perceptions of possessed products are getting old, insufficient or outmoded. As 
Maloney said that car manufacturers were trying to convince consumers by TV 
advertisements about their 1950 model cars could not possibly be as good as the ’51, 
which had vertical strips of chrome on the fenders.729 Therefore, advertisements are 
not only playing a crucial role in brand promotion but also has an important role in 
increasing consumption.  
5.2.6 An endeavour to set a legal frame for planned obsolescence 
Manufacturers with a vast market share can gain favour from costly-product 
(exclusionary) model changes and consequently, stand out among their rivals.  In 
regard to this issue, remedies of EU competition law currently do not seem to protect 
SMEs properly. While employing regular fashion-based changes, prima facie, have 
not been deemed to be anti-competitive, those slight changes in the product may put 
small competitors in a tight spot due to the incremental costs of adopting trends. This 
regular trend cost may also lead to market entry restrictions for newcomers, in addition 
to a loss for rivals.  
Yet, there is no precaution at a level of the European Union even if a few European 
bodies have already conducted some studies concerning planned obsolescence.730 
Some EU Member countries such as France and Italy took proactive measures while 
 
 
728 For further research on this area, see Sun and Sun (n 655). 
729 Maloney (n 649) 58. 
730 European Economic and Social Council, ‘New attitudes towards consumption: best practices in the 
domain of built-in obsolescence and collaborative consumption’ (2015) 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/publications-other-work/publications/new-attitudes-towards-




others still act with suspicion. However, there are several non-governmental 
organisation movements in Spain731 and Germany732 in just the same as HOP733 in 
France. Nevertheless, it ought to be reacted on the undue delay of regulating planned 
obsolescence in a usual way because making law on such a scale, which would affect 
both economic and environmental sustainability, is problematic in itself. 
On the one hand, planned obsolescence closely affiliated with the breach of good faith 
when considering the unjust suffering of consumers. However, this does not indicate 
that every member country is approaching this issue under the title of consumer law 
or contract law. For example, the Italian Competition Authority and the French 
Consumer Fraud Group as two different governmental bodies conduct the same case 
against Apple Inc.734 This demonstrates the multidimensionality of this issue because 
this problem affects not only the consumer but also the sustainability of the economy, 
environment, and cross-company competition. Hence, further research in this field 
would be of great help in redressing pointed issues. On the other hand, planned 
obsolescence is a complex multi-variable process, but the only accurate thing that one 
can assume that information asymmetry (imperfect information or high search cost) is 
the nitty gritty of planned obsolescence. Asymmetric information between sellers and 
buyers, by its very nature, is the principal reason for disputes regarding contract law, 
 
 
731 Ana Pont, Antonio Robles and Jose Gil, ‘e-WASTE: Everything an ICT Scientist and Developer 
Should Know’  (IEEE, 2019) 169629 
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8908772> accessed 6 November 2020. 
732 Tobias Brönneke, ‘Premature Obsolescence: Suggestions for Legislative Counter-measures in 
German and European Sales and Consumer Law’ (2017) 14(3-4) Journal for European Environmental 
and Planning Law 361-372.  
733 HOP (Halte a l’Obsolescence Programme) stands for the Association of Stop Planned 
Obsolescence, which aims to take community’s attention by expanding awareness of consumers, 
manufactures and also policymakers to ensure keeping all products away from planned obsolescence. 
734 Italian Competition Authority approaches the detrimental updates of smartphones without informing 
consumers well as a misleading business practice under unfair competition law, whereas the French 
Consumer Fraud Group addressed the same problem under consumer law as a criminal offence. 
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consumer law and unfair competition law. Planned obsolescence is also detrimental 
to other rival manufacturers, relevant markets and the social welfare, which are 
required to probe over competition law and unfair competition law735 as a field often 
bracket with competition law.736 However, this study only considers the problem from 
the supply side perspective by testing the existence of abuse of dominance. 
5.3 Does planned obsolescence underrated or unnoticed issue? 
The rapid pace of technological change rooted in Moore’s law,737 the so-called law of 
product obsolescence, which overwhelmingly influenced electronic consumption. 
Moore’s law indicates the remarkable enlargement in technology like greased 
lightning. Gordon Moore, emeritus chair of Intel, pointed out the strategy of Intel is that 
the number of transistors over integrated circuits doubles every 18 months.738 This 
idea survived as far as the recent past, but the speed of technological development in 
computers now shows a slowdown, fall behind Moore’s plan.739 However, this plan 
 
 
735 It should be noted that the protection of the interests of competitors is also evaluated within the 
scope of unfair competition law. As per 6th and 8th Recital of UCPD, prevention of these practices has 
been thought of as protecting the commercial interests of competitors. However, matters pertaining to 
business-to-business unfair business practices are not covered by the UCPD. For instance, recent 
applications in counterfeit goods have heightened the need for regulations among businesses regarding 
unfair competition. Therefore, it is also worth considering that there might be some issues benefiting 
consumers, not businesses. 
736 Glöckner, the eminent German scholar, underlined the common purpose of unfair competition law 
and competition law pursuant to Dassonville Formula and Doctrine Cassis de Dijon. See, Jochen 
Glöckner, ‘The Law Against Unfair Competition and the EC Treaty’ in Reto Hilty and Frauke Henning-
bodewig (eds), Law Against Unfair Competition (Springer 2007); Case C-8/7 Procureur du Roi v Benoît 
and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 1974-00837; Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 1979-00649. 
737 For further information, see Gordon Moore, ‘Cramming more components onto integrated circuits’ 
(1965) 38(8) Electronics 1-4; John Shalf, ‘The Future of Computing beyond Moore’s Law’ (2020) 
378(2166) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 1-15. 
738 Moore alleged almost all technological products become older within maximum two-year period. This 
highly controversial assertion also demonstrates how fast technology is developing. For further reading, 
see Hodges and Taylor (n 70) 14-15. 
739 However, according to Brian Krzanich, Intel’s chief executive between 2013-2018, Moore’s law is 
still alive. See, Cara McGoogan, ‘Moore’s law is not dead, says Intel boss’ The Telegraph (Las Vegas, 
5 January 2017) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/01/05/ces-2017-moores-law-not-dead-
says-intel-boss> accessed 15 April 2019. 
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leaves its mark on the current planned obsolescence strategies by continuously 
releasing the new versions of software, which needs better hardware. Under normal 
circumstances, there is no way to induce the homo-economicus to purchase a new 
edition, new copy or entirely new product unless providing substantial improvements. 
Therefore, manufacturers have the tendency to adopt planned obsolescence as an 
artificial tool to maintain their continuity by boosting repetitive purchases and directing 
consumers what they ‘need’ to buy. Although the planned obsolescence dates back 
to older times, it fits well with the new economy.  
Post-planned obsolescence strategies are currently more effective than built-in 
obsolescence practices740 because studies show that consumers mostly accept the 
shorten lifespan of the product in advance as long as they get high performance at a 
given period. Again, a great percentage of consumers are changing their products with 
the effects of fashion and new technology. This rate is higher than the percentage of 
changing product due to low performance and malfunction.741 This refers that 
consumers have more tendency to buy desire-oriented goods rather than to be need-
oriented. Finally yet importantly, initial observations previse that raising consumer 
awareness will almost certainly be inadequate for challenging against fashion. In other 
words, for example, labelling application on the product regarding the anticipated 
lifespan of a product would probably be less effective in this regard.742 
 
 
740 See also, in particular, Tim Cooper, 'Inadequate Life? Evidence Of Consumer Attitudes To Product 
Obsolescence' (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 421-449; Tim Cooper and Sian Evans, 'Consumer 
Influences On Product Life-Spans' in Tim Cooper (ed), Longer Lasting Products: Alternatives To The 
Throwaway Society (Gower Publishing 2010) 319-351. 
741 Fabian Echegaray, 'Consumers' Reactions To Product Obsolescence In Emerging Markets: The 
Case Of Brazil' (2015) 1 Journal of Cleaner Production 191-203. 
742 See, Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 of 4 July 2017 setting a framework for energy labelling and 
repealing Directive 2010/30/EU [2017] OJ L 198. 
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Staying focused on only making long-life products would not be economically and 
environmentally sustainable if these products are replaced with newer products, even 
they are still functional. Manufacturers, therefore, should choose the optimal longevity 
and quality for their products by paying regard to consumers’ expectations (the quality, 
which consumers are willing to pay considering the innovation rate) and the rate of 
innovation. In case of marginal cost is more than marginal benefit in which products 
are over optimal quality would result in the loss of social welfare, on the other hand, 
the case that marginal cost is less than marginal benefit (this is the likely case in 
monopoly situations) will also give the same result, which is shown in the Figure 3 
below.743 Therefore, if planned obsolescence is defined by producing goods in less 
than optimal quality in the monopoly or oligopoly markets, the application of Article 
102 TFEU becomes lawful.  
 
Figure 1 Optimal Quality-Cost chart744  
In line with the above, there is a delicate balance between quality value and quality 
cost. A fanatic attitude to increase product quality to prevent planned obsolescence 
through ignoring economic facts would also harm the economy and consequently the 
 
 
743 Rudi Kurz, ‘Quality, Obsolescence and Unsustainable Innovation’ (2015) 28(2) Ekonomski 
Vjesnik/Econviews 511-522. 
744 ibid 513. 
211 
 
welfare because the cost would likely exceed the purchasing power for consumers as 
seen in figure 2 below.  
  
Figure 2 Quality Cost in Design Process745 
At the same time, producers should also consider the total quality cost (TCQ), given in 
the chart below, which is the sum of failure (CF), appraisal and prevention costs (CAP) 
in which the lowest point of TCQ shows the optimal quality in terms of producers. 
Increasing quality at all costs would therefore not be a logical decision in an economic 
way. Many consumers will not be able to afford to purchase high-quality products 
because of their increased costs and even the rest of consumers will be likely to stop 
using their durable products when better products or new trends are introduced even 
if products have still lifetime. The total quality calculation would therefore provide lower 
cost, higher revenue, empowered employees and delighted consumers.746 In a 
nutshell, the slow production has merits; however, it is adversely proportional to 
affordability, innovation and fashion. 
 
 
745 Aurora Zugarramurdi and others, Economic Engineering applied to the Fishery Industry (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 1995) 219. 




Figure 3 Classical model of optimum quality costs747 
To sum up, the anxiety of the imminent danger of creative destruction on businesses 
creates incentives to decrease the quality level and consequently, the durability of 
products. These incentives are stemming from three reasons but not limited to: (1) the 
desire of decreasing production cost, (2) to make room for following innovations by 
leaving consumers no choice but stop using their existing belongings, and (3) minimise 
the potential damage arising out of creative destruction and even turn this into an 
advantage. Considering these accounts, businesses are always inclined to adopt 
planned obsolescence if there is no legal arrangement. 
5.4 What steps have been taken concerning planned obsolescence in the EU? 
It has been hard to encounter a strict sumptuary law for the last two centuries. Quite 
the reverse, purchasing has always supported by modern economic thoughts. Sellers 
accordingly persuade, provoke and even deceive buyers to make more sales by 
creating artificial needs for more consumption. Planned obsolescence is one of the 
most preferred ways to expedite the gap of these needs, so-called consumerism. It 
 
 
747 Krystel Castillo-Villar, Neale Smith and James Simonton, ‘The Impact of the Cost of Quality on Serial 
Supply-Chain Network Design’ (2012) 50(19) International Journal of Production Research 5545. 
213 
 
elicits consumerism via revealing artificial needs to rebuy or upgrade of current 
belongings, which consumers are not aware of the cost of having because of the 
asymmetric information between manufacturer and buyer. Even if the European 
Parliament (EP) asked the EC for a EU level definition of planned obsolescence over 
three years ago,748 there is no development in this regard yet. However, for the sake 
of presenting this issue, this study offers a simple definition of planned obsolescence 
that it is a business strategy to intentionally shorten the product life cycle either in the 
manufacturing phase or in the after-sale phase by adopting several tactics. 
The EESC was the first European body calling for a total ban on planned obsolescence 
in 2013 for alleviating the unemployment rate of EU countries and reducing the 
environmental pollution. More recently, the EP called on the Commission to take 
measures on planned obsolescence in its report ‘on a longer lifetime for products: 
benefits for consumers and companies’ in direct proportion to intense interest in the 
collaborative economy. The EP also pointed out the necessity to define planned 
obsolescence by policymakers and researchers via taking into consideration legal and 
non-legal measures.749 
The EP took a resolution against planned obsolescence to ensure the effective use of 
natural sources in light of Articles 191, 192 and 193 of the TFEU and other affiliated 
environmental based decisions and working plans.750 In respect thereof, the 
importance of applying eco-design requirements and the need of circular economy 
were overemphasised to more sustainable consumption. This decision suggests 
 
 
748 European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2017 on a longer lifetime for products: benefits for 
consumers and companies (n 630) para 30. 
749 European Parliament Economic and Scientific Policy Department in Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies (n 281) 82. 
750 European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2017 on a longer lifetime for products: benefits for 
consumers and companies (n 630). 
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necessitating designing robust, durable and high-quality products,751 manufacturing 
long lasting, repairable, upgradeable, recyclable products with interchangeable 
components,752 boosting the European labour market753 enlightening consumers 
regarding the durability of the product,754 defining the concept of planned 
obsolescence by the Commission,755 presenting more sustainable products to 
consumers,756 and preventing software obsolescence.757 Also, assuring longer 
product life cycle improves the appeal of EU goods, which provides a solid position to 
EU in the global arena because of the imported products tendency decline.758 The EC 
took several steps to put these targets into practice by applying eco-friendly standards, 
an effective spare part design protection system and a circular economy program. 
In response to the parliamentary question regarding what steps has the Commission 
taken about planned obsolescence issue in the context of implementing circular 
economy,759 Vella on behalf of the Commission pointed out three main points.760 First, 
he mentioned an independent testing program being developed to classify planned 
obsolescence related issues under the Horizon 2020 Programme.761 Second, he also 
referred to the implementation affiliated legal regulation762 by providing new labels 
 
 
751 ibid, paras 1-8. 
752 ibid, paras 9-15. 
753 ibid, paras 16-26. 
754 ibid, paras 27-29. 
755 ibid, paras 30-32. 
756 ibid, paras 33-36. 
757 ibid, paras 37-40. 
758 Arnold Tukker and Ursula Tischner, New Business for Old Europe: Product-Service Development, 
Competitiveness and Sustainability (Greenleaf Publishing 2017); European Parliament Economic and 
Scientific Policy Department in Directorate-General for Internal Policies (n 281) 41. 
759 European Parliament, ‘Question for written answer to the Commission Rule 130 by Giulia Moi 
regarding planned obsolescence’ [2017] E-000570-17. 
760 European Parliament, ‘Answer given by Mr Vella on behalf of the Commission to the question 
reference’ [2017] E-000570/2017. 
761 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Closing the loop – An EU action 
plan for the Circular Economy’ [2015] COM(2015) 614 final. 
762 Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC. 
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addressing products’ robustness and reparability. He finally put emphasis on the 
importance of standardisation for struggling with planned obsolescence.763 In addition, 
Fayole on behalf of the European Environmental Citizens Organisation for 
Standardisation as an individual standardisation institution made a sentence that 
“consumers are forced to discard products sooner than they want because the repair 
is made impossible or unaffordable. Our hope is for products can be disassembled for 
repair, and have spare parts and service manuals available. This would be a big win 
for consumers and independent repairers.”764 This directly implies the planned 
obsolescence practices and the necessity of preventing them. 
In addition to the circular economy program, the EESC also proposed a new term of 
the functional economy by slightly modifying circular economy principles to support 
policies regarding product eco-design to research into the most efficient way to use a 
product in what extent to worth purchasing the product.765 For example, ease of use 
and after-sales services are some determinants of product quality.766 The consensus 
of the EC is that all products should be repairable, and the lifetime of the product 
should not be limited. However, bearing in mind that some scholars allege that setting 
a reasonable limit on the product life cycle for controlling economic resources and 
avoiding over-design of the intended objective would be more fruitful.767  If the 
 
 
763 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Closing the loop – An EU action 
plan for the Circular Economy’ [2015] COM(2015) 614 final. 
764 Kyle Wiens, ‘European Policymakers Plot a Path Past Planned Obsolescence’ (ifixit, 26 September 
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765 Thierry Libaert, ‘The Functional Economy (own-initiative opinion)’ (2017) OJ C 75 
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functional economy is implemented well, consumers will have a chance to use the 
product when required without the necessity of owning the product. On the other hand, 
manufacturers will have an incentive to produce durable goods as much as they utilise 
it by employing a rental business. This would likely be an effective measure against 
planned obsolescence. The EESC also stated the necessity of legal measures for the 
functional economy as a theoretical basis of the collaborative economy. 
Although these initiatives draw attention to basic issues from the demand side, other 
issues involving the supply side still stand as an unfamiliar territory as planned 
obsolescence is a well-rounded concept. Therefore, other results of planned 
obsolescence such as the pressure of making innovative goods within the ever-
shortening time gap and the suppression of innovation because of the large 
investments for every single update would necessitate initiatives from the supply side 
unless the Commission bans all planned obsolescence practices. However, these 
initiatives, at least, show the effort of triggering the Commission to take action. Despite 
the fact that several studies from the EP and the EESC, including but not limited to, 
tried to put planned obsolescence on the agenda of the Commission, the issue still 
stands on the blindside.  
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5.4.1 The pioneer definition and application against planned obsolescence in 
France  
France is the first country to ban planned obsolescence in 2015768 to set sight on both 
the economic growth and decrease of the environmental pollution.769 In other words, 
the main objective is to increase the use of renewable energy770 by complying with the 
circular economy.771 Per this purpose, planned obsolescence was outlawed and 
became a punishable offence. The article L. 441-2 of the French Consumer Code 
imposes a prohibition on planned obsolescence by providing a general definition. As 
per this article, planned obsolescence is defined as “the use of techniques by which 
the person/entity responsible for placing a product on the market is deliberately intends 
to shorten life cycle in order to increase its replacement rate.”772 Two-year prison 
sentence or up to € 300,000 criminal fine will be applied under the article L. 454-6 of 
the French Consumer Code in case of practising planned obsolescence. To make this 
prohibition more deterrent, courts are also furnished with the authority of increasing 
 
 
768 Energy transition and green growth law (Loi n° 2015-992) [2015]. See also, Anaïs Michel, ‘Product 
Lifetimes through the various legal approaches within the EU context: recent initiatives against planned 
obsolescence’ (Plate Conference, Delft University of Technology, Amsterdam, 8-10 November 2017) 
<https://limo.libis.be/primo-
explore/fulldisplay?docid=LIRIAS1683367&context=L&vid=Lirias&search_scope=Lirias&tab=default_t
ab&lang=en_US&fromSitemap=1> accessed 5 November 2020. 
769 For instance, it has been planned to cut in half of the waste going into landfills until 2050. To set 
another example, drastic decreases in fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions are 
targeted in a couple of years.  
770 From another angle, planned obsolescence has come to the fore heaps of times because of its 
detrimental effects on the environment.  
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its recognition as a branch of law’ (2018) 122 Energy Policy 499; Andreas Rüdinger, ‘The French Energy 
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this fine to up to 5 per cent of the annual turnover of the related entity. A preliminary 
investigation carried out against Apple Inc. upon the complaint by the association HOP 
at the beginning of 2018773 regarding suggested updates to damage for certain iPhone 
models deliberately. Upon the investigation, Apple was fined €25 million due to its 
planned obsolescence practices by decreasing older iPhones’ performance and 
battery management.774 
One of the most important reasons for choosing to analyse the French legal system is 
to observe pioneering regulations on consumer protection in addition to the direct ban 
on planned obsolescence. The regulations require the free replacement of the product, 
conditions of refund and at least two years guarantee for every product.775 Likewise, 
there is a two-year legal guarantee for new and second-hand goods in Greece.  About 
Italy, Germany and Belgium, there is a two-year guarantee for new products, but this 
can be reduced to 1 year for second-hand items. On the other hand, the duration of 
the warranty is determined based on the expected lifespan for both new and second-
hand products. 
5.4.2 Milestone Cases of Planned Obsolescence in national laws 
Planned obsolescence, also deficiently known built-in obsolescence, was an often-
ignored concept until a few years ago. The consciousness has gradually increased by 
consumers, manufacturers and governments, but planned obsolescence practices are 
 
 
773 Annick Girard and others, ‘Obsolescence of home appliances and electronics: What is the role of 
the consumer?’ (2018) 14 <https://www.recyc-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/sites/default/files/Obsolescence-
rapport-EN.pdf> accessed 6 November 2020. 
774 Le portail de l'Économie, des Finances, de l'Action et des Comptes publics, ’Transaction avec le 
groupe APPLE pour pratique commerciale trompeuse’ (Press Release, 
07.02.2020) <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/transaction-avec-le-groupe-apple-pour-pratique-
commerciale-trompeuse> accessed 15 October 2020. 
775 French Consumer Code, art 217. 
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still welcomed with tolerance in a kind of way. Legal scholars have paid less attention 
to planned obsolescence until this issue has grown in importance considering recent 
famous cases against “Apple Inc.” and “Samsung Group.”  
Pioneering firms get a temporary monopoly position, but after a while, other firms will 
participate in this position by imitating innovations.776 Under this circumstance, it would 
probably be necessary for firms to maintain innovations’ continuity in order to provide 
long-term profits. Along with this attention in innovation, however, there is increasing 
concern over planned obsolescence. It is possible to remark both two types of planned 
obsolescence in this regard. On the one hand, new products can substitute for olds 
with the help of built-in obsolescence. What is more, even if new products are not put 
on the market, manufacturers can generate earnings through the sale of the same 
products. On the other hand, it is possible to present every novelty as an innovation 
by applying post planned obsolescence strategies. Even slight changes can influence 
previous products, as is the case with innovation. Running down to service support of 
products, disharmonising products for new services and making products non-
functional as was the case with Apple and Samsung are some of the ways to employ 
this strategy by customer lock-in.  
5.4.2.1 The Apple Case in France 
French prosecutors launched a comprehensive investigation against Apple upon the 
complaint of the HOP regarding the allegations of deliberately slowing down iPhones 
in January 2018.777 After that, at the beginning of 2018, the French Consumer Fraud 
Group opened an investigation into ‘Apple’ regarding planned obsolescence, and it 
 
 
776 van den Bergh (n 145) 53. 
777 Roli Raghuvanshi, ‘Planned Obsolescence: Case of Apple & Epson’ (2017) 4 Aspirare 65-69. 
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was alleged that Apple deliberately shortens the lifespan and decelerates its older 
smartphone models through software updates.778 Apple, accordingly, acknowledged 
some claims of the HOP by particularly adding annotation that they had no ulterior 
motive behind this performance slowdown, rather this deceleration helps preventing 
unexpected shutdowns. Correspondingly, Apple published an apology letter from its 
website before the investigation and delivered following statement: ‘We have never – 
and would never – do anything to do intentionally shorten the life of any Apple product 
or degrade the user experience to drive customer upgrades.’ Over this apology, Apple 
offered a battery replacement program for $29 in order to solve this problem out, and 
around 11 million people used this opportunity. Furthermore, Apple committed that 
new models from iPhone 11 will design to last as much as possible. Despite this 
statement, Apple was fined for paying a penalty because of its previous conduct, which 
was regarded as ‘deceptive business practice.’ 
The General Directorate for Competition, Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control 
(DGCCRF) fined Apple €25 million due to its planned obsolescence practices by 
decreasing older iPhones’ performances and battery management. As consumers are 
not well informed regarding the iOS operating system updates, namely 10.2.1 and 
11.2, on their phones’ performances, Apple’s updates have been found unjust. These 
updates affected consumers using iPhone 6, iPhone SE, and iPhone 7 models and 
therefore, they were enforced to purchase a new battery or new models of iPhone. 
This is because those updates led to a permanent slowdown of the system since they 
were irrecoverable. Finally, Apple entered a guilty plea regarding its battery 
management practice by using a software update to slow down older iPhones and 
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assented to pay the penalty through making a press release on its French website 
within one month after the decision and also declared not to go for an appeal.779  
5.4.2.2 The Apple and Samsung Cases in Italy 
The Italian Competition Authority, Autorità Garante Della Concorrenza E Del Mercato 
(AGCM) took action against both Apple and Samsung for possibly setting up “a 
general commercial policy taking advantage of the lack of certain components to curb 
the performance times of their products and induce consumers to buy new versions.” 
AGCM accordingly confirmed the existence of planned obsolescence on 25 
September 2018. The chief purpose of the investigation is to discover if these 
companies are consciously decelerating their smartphones by applying software 
updates without informing consumers (iPhone 6/ 6 plus/ 6s plus holders for Apple; 
Galaxy Note 4 holders for Samsung). This also relates to its destructive effects on 
performance and battery. They also prevented consumers from reverting to their 
previous status. As a result of the investigation, these practices were found unfair and 
misleading as these practices both violated Article 20, 21, 22 and 24 of the Italian 
Consumer Code.780  Apple and Samsung consequently were both fined the maximum 
amount allowed by law, which was 5 million Euros. Furthermore, the AGCM also fined 




779 Le portail de l’Economie, des Finances, de l’Action et des Comptes publics, ‘Transaction avec le 
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One of the most important reasons for choosing to analyse the Italian legal system 
here is to observe its pioneering decisions from an unfair competition law viewpoint in 
addition to its firm position in regard to planned obsolescence practices. To explicate 
the first cause, the Italian Competition Authority sentenced the maximum legitimate 
amount of fine to Apple because of its misleading business practices782 because Apple 
breached the trust via exploiting the influence of brand loyalty, which was definitely 
required a severe sanction under competition law, unfair competition law and, to some 
extent, consumer law. This is because trend and brand loyalty are some of the most 
important factors, which lead to repetitive purchase behaviour on consumer choices 
to gain market power.783 To this respect, while the consumer was informed well 
regarding the possible results of the update, it is forced to update, which caused the 
product to become dysfunctional. 
5.4.3 The contractual dimension of planned obsolescence 
Regarding the relevant EU regulations on terms of the contractual liability, producers 
are liable when their defective units cause damage.784 To make a claim against the 
producer, ‘the injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and 
the causal relationship between defect and damage.’785 A similar provision is also 




783 Karsten Hansen, Romana Khan and Vishal Singh, ‘Repetitive Buying Behaviour: An Empirical 
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784 Council Directive numbered 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, Art 1. 
785 Council Directive of 25 July 1985 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
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are required for contractual liability, which can be simply claimed in terms of planned 
obsolescence practices.786 
In addition to the above-mentioned general rule, statutory warranty against hidden 
defects is also regulated in the same law as the following article: ‘The seller is bound 
to a warranty against hidden defects in the thing sold that render it unfit for its intended 
use, or that so impair its use that the buyer would not have bought it, or would only 
have given a lesser price for it if he had known of the defects’.787 According to this, 
sellers are responsible for hidden defects (vice chaché) even though these may not 
be perceptible at the time of sale. In the case law, it is expected that the seller is aware 
of all hidden defects since being unaware of these shall not be considered as a valid 
defence. The key question here is whether adopting planned obsolescence in products 
means a hidden defect or not.  
Regarding Italy, for example, sellers shall provide a warranty for the hidden defects 
under the following four conditions: (1) existence of defects, (2) inconspicuousness of 
defects, (3) presence of defects before the sale of the product and (4) the use of 
product or product value must be decreased by those defects.788 In terms of the 
German Legal System, sellers are liable to notify consumers regarding the hidden 
defects of products.789 However, there is also no application to assess whether 
planned obsolescence can be evaluated in this context.  
Overall, in light of these regulations but not limited to, consumer law or contract law 
may provide some solutions to planned obsolescence. These solutions only ensure 
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the proper maintenance for business to consumer relations, whereas they do not 
protect rival businesses. There is always the possibility that fully informed consumers 
decide to purchase the product even if these regulations are strictly applied. Hence, 
because of the multidimensionality of this issue, these regulations will not be effective 
on their own to prevent planned obsolescence unless a planned obsolescence ban is 
enforced. 
5.4.4 Discussion on planned obsolescence as an unfair commercial practice 
A fierce competition indicates the existing economic structure because it has 
commonly been assumed that the free market enhances the quality and decreases 
the price of products through dominant neoliberalist thought. Accordingly, competitive 
freedom has been created in line with the good faith principle. By the same token, the 
regulation of commercial transactions is gaining momentum because of the ever-
increasing trade volume. In this context, the European Union and its member states 
have been endeavouring to legislate against unfair commercial practices damaging 
the market, consumers and competitors. In general, dishonest commercial practices 
have already been forbidden with the Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, which 
provides that “Every member country shall provide effective protection against unfair 
competition.”790 Besides, these practices are restricted by Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (“UCPD”).791 
 
 
790 This article, not included in the first version of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, was accepted at the revision conference of Washington in 1911.  For more information, see 
George Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (WIPO 1969) 142-146. 
791 2005/29/EC Unfair Commercial Practices Directive implemented by the European Parliament and of 
the Council on 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer (“B2C”) commercial practices in 
the internal market. See also, Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) [2007] 
OJ L199/40. Rome II is also worth considering in terms of determining the impacted areas regarding 
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Unfair competition law plays an important role in the protection of competitors, 
consumers, society and the market itself.792 The Paris Convention primarily designed 
the general framework and conditions regarding unfair competition law for the 
production of industrial property in terms of the development of general legislation in 
continental Europe793. Contracting parties have agreed that they will ensure the 
prevention of unfair competition by domestic law under Article 10ter. Pursuant thereto 
some countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Greece, enacted a separate law 
for the protection of unfair business activities. On the other hand, some countries such 
as France, Italy and the Netherlands have attached to unfair competition clauses in 
their existing laws. Although the common denominators of these laws have several 
similarities, a generally accepted definition of “fairness” cannot be provided because 
of the distinct cultures of the nations. For this reason, contracting parties decide on the 
domestic level that is fair in terms of their social norms and values. In parallel, Article 
25 of the Paris Convention refers to the freedom of implication for any country party in 
accordance with its constitution.794 
 
 
product liability (art 5), unfair competition (art 6) and environmental damage (art 7). For further reading 
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794 After the Paris Convention, various regulations have been made towards preventing unfair 
competition. For example, Articles 1/3, 22/2 and 39/1 of the TRIPS directly refer to unfair competition 
provisions of the Paris Convention. Thereafter, World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has 
published “Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition” in Geneva. Apart from these, 
averting of unfair business practices regarding competition in practice has been made more effective 
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In Annex 1 of the UCDP lists 31 commercial practices, including but not limited to, 
which are in all circumstances considered unfair. Planned obsolescence is not in this 
practices list, but it may be considered as misleading or aggressive commercial 
practices under misleading advertisement. Planned obsolescence is a problem mostly 
stemming from information asymmetry. Spreading misleading information by 
advertisements is part of the post-planned obsolescence strategy because it creates 
high and repetitive demands. With the increasing competition, manufacturers tend to 
emphasise their competitively strong sides in their advertisements,795 but they should 
not lead to deceiving consumers through misleading advertising. Some advertising 
practices, such as stimulus and surreptitious advertising, affect consumer perception 
to impose the thought that previous products fail to satisfy current needs.796 
For example, shopping on the Internet becomes a common consumer habit797 
because it offers an easily accessible wide range of products with the help of e-
 
 
through Directives numbered 85/374/EEC, 2005/29/EC, and 2006/114/EC, respectively. These should 
be taken into consideration with the Article 3(g) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) indicating to ensure not distorted internal market competition by the European Community. 
795 This is called comparative advertising, which is not prohibited. Advertisements can be explicitly or 
implicitly linked to competitors. However, the issues claimed in advertisements must be concrete, real 
and provable because the general assertions, such as the most useful product and best quality product, 
may be deceptive. 
796 Following the users on the Internet to show the appropriate advertisements is an important way to 
reach the target audience directly. All internet users today are exposed to this, even if they are not 
aware of it. Decisions and preferences of internet users are usually provided by cookies, which record 
lots of things, such as consumption habits, political and religious background, supported teams and so 
on. In this case, very strict controls have started with the acceptance of General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016/679 within the European Union and the European Economic area, but this is not one 
of the subjects of this dissertation. 
797 The numbers of different sale channels where the mediators are reshaped into other forms have 
been increasing ever since becoming prevalent of the Internet sales. In this regard, it is necessary to 
regulate the using of online platforms. As an example, people currently can sell their unused staffs or 
unwanted gifts under the market price with the help of “Sharing Economy” as an economic system in 
which sharing assets or services among private individuals in return for a fee or nothing. The sharing 
economy has gained more importance because of the convenience and prevalence of doing online 
transactions. Uber and Airbnb are one of the most striking examples that can demonstrate the 
importance of sharing economy. This work shows the current and potential conflicts on the same 




commerce. It is also beneficial to inform consumers about the myriad alternatives to 
the exact products. However, internet advertising, as an ever-changing commercial 
practice should be closely taken into consideration by unfair competition law. Hidden 
advertisement, misleading advertising with quality labels and misleading pricing 
information are three categories, including but not limited to, of misleading advertising 
on the Internet.798 As these are all potential tools for adopting planned obsolescence, 
an approach from unfair competition law would be instrumental. 
Lastly, as commented above, it is also conceivable to analyse aggressive commercial 
practices under the title of unfair competition law. This is because the consumers buy 
the imposed products rather than buying the need-oriented product. For example, 
consumers generally make complaints about the coercive notices as a strategy of 
planned obsolescence, which forces consumers to buy upgrades regarding their 
incompatible software programs.799 It is one of the main reasons for replacing after the 
average use time of numerous smartphones when they are still functioning. Thus, 
providers may easily degrade their products by offering other functions, which are 
considered necessary.800 
In general, production is carried out according to consumer needs and demands 
because the consumer is the ultimate buyer of the product. Thusly, for example, the 
consumer may give preference to low-quality products for using several times in the 
context of consumer sovereignty. That is why manufacturers frequently produce low-
quality products. It is based upon the consumers’ demand. On that note, Article 1 of 
 
 
798 European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies Economic and Scientific Policy 
Department, ‘Misleading Advertising on the Internet’ (IMCO, IP/A/IMCO/ST/2010-05, PE 440.289, July 
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800 Proske and others (n 221). 
228 
 
UCPD, according to its wording, attracts a great deal on attention regarding unfair 
commercial practices harming consumers’ economic interests. 
5.4.5 The applicability of competition law in planned obsolescence 
Even though competition and consumer law both aim to protect consumers in a 
complementary manner, their understandings of consumer harm are quite different. 
For example, deception provides a basis for the theory of harm in terms of consumer 
law as it damages consumers directly by preventing free choice, welfare optimization 
and freedom of contract through misleading conducts801 As to the competition 
perspective of deception, Stucke verified the competitive harm by abusing dominance 
since consumers have not enough alternatives in non-competitive markets and 
consequently, they somehow have to connive at deceptive conduct.802 Deception by 
businesses shows up in different forms like falsifying consumers, regulators, other 
market actors or standard-setting institutions.803 These would likely cause a sheer 
number of anti-competitive results by decreasing consumer surplus and gaining more 
market power.804 However, neither US Antitrust law nor EU Competition law does not 
think that deception is a type of abusive behaviour.805 
To take a step further to this discussion, it is useful to argue deception by behavioural 
exploitations. Behavioural economics, which is predicated on the irrationality of 
 
 
801 Max Huffman, ‘Bridging the divide? Theories for integrating competition law and consumer 
protection’ (2010) 6(1) European Competition Journal 11-13; Siciliani, Riefa and Gamper (n 254). 
802 Maurice Stucke, ‘How do (and should) competition authorities treat a dominant firm’s deception?’ 
(2010) 63 Southern Methodist University Law Review 1069; For counterarguments, claiming that 
competition law protects the competition, not the competitors, see, Phillip Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (Wolters Kluwer 
2008) 327. 
803 Mark Patterson, ‘Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law’ 
(1997) 66(1) Antitrust Law Journal 1. 
804 Note, ‘Deception as an Antitrust Violation’ (2012) 125(5) Harvard Law Review 1235 
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consumers, looms large in making regulations on consumer protection. Businesses 
can abuse foreknown biases of consumers by well-hidden deceptive conduct, which 
is likely to cause competitive harms.806 To take a stand a paternalistic or anti-
paternalistic approach depends on the existence of consumer sovereignty, which is 
very controversial. However, one thing is certain that it is time to face behavioural 
economic models by benefiting from Chicago School novel approaches, 807 which 
should be incorporated in the policymaking stage808 through acknowledging that 
homo-economicus lost its currency in which bounded irrational man exists. There are 
prominent empirical results in terms of consumers’ decision-making process that it is 
easy to misdirect, nudge in the words of Thaler, consumers in certain 
circumstances.809 An analysis of such situations, so-called behavioural economics, 
would able to offer fact-based analysis to competition law in favour of consumer and 
market protection. 
The competitive structure of the market is preserved by demarking the relations 
between undertakings, and also, between these undertakings and their consumers. It 
is accordingly useful to mention that the application of planned obsolescence would 
likely impair trade conditions in terms of both providers and consumers. It is required 
to discuss which doctrine will be more appropriate in this case to find out whether 
providers or consumers are liable for damage stemming from the product by 
considering doctrines of caveat emptor and caveat venditor.810 Producers will have 
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strict liability unless they do not provide perfect information to consumers regarding 
their products.  
EU competition law mainly aims to ensure the trilogy of quality, price, choice and 
innovation.811 One can say that manufacturing poor quality of products because of 
employing planned obsolescence practices like shortening the life cycle, making 
incompatible or for any other reason is at odds with the basic objective of competition 
law. However, one can challenge this allegation by asserting the increase of 
innovation, even if there is no finding regarding this influence yet. Therefore, this 
problem will become a highly controversial topic to find which pan of scale will 
outweigh.  
Article 102 TFEU would be suitable for this debate since it is proved that planned 
obsolescence is only effective in either monopoly or oligopoly markets.812 A monopolist 
or an oligopoly lean towards the idea of reducing product durability to reap more 
monopoly profits as well as to exclude actual and likely competitors at the risk of 
endangering their sales.813 It is also proved that fragile product monopolists are 
stronger than durable-good monopolists.814 This addresses that there is an incentive 
for producers to make less durable products in terms of profitability.815 This study is 
 
 
811 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ in Ioannis 
Lianos and Damien Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 
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Research Paper No. 17/2018, 2018) 2-22 
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only to intent shedding on the light to the relationship between planned obsolescence 
and Article 102 TFEU even if it is also possible to discuss Article 101 TFEU in this 
regard by, for example, evaluating cartel conducts to adjust products’ lifetime.816 
After the AstraZeneca case,817 abuse of dominance types are extended by accepting 
that every single conduct, which might likely harm to competition would likely be a 
subject of Article 102 TFEU. Hence, whenever producers engage in anti-competitive 
conducts such as use information asymmetry in their favours and lock-in their 
customers by increasing switching costs, etc. in both primary and secondary markets, 
Article 102 TFEU would be applicable. Therefore, following listed conducts including 
but not limited to be worthy of discussing and further debates: increasing switching 
costs for consumers, stop producing spare parts, designing not reparable, 
upgradeable and interoperable products. 
Seen in the light what has been mentioned hitherto, there are many controversial 
issues in different legal fields regarding planned obsolescence. Although it damages 
the environment and the welfare of consumers, it also causes great damage to the 
market and its competitive structure that calls for a competition law approach. 
Therefore, it is imperative to employ a comprehensive (holistic) approach if the 
European Commission will not regulate a total ban for planned obsolescence because 
the economy and the market are affected as well as manufacturers and consumers. 
 
 
Technology, SA [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:575; Case COMP/39.886 Ryanair/DAA-Aer Lingus [2013] 
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816 See Phoebus cartel case. Bright (n 638); van Gompel (n 638) 104-111; Rivera and Lallmahomed (n 
270) 119. 
817 AstraZeneca (n 67). 
232 
 
5.5 How much freedom do manufacturers have in the product design? 
Owning the IP rights of products leads to a very cost-effective reproduction, although 
it requires a sizeable investment.818 Therefore, businesses have a massive incentive 
to invest in developing novel products, which allow for extending the market power 
due to very few marginal costs.819 When a dominant business manufactures such 
products, which are only compatible with its other products and appliances, it may turn 
into anti-competitive conduct as it has an exclusionary effect against rivals. Even a 
very small design change would likely produce an effect to dominate the market by 
reaping monopoly earnings.820 Such changes, particularly in platform markets, are 
also likely to risk supplanting the entire market by courtesy of network effects821 as 
consumers are forced into bearing switching costs (locked-in) if they want to change 
their goods or services.822 This likely inflicts heavy damage to consumer welfare as it 
imposes an additional burden on consumers. Even if the measure of consumer welfare 
is difficult, it is known that it is positively correlated with consumer surplus, which is the 
amount of difference between willing to pay and pay in reality.823 
As discussed hitherto, there is more than one way to suppress innovation. This chapter 
argues to what extent product design practices may be exclusionary that cause 
suppression of innovation by specifically focusing on the issue of planned 
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obsolescence. Designing products is a niche matter of law, which is another 
controversial intersection point of competition and IP law. Consequently, when a 
business is in danger of being accused of enforcing predatory design practices, it may 
hide behind its patented technology by claiming in the furtherance of existing 
technologies.824 Businesses, which have IP rights, are able to determine standards for 
the market to bound follow-up innovations to this path, albeit this path does not 
address the highest quality or best efficiency.825 This is likely prejudicial to stiff 
competition and progression of innovation by having tailwinds of network monopoly 
advantages, so much the more in case of practices regarding the forestall to 
interoperability of products.826 
The issue of exclusionary product design is oxymoronic in terms of competition law as 
regards whether and to what extent it violates competition by foreclosing competitors 
or presenting customers forced choices. It is highly debatable whether product design 
changes (redesigns) harm competition.827 The law is likely ridden with contradictions 
in regard to evaluating the anti-competitiveness of designing practices by just 
examining how incompatible products are.828 However, given such designs incentivise 
anti-competitive conduct, they would be subjected to competition law. Otherwise 
stated, businesses may take advantage of designing products that are only compatible 
with the entity’s other goods to leave consumers with no choice but buying their own 
complementary products. This leads to anti-competitive aftermaths in the secondary 
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market by technologically tying consumers and competitors through gathering strength 
from complementary productions and overcharging consumers.829  
Practises concerning exclusionary product designs have been at the heart of US 
Antitrust law for nearly four decades under the wide-ranging discussion regarding the 
regulation of innovation.830 It has thereafter come into prominence in terms of EU 
competition law in the wake of the US investigations of Microsoft.831 One plausible 
reason why European lawyers underrated this issue might be an ambiguous 
environment of enforcing competition rules with reference to analyse Article 102 TFEU 
where practice and rhetoric represent a different kind of approaches.832 As such, 
scholars argue which types of analysis (the effect-based approach, economic 
approach, consumer welfare-based approach or a capability approach) would be 
appropriate to examine actual or likely anti-competitive effects of product design 
strategies.833 If one brings exclusionary design practices to trial, the Court will likely 
consider two main issues: (1) whether there is an actual improvement or not, and (2) 
to what extent such conduct is deemed reasonable. The Court, in the first case, will 
stray from its intended path when it inquires into the existence of innovation. Other 
than that, in the second case, the Court will have difficulty in providing well-established 
case law as the concept of reasonableness is extremely vague on this point. These 
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uncertainties leave businesses in suspense since they have no clue to predict their 
contribution to innovation.834 
Product design is a business decision regarding the determination of product features 
such as whether products are designed as interoperable. An intervention to the 
product design process would arguably be intrusive in terms of competition law, as 
this niche area of law only engages in circumstances where products are offered or 
sold. However, design practices, in some instances, such as exclusive dealing and 
tying, would be a subject of competition law because they have an impact on the 
market. For example, Article 102 TFEU intervention would be utilised where there is a 
product tying (if the use of a product is linked to another product, that is, it is necessary 
to have another product in order to be fully capable of using the specified product) as 
is the case with the Microsoft.835  
The Commission initiated a proceeding against Microsoft regarding the alleged 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU to investigate whether Microsoft tied its own PC 
operating system (Windows) and web browser (Internet Explorer) in 2007. In 
conclusion, the Commission fined Microsoft €561 million, which was 1.02 per cent of 
Microsoft’s turnover in the relevant fiscal year between 2011 and 2012.836 The Court 
found two instances of Microsoft’s conduct anti-competitive regarding the abuse of its 
dominant position. First, Microsoft obtained a competitive advantage through refusing 
to supply complete and accurate interoperability information for its own product market 
 
 
834 Newman (n 819) 728. 
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while developing its products in this market. The Commission put this issue in the 
picture by making following the statement: 
“…That practice allowed Microsoft to obtain an unparalleled advantage with 
respect to the distribution of its product and to ensure the ubiquity of Windows 
Media Player on client PCs throughout the world, thus providing a disincentive 
for users to make use of third-party media players and for OEMs to pre-install 
such players on client PCs.”837 
Second, the Court considered that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the client 
PC operating systems market by the linking of separate software products together. 
The issue was about foreclosing consumers from purchasing Windows without 
Windows Media Player, and this tying practice had an impact on the media player 
market inevitably.838 The Commission, accordingly, made below statement: 
“… Microsoft interferes with the normal competitive process which would benefit 
users by ensuring quicker cycles of innovation as a consequence of unfettered 
competition on the merits... the bundling increases the content and applications 
barriers to entry, which protect Windows, and facilitates the erection of such 
barriers for Windows Media Player.”839 
Thus, the Commission took up its position against exclusionary design practices that 
are likely to cause market barriers, unfair competition, commercial exploitation of 
consumers, and the suppression of innovation by isolating competitors that strive to 
make a contribution to existing technology. From this viewpoint, a manufacturer may 
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freely design its products unless it prevents merit competition, the progress of 
innovation and, more generally, the welfare of consumers. 
5.6 Planned obsolescence as an exclusionary product design practice 
It is arguable considering the above definitions that planned obsolescence closely 
relates to the concept of exclusionary product design as both concepts have an impact 
on excluding competitors and exploiting consumers by remaining them vulnerable. 
Little is known about the outcomes of planned obsolescence in regard to competition 
law, as is the case with exclusionary design conduct. Several attempts have been 
made to weigh on the pearls and pitfalls of planned obsolescence in terms of 
manufacturers. A dominant opinion of the literature demonstrates that manufacturers 
benefit from designing low durable products because it results in unavoidable repeated 
purchases or frequent repairing, which make producers a stable financial earning. 
Therefore, accelerating obsolescence may amount to brace for the competitive 
position in terms of providers.840 On the contrary, several studies have suggested that 
producing durable goods may also yield a profit.841 As there is no consensus in this 
respect, it would be hard to analyse the extent to which planned obsolescence is per 
se beneficial for the manufacturer and more importantly, the progress of innovation. 
Some scholars allege that planned obsolescence is a necessary practice to the 
achievement of steady technological progress. This means manufacturing long-lasting 
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products results in decelerating the progress of innovation.842 It consequently seems 
to what extent planned obsolescence practices are beneficial.843  
Manufacturers are free to design their products as per lex lata as long as they 
implement the minimum requirements stated by regulations or standards if any. 
However, in terms of competition law, the issue of whether planned obsolescence 
practices are considered harmful or not will be an enigma of analytical jurisprudence 
because of its multifaceted outcomes. Given that, an opportunist monopoly shortens 
durability of their products to generate more demands for reaping the benefit of this 
design practice,844 there would be adverse outcomes for consumers (as they require 
to repurchase), competitors (as they are not able to penetrate into the incalculable 
market where it is required to make large investments in every design change), and 
the environment (as remanufacturing leads to the exploitation of natural sources and 
the accumulation of irrevocable waste). On the other hand, planned obsolescence 
provides the pecuniary benefits of manufacturers (as it paves the way for selling the 
same item many times) and the progress of innovation (as it creates incentives for 
businesses to develop new technology for reaping the profits of planned obsolescence 
after they obtain concerned IP rights). However, one may object with regard to the 
advancement of technology because of three considerable apprehensions since (1) 
the Schumpeter-Arrow discussion still remains inconclusive, (2) consumers are 
restricted with the use of such innovation in full technologic capacity, and (3) fostering 
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innovation cannot be guaranteed as it is up to a monopoly decision whereas 
competitive markets ensure continuity of innovation.  
Overall, the issue of planned obsolescence shall be accepted as an issue of 
competition law by considering the importance of mentioned effects on both 
consumers and the market. However, there is no precaution at a level of the EU yet 
even if a few European bodies have already conducted some studies concerning 
planned obsolescence.845 Nevertheless, making law on such a scale, which would 
affect economic, technological and environmental sustainability, is problematic in 
itself. There are some demand-side precautions to address this issue, such as 
introducing Product Liability Directive846 and the Sale of Good Directive,847 but these 
are weak to disincline manufacturers. Consequently, this section will suggest the 
support these deterrent laws with the enforcement of competition law (by considering 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU) as is the case with exclusionary product design, which 
arises from practically the same intentions and leads to almost the same 
consequences. Considering all planned obsolescence strategies per se unlawful in the 
context of competition law can offer a potential solution from the supply-side 
perspective, and this will consequently open the way for competition on the merits. 
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5.7 A legal treatment of planned obsolescence in the context of the EU 
competition law 
5.7.1 Average consumer principle and information asymmetry 
It is going to be claimed that planned obsolescence is a problem stemming from 
information asymmetry. Following this allegation, it will be stated in what way 
businesses would feed misinformation or disinformation about their products. Planned 
obsolescence is simply the concealment of what the manufacturer knows about the 
product quality (i.e. the durability of the product and the lifespan) in the unawareness 
of the consumer. It would be impossible to make mention of an average consumer if 
the consumer is ill-informed. The concept of the average consumer is mostly referred 
by the CJEU when determining the liability of providers. One of the most fundamental 
aims of EU competition law enforcement is to protect consumers by enabling 
consumers to make conscious decisions.848 Consequently, it seems a true way to 
embark on a quest for possible remedies within EU competition law. Before setting 
arguments in accordance with the relationship between planned obsolescence and 
competition law, three brief discussions are presented below for the demarcation of 
the problem.  
5.7.1.1 Is planned obsolescence a form of deception? 
Planned obsolescence stemming from information asymmetry puts consumers in a 
tight spot, where they generally have no other alternative to buy because only 
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dominant undertakings can apply planned obsolescence strategies.849 Therefore, 
consumers have to take the risk of being deceived given they really require 
purchasing.850 In this respect, it is rather controversial to establish any competitive 
harm due to the lack of legal basis and case law. As a matter of fact, falsifying 
consumers, regulators or standard-setting organisations result in anti-competitive 
outcomes851 because it lowers consumer surplus.852 However, it needs to be 
highlighted that such deceptions are not deemed to abusive behaviour in terms of EU 
competition law.853 
5.7.1.2 Is it possible to benefit from the Lemon problem to conceptualise 
planned obsolescence? 
Almost all issues arising from the exercises of planned obsolescence have their origins 
in purchasing transactions in the absence of having necessary information regarding 
the subject of the agreement. To be more precise, buyers as uninformed parties of the 
sale contracts will likely be aggrieved by the lack of warning about the aftermath of the 
contract product. The matter is to drive buyers into a deadlock because of the 
information asymmetry by producers’ built-in obsolescence practices. Using this 
information asymmetry by sellers would result in adverse outcomes.854 Limitedly 
informed contract parties would be in a vulnerable position in which the seller has more 
information and consequently, the buyer makes an unconscious decision.  
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Akerlof pointed to the economic cost of asymmetrical information in purchasing 
transactions by ‘lemons problem’ regarding the uncertainty of product quality.855 The 
actual quality of the product is the private information of the product owner.856 Thus, 
the seller may falsify the buyer about the condition of the product and can freely set 
an above-average price by taking advantage of asymmetric information through 
misrepresenting the product.857 This consequently breaches the trust in second-hand 
market in which there is a general view that all products are potentially faulty. In 
reaction to the lemons problem, second-hand market is devoid of products in good 
condition. The seller, as an only person having knowledge about the well condition of 
his product, inherently demands above average market price. However, these 
relatively expensive goods cannot be sold inasmuch as the consumer has inadequate 
information. Hence, consumers tend to prefer cheap products in the second-hand 
market or underqualified products in the primary market.858  
Ordoliberal school, from another perspective, finds information asymmetry favourable 
and natural where it gives a chance to entrepreneurs that they make benefit from the 
lack of innovation and eliminate the instabilities in the market. Therefore, the 
Ordoliberal school differs from neo-classic competition understanding by describing 
the market as a process.859 Under the shadow of theoretical discussions, one may 
 
 
855 George Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 
84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. This article goes by the name of lemons problem or 
adverse selection. Lemon is a term used in the American second-hand automobile market to denote 
cars with serious hidden defects. One who wants to buy second-hand car offers an average price 
because of his limited knowledge. However, the seller is au fait with the current condition of his car, as 
a matter of course, he asks actual value or higher than its actual value. Therefore, the second-hand 
market mechanism is interrupted by the lemon problem. 
856 Grout and Park (n 685) 596, 597. 
857 Arrow (n 2) 609-626. 
858 Grout and Park (n 685) 596, 597. 




easily see the relationship between planned obsolescence and the lemon problem. 
The root of the problem is that there are more less-quality products in the secondhand 
market than high-quality products. This leads to an adverse selection because the 
buyer thinks that the owner of the product is somehow being conned. However, there 
will be more risk of being deceived when it comes to cheap products. Hence, 
secondhand markets are not effectively working because of the asymmetric 
information problem.  
Overall, asymmetric information between parties was regarded as a market failure until 
the 1970s, but Akerlof put this issue on a different ground by posing an adverse 
selection problem, so-called lemon problem.860 Regarding this problem, it has been 
emphasised counteracting institutions, which prevent the cost of the quality 
uncertainty. These preventions can be respectively listed to give guarantee for a length 
of time, to give preference to brand-name goods or services, and finally to give 
credence to licences, such as attorney’s licence and titles of PhD or Nobel.861 
Furthermore, it can be accordingly observed that some manufacturers take voluntary 
measures against planned obsolescence, such as issuing more extended guarantees 
and informing consumers regarding the product’s minimum lifetime.862 The lemon 
problem as a well-connected concept with planned obsolescence requires a better 
standardisation, superintendence or a longer warranty period but not limited to. 
However, it is not easy to formulate planned obsolescence over the lemon problem 
because the problem is not only about second-hand market transactions. Under 
normal conditions, overpriced products in the main market should have directed 
 
 
860 Tyler Cowen and Eric Crampton, ‘Introduction’ in Tyler Cowen and Eric Crampton (eds), Market 
Failure or Success: The New Debate (The Independent Institute Books 2002) 1-34. 
861 Akerlof (n 855) 488. 
862 Proske and others (n 221). 
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consumers to second-hand markets, but planned obsolescence turns the scale that 
consumers are forced to make purchases in the main market due to the disposability 
of products. This, in fact, directly threatens competition in the second-hand market. 
5.7.2 How does planned obsolescence suppress innovation? 
Business practices to somewhat decrease the value of products after the sale can be 
regarded as illustrations of the planned obsolescence. For example, a lawsuit against 
Apple Inc. in Brazil conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Politics and Informatics, 
Instituto Brasileiro de Política e Direito da Informática, refers to put an already obsolete 
product on the market because of the claim that Apple.inc has not implemented its up-
to-date technology. Furthermore, publishing more than one edition of a textbook every 
two or three years would likely be a good illustration of planned obsolescence863, which 
has a destructive impact upon the old versions in the current market and the second-
hand market. By contrast, this is the main incentive for publishers to improve their 
work.864 As a result, the concept of planned obsolescence seems to be against the 
interest of consumers, and it should be carefully examined because it is still 
ambiguous and unclear in terms of the law.     
The suppression of innovation is more likely a case of monopolising the aftermarket. 
This is commonly known as either vendor lock-in or customer lock-in, which both 
demonstrate the dependence of consumer to the specific seller.865  Halting of the 
production of essential parts for the operability of the old products and designing 
programs incompatible with the old software systems are some examples of this 
 
 
863 Hodges and Taylor (n 70) 21. 
864 Waldman (n 685) 273. 
865 In the most basic sense, lock in indicates the switching cost, preventing consumers from using rival 
products, stemming from network effects, learning costs and contractual provisions. This cost may 
sometimes avert the productivity. For further reading, see Dirk Auer and others (n 96) 1-12. 
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business strategy. Likewise, the high cost of repairing or upgrading866 forces 
consumers to purchase new products.  
This theme came up in the case of Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services 
in the U.S. Kodak as a durable goods producer in camera-related products carries on 
a business in the competitive market. Kodak equipment has nonesuch perfect 
substitute in the new equipment market in which Kodak has no market power. Hence, 
Kodak and its technical services can only carry out essential maintenance. For this 
reason, Kodak was accused of monopolising the aftermarket because of its anti-
competitive practices with respect to force customers to get their own service. After 
proceeding, the Supreme Court of the United States reached a decision that Kodak 
was liable under antitrust laws867 because of its ‘locked-in’ consumers. Despite the 
fact that Kodak is not dominant in the aftermarket, it has sufficient market power 
because customers have no other alternative for maintenance.868 The importance of 
the Kodak case in terms of EU competition law was to be taken as a reference to 4 
criteria as determined in the Pelikan/Kyocera case.869 
In the Pelikan v Kyocera,870 Pelikan filed a complaint against Kyocera regarding abuse 
of dominant position by reference to eliminate Pelikan and other rivals in the toner 
cartridges market in which only Kyocera’s toner cartridges are compatible with 
 
 
866 Inability to upgrade of products should be evaluated in the built-in obsolescence field. 
867 Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services [1992] 504 US Supreme Court 451. 
868 In theory, it is widely accepted that competition in the primary market prevents monopolisation in the 
aftermarket. However, this is not practically observable because of the market failures, such as 
information asymmetry and brand switching costs. To better understand what locked-in consumers 
means, see Waldman (n 120) 148-151. 
869 European Commission, ‘XXVth REPORT on Competition Policy 1995’ (Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities 1996) 41 
<https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/1995/en.pdf> accessed 6 November 
2020. 
870 Case IV/34.330 Pelikan v Kyocera [1995] SG(95) D-11872.  
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Kyocera printers. Although the Commission rejected the complaint because Kyocera 
was not in the dominant position in the foreclosure market, it created significant criteria 
that companies could be in the dominant position in the secondary market even if they 
are not in the dominant position in the primary market. After all, a new dominance 
analysis, which is regularly applied in later decisions871, has been developed related 
to the aftermarket. Two important criteria have been emphasised in the foreclosure 
market analysis872 for the determination of the dominant position. In case of failure to 
comply with these criteria, the dominant position will be considered for the foreclosure 
markets. The first point is that customers should be able to monitor the total cost of 
ownership of the product throughout the life of the product. This cost is provided by 
the fact that the price of the product, maintenance and consumables are known in 
public. The other vital criteria are that when one of the mentioned costs, such as toner 
cartridge and service cost, increases, it would be no serious cost to switch to other 
brands and a sufficient number of customers can able to switch their products with a 
reasonable amount of time. This analysis is generally related to the competitive 
conditions of the primary market and the interdependence between the primary and 
secondary markets. The reasoning behind the analysis is to offer customers the 




871 The aftermarket dominance analysis has also been mentioned in the following cases: Case C-53/92 
P Hilti AG v Commission of the European Communities [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:77; Tetra Pak (n 610). 
872 In fact, more than two issues have been mentioned. For example, lack of price discrimination 
between old and new customers is taken into account. Hence, abstaining from price discrimination 
strategies, especially in the secondary market would inure to the benefit of companies.  
873 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, ‘Competition Issues in 
Aftermarkets – Note from the European Union’ (DAF/COMP/WD(2017)3, 2017) 4-5 
<https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)3/en/pdf> accessed 6 November 2020. 
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It should also be noted that the Commission gave an extra definition for the aftermarket 
in the ‘2005 Staff Discussion Paper on exclusionary abuses.’ Before this, the 
Commission has specified markets as bundle or systems as long as customers make 
informed choices. In the lack of informed choice, switching cost test will be conducted 
in the single-form product market rather than the aftermarket.874 So, it has been 
accepted that the independence of the aftermarket depends on informing customers 
well. If customers have enough information before purchasing, they will have the 
power to discipline undertakings. Therefore, one may claim that the existence of 
planned obsolescence as a way of taking advantage of information asymmetry will 
preclude the formation of the aftermarket. 
Switching cost creation is often a way for companies to increase their loyalty in the 
sight of customers.875 At the same time, creating a switching cost has a signification 
for forming a dominant position. In the Hilti v Commission case876 (Hilti is a nail guns 
producer, and it produces cartridges, cartridge strips and nails for its own nail guns), 
Hilti has created a market in accordance with its specific design that necessary pieces 
of its nail guns are only compatible with Hilti’s own products. There was a complaint 
that Hilti rendered helpless Hilti nail gun holders to sell its own nails. Consequently, 
the Commission considered Hilti had abused its dominant position and accordingly 
imposed a heavy fine on Hilti. In the investigation stage, Hilti lodged an appeal that a 
nail gun, nail cartridges, nail strips and nails would be considered in the same product 
market. However, this objection was overruled with the following statement: 
 
 
874 European Commission, ‘DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses’ (n 848) paras 248-249. 
875 Hal Varian and Carl Shapiro, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard 
Business Scholl Press 1999). 
876 Hilti (n 871). 
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“… the relevant product market is defined as the market for those products, 
which in relation to their characteristics, are apt to satisfy an inelastic need and 
are interchangeable only to a limited extent with other products.”877 
As concerns in the British Airways Plc v Commission,878 British Airways committed to 
pay extra commission to British travel agencies if they achieve to sell British Airways 
flight ticket more than the previous year. Thus, the loyalty of travel agents to British 
Airways has increased and consequently, they have been in the locked-in situation to 
provide fewer and reluctant services for other airline companies. The General Court 
regarded this situation as an abuse of a dominant position. In this decision, the Court 
did not even consider the high market share of British Airways by establishing that 
these kinds of practices would narrow the market and eliminate the other competitors 
in the affiliated market.879 
All the cases and regulations mentioned above will be discussed within the context of 
prohibiting planned obsolescence, which also causes considerable switching costs 
and increases the dependence on products. Planned obsolescence will exist in cases 
if the repairing cost of the product is over preferable limits and product parts are not 
sufficiently interchangeable or upgradeable.  There are many other applications, 
including but not limited to offering incompatible software for electronic products, using 
chips for accelerating obsolescence and downloadable contents. 
 
 
877 ibid I-697-698. 
878 Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:166. 
879 However, at this point, Court mentioned the lack of competitive ability of the competitors of British 
Airways financially. For detailed analysis, see Paul Moura, ‘The Sticky Case of Sticky Data : An 
Examination of the Rationale, Legality, and Implementation of a Right to Data Portability Under 
European Competition Law’ (MSc Dissertation, London Schools of Economics 2014). 
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In these kinds of situations, the importance of branding becomes a part of an activity 
to help purchase consideration. Brand loyalty is one of the most important factors, 
which lead to repetitive purchase behaviour on consumer choices.880 For example, an 
irreplaceable battery of Apple’s iPod is an explicit example of the strategy of planned 
obsolescence. Despite this, consumers proceed with buying an iPod with the help of 
brand loyalty and trends. When considered from Apple’s point of view, there is an 
incentive to approach this strategy for maintaining the quality of its devices,881 and its 
enviable reputation.882  
In addition to all these, the protection of second-hand market is a significant matter 
because of the environmental concerns gaining in popularity. However, it is hard to 
maintain the foreclosing market with the non-durable goods under the planned 
obsolescence strategy. Hence, the models of sharing economy and circular economy 
have gain importance as opposed to this issue. The ways using the products more 
efficiently are sought out rather than buying goods at regular intervals because long-
lasting products rather than disposables drastically reduce the repetitive purchasing. 
In addition, under favour of producing long lasting products, second-hand products 
can engage in competition with the new versions of products. Therefore, the practise 
of planned obsolescence inevitably damages the competitive structure of second-
hand markets.883  
 
 
880 Hansen, Khan and Singh (n 783).  
881 Regarding smartphones production, industry associations argue that non-removable batteries can 
allow a different product design (e.g. 25% thinner as additional housing of battery can be avoided), 
which is considered as one of the main buying decisions of the consumer. For more information, see 
Proske and others (n 221). 
882 Strausz (n 121) 1405, 1417-1418. As a matter of fact, iPod battery can be hassle-freely changed by 
Apple. However, third parties have provided some battery replacement kits inexpensively to iPod 
owners to change by owners. Therefore, Apple had an incentive to decide to solder the batteries to 
metal back plate for preventing this practice and maintaining its device and its reputation.    
883 Aladeojebi (n 271) 1504. 
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5.7.3 Testing Article 101 TFEU in the context of planned obsolescence 
The enforcement of Article 101 TFEU may come to the fore concerning an application 
of planned obsolescence if it meets certain conditions. If agreements between 
undertakings cause restrictive consequences on competition, it will be possible to 
discuss applying this rule. For example, when undertakings gather to adopt a course 
of action to limit product lifespan as such in Phoebus cartel, Article 101 TFEU would 
be applicable. However, this kind of joint resolution will be more complex to analyse 
under Article 101 TFEU if this consensus helps to decrease prices. This is because it 
is required to entertain the possibility that (price-sensitive) consumers can take more 
advantage of reaching innovative products. Therefore, the application of Article 101 
TFEU will be next to impossible. 
5.7.4 Testing Article 102 TFEU in the context of planned obsolescence 
This section enlightens on the question of the applicability of Article 102 TFEU in 
planned obsolescence practices. First and foremost, it is required to state that the 
implementation of Article 102 TFEU would not be straightforward. However, the 
AstraZeneca case made way for interpreting Article 102 TFEU in a broader context as 
it has been explained above.884 The letter of the law concerning Article 102 TFEU 
specified four fundamental types of abuse, but this is not an exhausted list. Particularly 
two of them leave the door open to enable applying the law into planned obsolescence 
practices. First, according to Article 102(a) TFEU specified that ‘directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’ might be 
regarded as an abuse. Second, TFEU 102(b) TFEU specified that ‘limiting production, 
 
 
884 See, section 5.4.5. 
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markets or technical development to the prejudice to consumers’ might also be 
regarded as an abuse.  In these contexts, dominant undertakings have ‘special 
responsibilities’ in order to maintain the competitive process of the market.885 
Therefore, it can be claimed as a legal remedy that dominant undertakings ought to 
avert from employing planned obsolescence.  
It is proved in the economics literature that durable-good monopolists are 
comparatively weaker than perishable-good monopolists. It means, manufacturers 
would likely to fail to reach targeted profits as long as they produce durable goods.886 
That is the reason why there is an incentive to shorten durability.887 Despite decades 
of research, the issue of durable-goods monopolist’s continues to be debated, 
especially in terms of whether and to what extent they promote welfare.888 Orbach 
suggested several strategies to solve this problem. First of all, commitments to protect 
consumers from the sharp price reduction for the foreseeable future can be applied in 
order to convince potential buyers. Most-favoured-nation guarantees, buybacks or 
returns are some commitments, which might be proposed within this scope.  Secondly, 
price discrimination would be preferred on the grounds of early and late shoppers in 
which late shoppers receive discounts in return for postponing their purchases for a 
while. However, durable-goods monopolists might have been faced with a 
commitment problem again in the case of an early given discount. In the third place, 
attaching complementary perishable-goods to durable-goods might be considered. In 
 
 
885 This responsibility firstly established in Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin (n 345) para 57. 
886 Michael Waldman, ‘Planned Obsolescence and the R&D decision’ (1996) 27(3) Rand Journal of 
Economics 583. 
887 Orbach (n 651) 67, 70. 
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this way, a durable-goods monopolist will be able to continue selling or leasing. Finally, 
another strategy is manipulating the product life cycle by contrived durability and 
planned obsolescence. This strategy, formed as a central core of this thesis, has been 
a controversial and much-disputed practice within the field of law. This problematic 
strategy is also one of the most frequently used practices for a solution in terms of 
durable-goods producers, which desire to control primary and secondary markets.889 
To sum up, there is a riddle for durable-goods monopolists. On the one hand, it would 
be inefficient to produce innovative products on condition that consumers remain using 
their previous-durable products. On the other hand, the total amount of sales 
consequently decreases if it is easy to find buyers in the secondary market. These 
leave durable-goods monopolists no choice but take the abovementioned measures. 
The frame of abusing is explained in the Hoffmann-La Roche case as “… an objective 
concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is 
such as to influence the structure of a market where, […] has the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth 
of that competition.”890 From this point of view, there is no room for doubt that planned 
obsolescence has a disruptive influence on the market, particularly for the 
aftermarkets. Lianos, Korah and Siciliani define aftermarkets as a situation in which 
consumers have to purchase secondary (consumable) products during the lifespan of 
their durable products, which they have already purchased in primary markets. Ink 
cartridges of printers and spare parts of cars would be pointed instances in this 
regard.891 That is to say, primary products are typically bound and compatible with 
 
 
889 Orbach (n 651) 67-118. 
890 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 24) para 91. 
891 Lianos, Korah and Siciliani (n 43) 252. 
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secondary products under the favour of IP rights protection. As this strategy frequently 
leads to locking in customers, the separation of these markets becomes disputable. 
This situation was elucidated to a large extent in the EFIM in September 2013. The 
EFIM (the European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers) requested 
Commission to investigate four OEMs, namely Hewlett-Packard, Canon, Epson, and 
Lexmark with reference to deny supplying associated IP rights to independent 
suppliers of generic ink cartridges under Article 102 TFEU. Pursuant thereto, the CJEU 
confirmed previous decisions of the Pelikan/Kyocera and Info-lab/Ricoh that the 
market determination differs depends on whether consumers are able to calculate 
lifespan costs of primary products in advance.892 
Concerning the dominance on aftermarkets, the four-criteria test was repeated in the 
EFIM decision of the CJEU893 after the decisions were made by the General Court894 
as it was previously mentioned in the Pelikan/Kyocera.895 According to this test, the 
dominance in the aftermarket will be absent if (1) consumers are able to make an 
informed choice by considering several points such as lifetime cost and warranty 
restrictions that (2) they are likely to make such choice accordingly where there is an 
apparent exploitation policy in a specific aftermarket, and (3) a sufficient number of 
customers ought to be able to adapt their buying behaviours at the level of the primary 
market (4) within a reasonable time. Under these circumstances, OEMs cannot be 
regarded as they are in the dominant position on the aftermarket even though they 
have a 100% market share in the secondary market. In sum, consumers are in a key 
 
 
892 European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers (EFIM) v European Commission, 
Lexmark International Technology (n 815) para 36. 
893 ibid para 15. 
894 Case T-296/09, European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers (EFIM) v European 
Commission [2011] II-00425. 
895 Pelikan v Kyocera (n 870) para 61. 
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position to apply this four-criteria test because they have to be very well-informed in 
the long run. Moreover, they should have the ability to punish OEMs due to the supply 
of low quality and high-priced products on the aftermarket by changing their 
behaviours in the first market. Otherwise, abuse of dominant position will be the issue 
for this aftermarket conduct.  
Geursen incisively grounded the EFIM decision on the United Brands896 and Hoffman-
La Roche897 that the CJEU decisions are consistent in terms of the basic 
understanding of the dominant position. That is to say, dominant undertakings are 
defined as an ability to act independently from competitors, customers, and 
consumers. It is possible to take to mean that an OEM is in the dominant position given 
it can act independently without harming itself.898 Since the said OEMs in EFIM did not 
have dominant positions in the primary inkjet printers market, it is determined that they 
were not dominant in the secondary ink cartridge market as well. In other words, the 
EFIM decision proposed a two-folds test based on the existence of fierce competition 
in the primary market and well-informed consumers. Therefore, if consumers cannot 
switch to another primary/secondary product combination, the market will be 
considered as a single product market instead of a two-tier market structure. 
Correspondingly, in the UK, the Privacy Council hold a well-known example of defining 
market of spare parts in the Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Green Cartridge Co (Hong 
Kong).899 According to this case, as consumers are aware of the need for cartridge 
 
 
896 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the 
European Communities [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 65 
897 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 24) para 38. 
898 Wessel Geursen, ‘The EFIM-case: no dominant position of printer manufacturers on ink cartridge 
aftermarket’ (European Law Blog, 26 September 2013) <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2013/09/26/the-
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899 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Green Cartridge Co (Hong Kong) Ltd [1977] AC 728 3 WLR 13. 
255 
 
renewal after a short using period, they can predict maintenance costs. Therefore, the 
practices aiming to dominate aftermarket will not be regarded as anti-competitive 
conducts as long as consumers are able to foresee the real cost of the product. That 
is why any increase in secondary market prices like cartridges for printers will 
decrease the number of sales of the main product.900 The decision of the Privacy 
Council laid emphasis on the difference between foreseeable regular supply costs and 
unpredictable repair costs.901 
As another common example, with the help of built-in planned obsolescence, some 
printers are only compatible with their own manufacturer’s cartridge. On top of that, 
many cartridges are programmed to stop operating even if it has a 30% - 40% fill 
rate.902 Smart chips serving the purpose of announcing ‘out of ink’ notice sooner than 
needed in printers provide assurance to manufacturers for enhancing purchase 
repetitiveness.903 In fact, this scenario also shows the locked-in consumers issue, and 
it indicates an abusing dominant position because the printer market is used as bait to 
reap more profit in the cartridge market. Providing the main product at a low price and 
offering the connected consumable product at a relatively high price can be seen not 
only in printers but also in coffee machines, game consoles, etc. The profitability of the 
subsequently sold products (cartridge, video games, coffee capsules) usually results 
in cementing the dominance of generic manufacturers on both sides of the markets. 
This inevitably creates a conflict between primary product manufacturers and 
aftermarket manufacturers regarding the sale of consumables. Especially generic 
 
 
900 Paul Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property (OUP 2013) 380. 
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902 Neil Maycroft, ‘Consumption, Planned Obsolescence and Waste’ (2009) 
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product manufacturers usually stay out of the market because they cannot get 
permission regarding the necessary IP rights to make compatible products. Along a 
similar line, a higher court in Germany (Oberlandesgericht) found an abusive 
behaviour in the coffee machine market because of the refusal to licence. According 
to this, Nespresso was in a dominant position on the coffee pods markets because it 
tied customers to use its capsules by excluding other capsule makers.904  
To put it in a different way, planned obsolescence of products deals a major blow to 
the product values of the secondary market. Since the products are becoming obsolete 
and impractical in a short period of time, most of them cannot even be the subjects of 
the secondary market. A minority of products, which are fortunate to attain a place in 
the secondary markets, dramatically decrease in value. To sum up, planned 
obsolescence leads to a progressive deterioration of the secondary market.  
5.8 Conclusion 
The issue of planned obsolescence has not been properly addressed in the supply-
side context although there was a wide range of initiatives from the demand side in a 
multidisciplinary context provided by institutions and bodies of the European Union. 
This chapter responded to the need for conceptualising planned obsolescence with a 
novel approach from the supply side perspective and presents a new breath to this 
unfamiliar territory. The EU and its member states individually have been 
endeavouring to legislate competition law issues that damage consumers, 
competitors, and the environment. At the same time, suitable conditions to maintain 
competitive markets are induced. However, it might also be suggested that fierce 
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competition creates pressure in the sense of practising obsolescence for providers905 
because competition between providers covers not only the price strategies but also 
the strategy of planned obsolescence.906 For example, undertakings in the electronic 
market are currently under the pressure of fast product cycles, which drives to employ 
planned obsolescence strategy.907    
Several subfields of law and economics meet on a common ground of fostering 
innovation for enabling higher quality products at a lower price because innovation as 
an introduction of innovative thinking into the market is the key to promote consumer 
welfare. The EU competition law, accordingly, aims to boost innovation alongside 
providing lower prices, higher quality and wider choice.908 In the competitive market 
conditions, companies have to design newer products or upgrade their existing 
products in a short span of time to keep pace with head to head rivalry. Fostering 
innovation, as among mentioned purposes of EU competition law, affects the rivalry 
between firms and consequently, innovation frequency of firms has gained 
importance.909  
The theory of harm in terms of EU competition law is associated with consumer 
welfare, which is getting polydimensional rather than sticking to price, quality, and 
choice trilogy. For example, the EC is currently of interest to evaluate privacy concerns 
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in its assessments based on the developed harm theory.910 Prima facie, planned 
obsolescence seems to promote consumer welfare as it necessitates to increase 
research activities and to the quick application of existing innovations. However, this 
approach remains superficial when availability and environmental toll of products are 
taken into account, as production is not costless. Moreover, nondurable products 
impose on the burden to consumers, who need to repurchase equivalent products time 
after time. Thus, this leads to an increased debt level of consumers that will harm 
consumer welfare.911  
Legal interventions to the market will lead to regulatory gaps as long as law follows 
behind ever-developing technology. To fill in these regulatory gaps, the law ought to 
make prompt decisions. Otherwise, such gaps will harm the market and consumer 
welfare. In light of the analysis made above, it can be said that the Commission can 
interpret planned obsolescence within the scope of Article 101 or 102 TFEU when 
conditions are suitable. When planned obsolescence practices are examined in the 
broader context, it would presumably be regarded as abusing the dominant position. 
It can be argued that companies have the edge on their rivals and their consumers by 
applying planned obsolescence to leave the consumer in a locked-in position. 
However, it is hard to generate a ‘straight-jacket solution’ by only considering 
competition law enforcement because even though economic theories demonstrate 
that dominance is a must to apply planned obsolescence, this does not mean that 
 
 
910 Marco Botta and Klaus Wiedemann, ‘Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion 
after the Facebook Decision’ (2019) 10(8) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 465-478; 
Maximillian Volmar and Katharina Helmdach, ‘Protecting consumers and their data through competition 
law? Rethinking abuse of dominance in light of the Federal Cartel Office’s Facebook investigation’ 
(2018) 14(2-3) European Competition Journal 195-215; Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye 
and Heike Schweitzer, ‘Competition Policy for the Digital Era’ (European Commission Report, 2019) 8 
<https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf> accessed 4 October 2020. 
911 Maggiolino (n 669) 405. 
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undertakings in competitive markets cannot employ this strategy. Therefore, in the 
absence of a total ban on planned obsolescence, competition law enforcement is must 




Chapter 6: Final Conclusion 
The suppression of innovation poses a serious issue in terms of EU competition law, 
as it hinders technological development to the prejudice of consumers. Therefore, the 
objective of this research was to argue the suppression of innovation issue over 
current legislations and cases in the context of EU competition law, which does not 
provide sufficient legal environment to prevent these suppressions. Therefore, this 
research investigated and conceptualised the suppression of innovation in terms of 
EU competition law through an examination of the abuse of the dominant position via 
limiting technical development to the prejudice of consumers under Article 102 TFEU. 
In this sense, this study could be regarded as a pioneering research regarding the 
unheeded issue of suppression of innovation in terms of EU competition law.  
6.1 Summary of the Research 
The thesis was composed of six chapters. The first chapter covered the core 
background of the concept of innovation suppression in the context of EU competition 
law. It covered the aim, scope, research questions, methodology and aims of the 
research. The need for an urgent prevention of innovation suppression practices was 
highlighted. 
In the second chapter, a theoretical foundation of the suppression of innovation from 
economic and legal contexts was presented to set a framework under the new 
economy concept. In this regard, the characteristics of creative destruction and 
innovative disruption, as two driving forces of the new economy, were examined in 
order to demonstrate why innovations are short-lived and need to be replaced with 
other innovations. By doing this, the concept of innovation and the necessity to 
promote innovation were also identified. As a result of this, it was illustrated that 
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businesses are obliged to make innovation because otherwise, they will face the risk 
of losing their market shares. However, alternatively, it was showed that they might 
also suppress innovation rather than making innovations to maintain their market 
powers. This can be done by designing products (such as a new product designed 
with a limited lifetime is disadvantageous to consumers) or employing other strategies 
(such as exclusively offering new features for their latest products rather than providing 
compatible updates), which could exclude rivals from the market. In this regard, the 
chapter claimed that businesses have not enough incentive to invest in the longevity 
of their products, rather than, they have to strive to be relentlessly innovative because 
of the rapid technological changes under dynamics of the new economy. In other 
words, businesses are likely to undermine the progress of technological development 
to reap the maximum benefit from existing technologies. Accordingly, it was suggested 
to address interventionist tools such as Article 102 TFEU and circular economy to 
contribute to social welfare and neutralise the externalities of innovation. This chapter 
also discussed the close relationship between competition law and IP law and 
revealed that the prevention of technological development would be an undesired 
result under both competition and IP law to not make inroads on the commonweal. 
Hence, it is safe to say that EU competition law can limit the use of patent rights for 
the public interest when the use of IP rights (such as unilateral refusal to supply) has 
anti-competitive effects. It was shown that businesses are furthermore encouraged by 
being furnished with substantial IP rights to produce and implement their innovations 
and those rights are granted to ensure the investment costs for the innovation to 
prevent innovations remaining hidden. In this context, it was argued that every 




The third chapter analysed the anti-competitive characteristics of the suppression of 
innovation by examining Article 102 TFEU, while incorporating the features of 
innovation and the new economy concepts into the contemporary development 
process of EU competition law, preparatory to the fundamental debate of the study 
regarding whether and to what extent EU competition law protects the progression of 
innovation. As a result of the analysis, it was argued that innovation suppression 
practices ought to be regarded as anti-competitive tactics due to their negative impacts 
on markets and consumers. The findings have shown that it is possible to investigate 
the suppression of innovation under Article 102 TFEU, as the harm to market and 
consumers were demonstrated. However, it was illustrated that both literature and 
case law did not provide any related harm theory. In this regard, it was showed that 
EU competition law does not only consider direct damages to consumers, it also 
undertakes other anti-competitive conduct having direct or indirect effects on the 
market as seen in the Continental Can and AstraZeneca cases. 
After arguing leading cases concerning to innovation such as the Google Shopping 
and Google Android cases, it was demonstrated that EU competition law has still static 
concerns and therefore needs to develop a dynamic understanding by forming 
innovation-emphasised assessment concepts in compliance with the digital revolution 
wave, which has a potential to change the whole legal thinking by virtue of the fact that 
all new concepts of digitalisation such as big data, AI, and algorithms likely pose 
problems in terms of markets. The analysis also revealed that the EC’s recent attitude 
in its competition analyses has shifted towards an IP-based approach, especially in 
the high-tech industries as could be seen in the Motorola and Lundbeck cases. This 
means that competition analyses no longer confine with only price-quality 
considerations but also innovation considerations. However, it remains uncertain how 
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the EC handles innovation-related problems since it has not determined any criteria in 
reference to its analyses. This chapter, accordingly, showed the IP law’s (specifically 
patents’) important role for the disclosure and diffusion of innovations, which are also 
expected outcomes of EU competition law. Hence, the common and complementary 
grounds of these two legal fields were addressed to examine the issue of innovation 
suppression by visiting relevant theories. Finally, due to the great importance of 
innovation for consumers and the market, the broad interpretation of Article 102 TFEU 
was suggested. However, it was considered that the uncertain nature of innovations 
(because of the unpredictable and dynamic nature of innovation) remains unclear to 
what extent competition law interventions would be pro-consumer. Therefore, a 
'cautious intervention' in the words of Ezrachi was suggested. 
The fourth chapter discussed niche issues that can suppress innovation and 
competition: namely, the non-use of patents, pay-for-delay agreements, standard-
setting, spare parts designs protection, and evergreening patents. In this context, this 
chapter showed that the suppression of innovation could take many different forms. It 
was seen that the common point of all the cases examined is to secure a competitive 
edge, rather than promoting innovation or providing alternative products to consumers; 
thus, innovation suppression practices were demonstrated as anti-competitive 
practices.  
Regarding the non-use of patent rights, it was argued that patent owners may exploit 
the monopoly right in a given period by removing innovations from the market. It was 
accordingly revealed that this trajectory signalises the suppression of innovation. In 
this regard, it was suggested that the EC and competition authorities should be 
entrusted with a task to determine which patent applications are abusive or legitimate 
by testing the obtained patents with Article 102 TFEU to weaken the hand of IP right 
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abusers to produce an ex-ante remedy to this niche problem. As to pay-for-delay 
agreements, which were also regarded as a type of suppressing innovation, the 
analysis showed that patent protection would be undue if it is not in the interest of 
promoting innovation. Therewithal, Article 102 TFEU as another enforcement were 
proposed. Concerning standardisation, which increases competition and prohibits 
lock-in situations via encouraging interoperability, it was seen that assuring the product 
quality by standardisation enables almost all products to meet certain criteria before 
being released on the market. So, it directs the competition conditions of the market 
in favour of innovation progress, businesses and consumers. However, it was 
propounded that standardisation can cause adverse effect by putting rivals in a difficult 
position because they may not be able to follow determined standards and therefore, 
contribute to the progress of innovation. Consequently, the findings of the research 
showed the necessity of intensive investigations under Article 102 TFEU when it 
comes to standardisation-related issues. In regard to spare part designs protection, it 
was established that the repair clause is not adequate to address current innovative 
developments like introducing connected and autonomous cars in the automotive 
industry. It was illustrated that both competition and innovation will be suppressed if 
this protection blocks generic manufacturers from producing alternative spare parts. 
Therefore, this study offers a two-phase test (first, demonstrating the spare parts 
design protections hinder the innovative and competitive capacity of independent 
spare-part manufacturers  and subsequently showing the damage to competition in 
aftermarkets) to leave the field for competition law enforcement by applying Article 102 
TFEU. This test proposed instrumental and implementable ways to keep the market 
competitive and innovative. Finally, evergreening patents were discussed as blockers 
of innovation. It was seen that patentees could extend and, consequently, cement their 
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privileged positions pursuant to their patent rights in an anti-competitive way. In other 
words, any inconveniences in the patent system would likely distort competition since 
other manufacturers with the intention to penetrate the same market are restricted 
from the competition. Therefore, it was revealed that the evergreening problem needs 
further examination from a competition law paradigm. Consequently, as a temporal 
solution, sore points of patent systems should be treated by Article 102 TFEU for the 
sake of ensuring competitive markets, consumer welfare, and the development of 
innovations. 
The subsequent (fifth) chapter debated planned obsolescence, as businesses 
employed this strategy to gain an unjust advantage over vulnerable consumers and 
against their rivals through suppressing innovation. It consequently showed the need 
for conceptualising planned obsolescence (there is no EU-level legal action so far) 
with a novel approach from the supply side perspective to this unfamiliar territory.  
The research was based on economic studies, which proved that planned 
obsolescence is only effective in either monopoly or oligopoly markets, to show the 
suitability of Article 102 TFEU in this regard. Then, it was demonstrated that a 
monopolist or an oligopoly lean towards the idea of reducing product durability to reap 
more monopoly profits as well as to exclude actual and likely competitors at the risk of 
endangering their sales. Accordingly, the research showed four fundamental types of 
abuse stated in the letter of the law concerning Article 102 TFEU does not refer to an 
exhausted list. Two of them leave the door open to enable applying the law into 
planned obsolescence practices. First, according to Article 102(a) TFEU specified that 
‘directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions’ might be regarded as an abuse. Second, TFEU 102(b) TFEU specified that 
‘limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice to consumers’ 
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might also be regarded as an abuse.  In these contexts, not to employ planned 
obsolescence strategies as opposed to ‘special responsibilities’ of dominant 
undertakings were argued by proposing the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU as a 
legal remedy. 
Finally, the final part of this concluding chapter is a summary of the main findings of 
this thesis with concluding remarks over research questions and some 
recommendations for further research. Following sections will demonstrate what has 
been covered as a contribution of the general knowledge, and what can be covered 
further in the future. 
6.2 Contribution and Recommendations of the Research 
The findings and recommendations of the research are as follows: 
- Suppression of innovation practices should be regarded as anti-
competitive and must be treated under Article 102 TFEU. 
This thesis discussed Article 102 TFEU’s role in promoting innovation in economic and 
legal spheres by seeking remedies to cases where suppression of innovation has 
occurred by answering the question of whether and under what conditions practices 
leading the suppression of innovation should be considered as anti-competitive. 
Through this analysis, this research revealed the deficiencies and weaknesses of EU 
competition law when it comes to providing an adequate level of encouragement for 
the continuation of innovative work. Since regulators, scholars, and practitioners of EU 
competition law are at present not aggressive enough to apply Article 102 TFEU with 
consideration of the issue of innovation, suppression of innovation practices such as 
planned obsolescence and the non-use of patent rights go unpunished. 
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This study showed that due to the open nature of Article 102 TFEU, which provides 
flexibility across numerous cases, there is no need to alter EU competition law. 
However, as competition policies are of paramount importance in promoting 
innovation, as well as in providing a low-price market aimed at improving consumer 
welfare, the EC’s approach to innovation must change. In this regard, Gilbert had 
demonstrated the necessity of an evaluation of competition law in terms of moving 
from a price-centric understanding of competition policies towards an innovation-
centric interpretation.912 In furtherance of this claim, Stucke and Ezrachi showed that 
lower prices do not benefit consumers per se; on the contrary, they create harm. 
Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to competition policies which rejects the 
mainstream thought that ‘more (fierce) competition is always good’ is a must, as more 
competition would likely cause more toxic effects. These effects are listed under 
several headings such as ‘choice overload’ and ‘exploiting human weaknesses’,913 
with the suppression of innovation being a further potential toxic effect introduced by 
this thesis. 
- The types of innovation suppression practices can vary. 
This thesis conceptualised the suppression of innovation practices in the context of 
EU competition law by demonstrating their anti-competitive features. However, this 
study limited itself to discussing selected instances, namely the non-use of patent 
rights (by showing that counterproductive patent trolls could harm innovators with their 
aggressive litigation strategies, and every disadvantage experienced by innovators 
leads to suppression of innovation), pay-for-delay agreements (by showing that further 
 
 
912 Richard Gilbert, Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy (The MIT 
Press 2020) 2. 
913 Stucke and Ezrachi (n 49). 
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patent protection may suppress innovation), standard setting (by showing that 
standards could boost innovative initiatives and prevent suppression of innovation by 
blocking interoperability), spare parts designs protection (by showing that this 
protection could prevent other manufacturers from producing alternative spare parts, 
therefore decrease the number of consumer choices by eliminating possible 
innovations by competitors), evergreening patents (by showing that they could restrict 
other manufacturers with the intention to penetrate the same market) and planned 
obsolescence (by showing that manufacturers could suppress their innovations 
because of the ever-accelerating innovation loop). For all the cases mentioned above, 
the application of Article 102 TFEU was proposed as an alternative enforcement option 
to prevent the suppression of innovation practices. Therefore, in a nutshell, the 
suppression of innovation could be occurred in different forms, but anti-competitive 
outcomes of suppressing innovation will enable the application of Article 102 TFEU. 
- The EC should consider creating innovative incentives and remedies by 
narrowing market definitions. 
Applying innovation-related considerations to competition law assessments in the EU 
was being discussed in much detail.914 So far, no decision has been made about 
promoting innovation in EU competition law,915 and the EU does not consider the 
innovation market as a separate entity at this time (innovation considerations are 
reflected in decisions within the given product market only).916 Given this status quo, 
 
 
914 Robertson (n 45) 90; Colomo (n 48) 201. 
915 Gilbert (n 912) 36. 
916 For example, the General Court has confirmed that patent settlement agreements between patent 
owners and generic companies are restrictive of competition by object. See, Sophie Lawrance and 
others, ‘Servier, Film Copyright Territorial Restrictions, Android, Guess, at the Intersection Between 
Competition Law and IP Law in the Past Year’ (2020) 11(3-4) Journal of European Competition Law 
and Practice 207-223; It is worth noting that the US has already begun to take the innovation market 
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the implementation of innovation as a policy choice involves great uncertainty. The 
general practice of creating market definitions reveals the availability of these 
choices.917 Narrow market definitions would likely require more in-depth antitrust 
analyses in every related market, while broader market definitions would decrease the 
impact of the EC’s antitrust role by providing dominant players a free hand in sub-
markets. Therefore, narrower market definitions are necessary to allow continued 
innovation under competition law.  
- The EC should provide quicker reactions to frequently emergent 
innovations by using the open nature of Article 102.  
The EC has shown tremendous interest in the digital market in recent years. Several 
positive steps have been taken by the EU with regard to the Internet of Things as 
evidenced by the EU’s antitrust watchdog investigations of Apple, Amazon and other 
big companies possibly suppressing their competitors.918 Another positive concerns 
digital-age issues; the EC announced that a new competition tool, which will set the 
rules for the online ecosystem, will be unveiled before the end of 2020. The tool will 
become increasingly relevant in the post-covid era. However, the tool will likely be 
 
 
into separate consideration. See, Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU 
Competition Law and US Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2006); Robertson (n 884) 145. 
917 Currently, the General Court considers the relevant market as the place where there can be effective 
competition between the products or services which form part of it and this presupposes that there is a 
sufficient degree of interchangeability between all products or services forming part of the same market 
in so far as a specific use of such products or services is concerned. See, Hoffmann-La Roche (n 24) 
para 86. 
918 European Commission, ‘Statement by Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager on the launch 
of a sector Inquiry on the Consumer Internet of Things’ (Speech, 16 July 2020) 
<ec.europe.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_1367> accessed 11 November 2020; 
European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into possible anti-competitive 
conduct of Amazon’ (Press Release, 17 July 2019) < 
ec.europe.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4291> accessed 11 November 2020; Nicolas 
Petit, Big Tech and the Digital Economy: The Moligopoly Scenario (OUP 2020); Ariel Ezrachi and 
Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Harvard 
University Press 2016) 245-47. 
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deficient if it overlooks the issue of innovation suppression. Moreover, shifting all focus 
to the digital economy seems imprudent, because conventional markets also face 
potential issues in regard to innovation suppression, as typically shown in the 
evergreening examples of the pharmaceutical industry and the spare parts design 
protection cases in the automotive industry. Although the latest developments have 
created high expectations for timely and effective interventions, further tools, policies 
and academic studies are crucial due to the less dynamic position taken by the law 
against rapid innovations. Therefore, the use of flexible tools such as the enforcement 
of Article 102 needs to be frequently visited alongside structural reforms.  
- A better understanding of the economic status quo is a must. 
The research covered the concepts of creative destruction and innovative disruption 
to clarify the essential points of the economy. From a macro perspective, innovation 
can often have devastating effects on industries, and it is possible to explain this with 
the creative destruction concept. For example, 3D printing technology disrupts several 
markets with a dual impact on innovation. On the one hand, this technology increases 
dynamic competition by lowering entry barriers. On the other hand, it eliminates 
incentives to be innovative as it eases the imitation of designs.919  From a micro 
perspective, disruptive innovations provide a monopoly position for innovators (in 
technology markets, this position would be cemented further with the help of IP rights). 
Though this is a temporary phenomenon until the next wave of innovation, the antitrust 
watchdogs should keep a close watch on the monopolies to prevent the abuse of the 
dominant position.  
 
 
919 Michal Gal, ‘3D Challenges: Ensuring Competition and Innovation in 3D Printing’ (2019) 22(1) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 1-39. 
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Today’s big companies can afford large investment costs and can compensate for 
them with low marginal costs. For this reason, several markets (particularly 
technology-related ones) have impenetrable barriers to entry. Furthermore, such 
companies turn their powers into an advantage by using concepts of the new economy 
such as asymmetric information, network effects and big data. At this point, they have 
achieved the ability to lock-in consumers, competitors and the progress of innovation, 
and they practice it from time to time. With intense competitive pressure, the new 
economic order provides the conditions under which dominant companies suppress 
their innovation and forces them to do so. This requires treatment with the legal tools 
of competition law by taking the basic dynamics of the economy into account when 
making policies and decisions.920 In this sense, it is important to develop a theory of 
harm in which both innovative and economic considerations can be addressed. 
6.3 Areas of Future Research 
This thesis showed that there is a need for further studies by revealing the anti-
competitive characteristics of business practices, which hinder technological 
development to the prejudice of consumers, under EU competition law to 
conceptualise the innovation suppression practices within Article 102 TFEU by 
covering certain problematic issues. In this context, the role of innovation was argued 
as a safeguard to increase consumer welfare, promote competitive markets, and 
ensure economic development. Despite the importance of innovation, this research 
found several gaps in different cases with regard to the suppression of innovation. For 
 
 
920 The EU has recently given the first signs of a new move by considering economic principles with the 
decision of CK Telecoms UK Investment. See, Case T-399/16 CK Telecoms UK Investments v 
Commission [2020] ECLI:EU:T:2020:217; Dirk Auer and Nicolas Petit, ‘CK Telecoms v Commission: 
The Maturation of the Economic Approach in Competition Case Law’ (2020) lpaa038 Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice 1-5. 
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example, the lack of assessment tools for innovative considerations in EU competition 
law was highlighted. In this regard, the issue could be more analysed from an empirical 
point of view. 
Moreover, it appears that R&D activities are gathering more momentum than ever 
before, as innovation is currently one of the main determinants of gaining more market 
power. Therefore, it was also claimed that there is a need to investigate competition 
in innovation activities in R&D markets. In this regard, following studies should define 
and analyse R&D markets as separate markets. Due to the dynamic structure of the 
markets, antitrust law should consider practices that suppress innovation before the 
products/services are introduced in the markets. In this regard, the ‘two-period model’ 
could shed light on the role of innovation in competition.921 According to this model, in 
the first period, undertakings concentrate on R&D activities and in the second period, 
only successful innovators can participate in price competition. This shows the winner-
takes-all character of innovation, which provides companies the ability to compete. 
Therefore, R&D activities are crucial to safeguard the future of businesses. At this 
point, these businesses engage in competition and start patent racing. In this regard, 
determining the R&D market as a separate market would effectively prevent any 
attempts to suppress innovation and free it from the toxic effects of competition, 
because this market determines the level of competition in the actual market.922 
 
 
921 Richard Gilbert, ‘Competition, Mergers, and R&D Diversity’ (2019) 54 Review of Industrial 
Organization 465-484; Giulio Federico, Gregor Langus and Tommaso Valletti, ‘Horizontal Mergers and 
Product Innovation’ (2018) 59 International Journal of Industrial Organization 1-23; Giulio Federico, 
Gregor Langus and Tommaso Valletti, ‘A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation’ (2017) 157 
Economics Letters 136-140. 
922 Robertson (n 45) 130. 
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Therefore, the EC should factor innovation considerations in its competition analysis 
before the product is presented to the actual market. 
As another example, it was seen that no legal action for planned obsolescence, has 
been taken yet at the EU level even though it constitutes an impediment to the 
progress of innovation. In these contexts, but not limited to them, scholars could use 
this research, which concentrates on particular topics concerning the close 
relationship between innovation and EU competition law.  
Also, the EC may address this analysis, which seeks a means of incorporating 
innovation considerations in competition law analyses. In this regard, there is a 
potential applicability of other competition law provisions, especially mergers and state 
aid controls. 
After all, it seems that the economic pressure on businesses due to disruptive 
innovations and creative destructions would continue forcing them to gravitate towards 
suppressing innovation. Therefore, this study can potentially play a role in bringing the 
concept of innovation suppression into question among scholars in EU competition 
and IP law fields, as this issue is likely to receive more attention with the increase of 
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